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Full text of "Annex "Item" To Fourth Marine Division Operations Report, Iwo Jima - Division Artillery Report"

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iwo jim4)NCLASS1FIED 






13 April, 1945. 

From: The Commanding Officer. 

To: The Commanding General, Fourth Marine Division, FMF. 


Operation Report, transmittal of. 

Transmitted herewith is one (1) complete copy 
of the Fourteenth Marine Regiment Operation Report of the Iwo 
Jima action. 



I "WO JIwa (Continued). 

1. administration --------_----i 

(a) Casualty Heoorts ---------- 1 

(fr) Personnel, morale of-------- 1 

2. Intelligence -------------~2 

(a) Haps, photos and supplementary intel- 

ligence- -----.--------.-2 

(b) Intelligence functioning ------ 4 

(c) Lnemy documents and materiel - - - - 9 

(d) Propaganda ------------- io 

(e) Counter Intelligence -------- io 

(f ) Public Relations ---------- n 

(g) Lnemy artillery- - -- -- -- -- - 12 

(h) Recommendations- ---------- 18 

(i) " Conclusions- - -- -- -- -- -- - 19 

3. Operations and Training- - -- -- -- -20 

(a) Preparation- ------------ 20 

(b) Planning- --------------21 

•(c) Loading- -------------- 23 

(d) Landing 27 

(e) Survey- --- 29 

(f ) Observation 30 

(g) Fire adjustment- ---------- 30 

■(h) Fire direction- - -- -- -- -- - ,32 

(i) Organization for combat-* ------ 32 

( j ) Liaison- -------------- 33 

(k) Communication- ----------- 33 

(l) Haps and Photos- ---------- 34 

(m) Personnel- ------------- 34 

(n) wo tor Transport- - -- -- -- -- - 35 

(0) Training deficiencies- ------- 35 

(p) ammunition expenditures- ------ 35 

(q) Enamy Artillery. • 36 

Methods used to locate- - - - - — 35 
enemy action against our artillery- 36 
Tactical employment of enemy artil- 
lery - - - 36 

effectiveness of enemy artillery- - 37 

(r) Lff eo.ti v,-ness of our artillery 37 


4. Sup'oly- - --------------- - 38 

(a) Counting out supplies- ------- 38 

(b) rlesup-oly- - -- -- -- -- -- -- 38 

(c) Shore based f afcll^fcs 

1 x *w^&&Mte&t\ 

iHr^sj ^%g%f' "^Hl "* fifc'****^ ~* — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 



4. Supply (Continued)- ---------- 58 

(d) Salvage- - - - - 39 

(e) Transportation- --------- — 59 

(f) Communication- - -- -- -- ----- 39 

5. Naval Gunfire . — 39 

(a) Fire on Targets of Opportunity- - — ■ 39 

(b) Fires with Air Spot- 39 

6. Transport Quartermaster- ------ — 40 

7. Ordnance- --------------- 42 

(a) weapons- - -- -- -- -- -- -- - 42 

(b) Combat Vehicles 42 

(c) Ammunition Expenditure- ----- — 42 

8. Chemical ---------- -- — 43 

(a) Training- ------------ — 45 

(b) Loading 44 

(c) Use of chemicals by the enemy - - — 44 
(&) Enemy Equipment --------- — 44- 

(e) Our gas discipline --------- 44 

(f) Salvage - - — 44 

9. Kedical 44 

(a) Embarkation ----------- — 44 

(b) Aboard' ship 45 

(c) Debarkation - -- -- -- -- -- — rr. 46 

(d) Ashore - Assault Phase ------- 46 

-(e) Recommendations --------- — 49 

10. General Recommendations -------- 49 

(a) Intelligence ------------ 49 

(b) Maps and photos --------- — 50 

(c) Airspot. for fire control ships - - - 50 

(d) HEAT, firing table, GFT 50 

(e) Smoke, marking targets with - - - — 50 

(f) Fire proof camouflage nets ----- 50 

(g) LST, loading ammunition on - - - - - 50 

(h) . LST, minimize time on - - - - — 50 

(i) * DUK¥ control and salvage ------ 51 

(j) LST, ramp damage control ------ 51 

(k) Control Vessel - beach liaison - - - 51 

(1) . DUKW's, landing point for - - - - — 51 

(m) Refueling DUKW's 51 

(n) DUKW's, dry embarkation of - - - - - 51 

kmiS ITK*WtjJfcAlN OPERATION REPORT - I WO JIi^ (Continued). 

10. General Recommendations (Continued) 

(o) Initial water and ration supply, control of 51 

(p) Ammunition- re supply - -- -- -- -- ---- - 52 

(q) Unloading APA' s ---------------52 

(r) Impregnation of clothing, DD™ ________ 52 

(s) Communication ----------------52 

A^hLA IT*,i* TO DIVISION OPbRnTIOia REPORT - I WO JI^A (Continued). 

1. Admi. nl 6 tr a t i on . 

(a) Casualty reports and reports of KIa & WIA, 

(1) The reporting of casualties In the Fourth 
Marine Division by the use of casualty cards simplifies the 
paper work and checking of casualties. Accuracy has increased. 
This Regiment first used this system on the Tinian operation 
and it proved itself far superior to the casualty reports of 
the mimeographed type. 

(2) The importance of identification tags 
cannot be over emphasized. When this Regiment left the rear t 
area a thorough check was made- and the report showed 100$ tags 
in hands of all members of this command. One mistake was found- 
in that • an enlisted man was promoted to 2dLt enroute to the 
target and new tags were not changed with his file number. 
Subsequently, he was killed in action and buried as an unknown 
enlisted man in the Division Cemetery. This error was corrected. 

(b) morale of troops, methods used to maintain high 
morale throughout the operation. 

(1) The morale of the troops -of this Regiment 
was high at all times. The food was a contributing factor as 
the change from "K" to "C" and 10-1 was a great improvement. 
This is the first operation in which canned fruit and fruit 
juices and new "C" rations have been available. The reception 
was most enthusiastic. 

(2) The very prompt mail service has greatly 
helped the morale of the men; also the fact the t censorship 
permitted the men to write of their current -experiences aided 
morale. The grift package of Air Hail stationery was greatly 
appreciated as the troops frown upon writing V-hail continually. 

(3) During the operation no plan for recreation 
was in effect. Recreation aboard ship from the rear area to 

the target consisted of reading pulp books which were passed 
from man to man, card playing, and shows put on by the troops. 

(4) The PX Ration,, containing smokes, matches, 
candy, and toilet articles, drawn by the Mess Sergeant along 

wi th the regular rations, was ava|pfg>|^|1|) H^ftjfWflFIFP'il 

Adrinetratlon (l) 


1. Administration (Continued) 

(b) (Continued) 

(0) vhenever conditions permitted, a situation 
map was maintained on the organizational bulletin boards. This 
added greatly to the interest and intelligent understanding of 
the progress of the operation. 

2. Intelligence . 

(a) Maps, Photographs and Supplementary Intelligence. 

(1) Kaps. 

a. The maps provided for this operation 
were sufficient in Quantity for the purposes of an artillery 
regiment. The paper stock upon which they were printed was of 
superior quality to that used for maps on previous operations. 
Detail on the maps was complete in the open beach areas, ana 
.-round the airfields of IWO JIliA. The detail in the map of the 
broken terrain in the north portion of the island, bordering 
the volcanic central plateau, was poor end misleading to'_ 
artillery forward observers, and gave artillery operations off- 
icers an erroneous impression in planning fires. It is real- 
ized that maps cannot be made completely accurate in detail 
without ground survey and vertical control, but it is hoped 
that the details of the natural terrain will be completely re- 
presented on future maps. 

Enemy situation from API, printed on 
Special Air and G-unnery Target Lap s , tends to confuse detail 
in that the symbols are too large to fit in with the scale of 
the map, 'and these maps are made up at such an early date that 
the final enemy situation proves to be entirely different from 
that printed on the maps. The enemy situation should be re- 
stricted .to the G-- 2 Situation haps printed during the planning 
period and immediately prior to the invasion. 

Special -air and Gunnery Target haps of 
scale 1:10,000 and 1:20,000 were used by the artillery. The 
1:5,000 maps were used during the planning phase, -nd for 
briefing of troops aboard ship.. The ruantity of 1:5,000 maps 
provided was far in excess of needs. The entire supply of 
1:5,000 maps would have been used if more terrain detail had 
been, represented on them then on the smaller scale maps. ■ These 
large scale maps could have thus been a gre: t aid in analyses 
of terrain' and target areas of enemy held ground. 

Intelligence (2) IlllPHc#^Ml 

II til 


2, Intelligence (Continued) 

(a) (Continued) * ' < - 

(1) (Continued) 

b. Haps provided at the staging area and 
during the combat operation were adeouate and complete as far as 
the known situation was concerned. It is believed that correct- 
ions to G-- 2 Situation Maps which ordinarily consist solely of* 
aerial photograph interpretations should include information of 
installations and enemy dispositions located from captured 
enemy maps, and documents, end PO'J interrogation. 

(2) Photographs. 

a. Photographic coverage receive ': by this 
regiment w- s of good quality snd complete. The number of sorties 
that were received by the R-2 were, in fact, in excess of needs. 
It- is believed that the best sets of stereo verticals of 'scale 
1:10,000 or larger without visible interference such as clouds 
or bomb bursts would suffice, and the resulting conservation of 
reproducing facilities and materials would enable distribution 
of these sets to include battalions. 

b. Photographs received during the oper-. 
ation were provided by D-2 and "ere of good quality and low 
altitude. These photos aided in locating targets and in study- 
ing terrain, but were of insufficient nuantity. 

It is recommended that low obliques 
made duUng operations be gridded prior to distribution with a 
target area grid projected to the oblioue photograph. The dis- 
tribution of these photographs should be sufficient to reach 
artillery battalions, and provide copies for the artillery for- 
ward observers. The fact that observation ws so limited in 
this oper'" t ion would have made photos of particular value to 
forward observers. The large scale verticals of enemy held 
territory in the 4th Division Z/A were very good, and useful 
in terrain analysis in conjunction with the above mentioned low 
oblioue s. The fact that these verticals were scaled at 1:5,000 
made the use of the TA template possible, lining it up with 
located points on the photo and reading off map locations of 
other- points directly from the photograph. 

(3) Hydro graphic inform 
Intelligence ( 3) 

FiO JiM^ (Continued) 

2. Intelligence (Continued) 

(a) (Continued) 

.(3) Continued) 

a. The hydro graphic information provided 
to all units prior to landing was accurate, timely, and com- 
plete. This is especially true of the information obtained by 
Pre-D-day underwater demolition teams, excep t that the report 
as to conditions of beach sand was incorrect and misleading, in 
that wheeled vehicles could not traverse the beaches and terrace 

(4) Dissemination of Information from Higher 


a. The information and special intel- 
ligence studies sent down from higher echelons during the plan- 
ning phase, at the staging area, and after D-day were adequate 
and timely, and all information of the target was useful. 

(b) Intelligence Functioning. 

(1) Collection of information. 

a. On this operation the following .." 
means o.f collecting information, listed in order of importance, 
were used: forward observers, aerial observers, sound rang- 
ing, O.P.'s, and reconnaissance. A fir sh ranging 0.?. was 
set up on lit. Suribachi, although the diameter of the crater 
was coo narrow to provide an adequate base. Nevertheless, 
this 0.?. was of. value in observing fires "and enemy activity 
during the daytime, using 20-power, captured, Japanese field 
glasses, and at night, in spotting enemy gun flashes. No 
other suitable Flash O.P. 1 s were found on I T /0 JIMa in the 
4th Division Z/A. 

Forward observer s, who . were on the 
ground with the infantry, observed enemy front line activity 
and positions. The ability of F.O. l s to observe and report 
enemy activity over a GLarge area wc s restricted, due to the 
rugged volcanic terrain in the 4th Division -2/A. serial 
observers had surveillance deep in enemy held territory, 
observing and firing on enemy activity, gun and mortar posit- 
ions. Air observers also made valimb^Ejpg^^r^s^on^ the nature 

Intelligence (4) fjjj .j^ jj C^p^^ 


I^-^ |* _ _ 


2. Intelligence (Continued), 
(b) ( Continued) . 

(l) ( Continued) . 

a. (Continued),, of the terrain. 
Sound ranging was used on this operation, for the first time, 
and proved effective in locating enemy guns and mortars, and 
in directing counterbattery fire against them." Use of sound 
ranging was limited during the daytime due to interference 

of front line small arms activity, friendly artillery, 
mortar fire., and rear area vehicular activity. A total of 
seventy- two enemy positions were located by Sound. Ranging 
during the operation, including three positions which were 
located during the daytime. 

b. Reconnaissance of forward areas, 
and of newly captured -areas, was made to locate OP r s and 
also to examine captured enemy installations in order to 
determine best method of attack by our artillery against 
such installations. 

(2) Evaluations and Dissemination of Infor- 


a. Evaluation of intelligence infor- 
mation was carried out by fU2, 14th Marines only where it 
applied to artillery targets or enemy artillery. , The shell- 
ing reports which, with the above listed information agencies, 
served as a source of counterbattery information often con- 
tained haphazard guesses regarding the enemy artillery 
locations. These guesses confused interpretation by the R-2 
vhen compared with his picture of the enemy artillery situat- 
ion. Echelons which had no right to evaluate counterbattery 
problems, in view of their narrow scope, were inclined to 
make deductions regarding location of enemy artillery 
positions. Information received, which was of immediate use, 
T*jas forwarded at once, bo-th to higher and lower echelons, and 
if of passing interest only, it was forwarded in the periodic 
report. Battalions received a- copy of the R-2 daily periodic 
report. Information of interest to artillery was usually 
phoned directly to the R-2. from .the P-2. This timely infor- 
mation was used in the continuous evaluation of the enemy 

Intelligence (5) 


jfiNij£.X ITLm TO DIVISION OPlRaTIO^ REPORT • - BvO JIMA (Continued). 
! ■ • ... ■ 

2. Intelligence (Continued). 

(b) (Continued). 

(2) (Continued) 

a. (Continued) 'artillery and in keep- 
ing an up-to-date enemy situation. D-2 periodic reports k 
delivered early in the morning following the report period, 
were accurate and complete in detail, but came in too late 
to aid in formulating" plans for night defensive fires and 
preparation fires. They were a great aid "in keeping all 
echelons of the regiment abreast of the situation. In order 
to iobtain a . complete picture of the, enemy situation over the 
entire division front, the Artillery R-2 can call all the 
infantry R-2 f s of front line regiments and discuss the sit- 
ation with them. He gets the required information to aid 
the! R~3 in planning the defensive and preparation fires in 
this manner, but he duplicates the efforts of the D-2 and 
keejss essential communications in use over a long period* 
A Suggested solution to this problem would be a concise 
telephonic summary from the D-2 to the Artillery R-2 early 
in [the evening following \ the report period. 

(3) Communications. 

I a. Artillery communications from front 

to Irear are exceedingly well suited to intelligence purposes. 
Information is transmitted rapidly from observers to battalion 
and regimental command posts' by both wire and radio. The 
only difficulty encountered in this system is that these 
channels are designed- for fire control, and essential intel- 
ligence information was often retained and evaluated unin- 
tentionally by fire direction and operation centers. Battal- 
iori Fire Direction Centers, because of their intense activity 
Inlcombat, do not welcome additional personnel or telephones. 
The| activity in the FDC also makes it impossible to pass 
information to Bn-2's by telephone. A suggested solution to 
th^s problem is to "tap" the FDC lines for a listening watch 
in.the 3n-2 section. This system i^ould require additional 
intelligence personnel. Another solution offered by 4/14 


2. Intelligence (Continued), 
(b) (Continued). 

(3) (Continued). 

a. (Continued) placing of an intel- 
ligence clerk in the FDC as a telephone operator, doubling 
in other FDC. duties. This method would have a drawback in 
direct support battalions since the volume of messages 
received would 'prevent the clerk from helping in the FDC. 

(4) Liaison. 

a. No continuous liaison was. main- 
tained, but occasional visits to infantry R-2's, D-2 and 
Corps. Arty. -2 by R-2 and 3n-2's could be termed as intel- 
ligence liaison. An officer from D-2 visited R-2 daily 
for liaison purposes in exchange of general intelligence 
information. Liaison could be had for the exchange of 
information, and was used on occasions, through the excel- 
lent telephonic communications within the Division. In the 
opening phase of the operation, prior to establishment of 
all Cr's ashore, an SCR30Q Intelligence Net was used. 
Though inferior to wire communications, it assured continuous 
flow of information. 

(5) Training and Use of Personnel. 

a. Prior to the operation a short 
training program within the regiment was carried out embody- 
ing general intelligence training, 'count erbattery intelligence 
me.thods, Japanese weapons, Japanese maps, and Japanese combat 
phrases. The Sound Ranging section was assigned to the 14th 
Marines completely trained, and their training consisted of 
working with the regiment In the field. The meteorological 
section had been with the Regiment since activation, and 
required no special training. 

b. Centralized intelligence training 
within the artillery regiment is necessary to keep interest 
up to date on intelligence technique. Further training in 
the reproduction of overlays pnd small strip maps from 
aerial . photographs, - and training in elementary drafting was 
found to b e needed .by most of the intelligence^ 9i^^#*fl^ng 
this operation. ~* 

Intelligence (7) 

*bi^X ITLh TO DIVISION QP*RATIOi>l RbPORT - IVjO Jliik (Continued). 

2." Intelligence (Continued), 
(b) (Continued). 

(5) (Continued). 

c. Artillery officers serving as 
Bn-2*s in artillery battalions seem to have a fair idea of 
the duties of an intelligence officer, but they are not suff- 
iciently impressed with the importance and details of their 
duties. This lack of training showed up especially when 
enemy resistance became so strong that our lines were unable 
to move from day to day. At that time intelligence was needed 
in the greatest of quantities. [ ^hen informed of the need for 
continuous up-to-date information, they were energetic and 
capable, and their reports aided immeasurably in obtaining 
the enemy situation. 

d. The vorkof the language officer 
assigned to the artillery regiment was generally as anticipated, 
and consisted of scanning captured documents and materiel to 
expedite its handling by the Division Language Section, and 

of. interpreting Japanese artillery and mortar firing charts, 
maps, and sketches for the R-*2. The language officer's 
training was adequate, and he was ' a great help to .intelligence 
functioning as he took care of many details concerning cap- 
tured documents and equipment which ordinarily requires time 
of more essential intelligence personnel. 

(6) Counterbattery Intelligence. 

a. • The method used was to keep a 
complete counterbattery chart showing enemy gun and morta-r 
positions located by API , F0 r s, AO's, OP's, sound . ranging, 
flash ranging and information from SHELo_,RLPS, This, system 
was used in conjunction with the Enemy Situation Map. 

b. API, Qt l s, AO's and sound ranging 
reports aided in building up the overall enemy artillery 

c. Artillery air observer's reports 
were very accurate in that they described the target before 


2. Intelligence (Continued). 

(b) (Continued), 

(6) (Continued) . 

c. (Continued) and condition of enemy 
installations. 'Reports by' tactical air observers were con-* 
sidered unreliable since confirmation of their reports could 
seldom be obtained through artillery air observers* or other 
agencies. Flash ranging was set up on wt, Suribachi, as 
previously mentioned., but .it could not range on artillery 
flashes because of the inadequate 1 base available. An azimuth 
was measured and reported on each gun flash observed. This 
information was plotted on the counterbattery chart and 
coordinated with other reports sent < in during the same period 
of time. 

d. Shelling Reports were frequent, 

but did not measure up to the standards expected of them. i<iany 
were lacking in essential information,- and vital communications 
systems had to be used in order to obtain the correct and 
complete information. Often 3HLLLREPS were transmitted too 
late for immediate use in locating enemy guns, but the old 
saying of "better late than never" is applicable. 

e. Front line troops and lower intel- 
ligence echelons shoved a tendency to neglect reporting the 
continuance or cessation of mortar or artillery activity in 
their sectors after having once reported the activity. Reports 
indicating continued activity of guns and mortars previously 
located aid immeasurably in more accurately pin pointing enemy 
gun positions and in determining the enemy artillery strength. 
It follows that this information aids in bringing down counter- 
battery fire to silence the enemy guns. 

(c) Enemy Documents and Materiel. 

(l) The emplacements' along the central beach 
area were completely investigated and stripped, and a few 
additional materials were turned in_by_sp.ocial parties oper- 
ating in, other areas. 

Intelligence (9) 




2. Intelligence (Continued). 

(c) (Continued). 

(2) Two medium mortar unit locations were 
found by restitution of captured maps and firing charts sent 
down from D-2 for R-2 study. In additon, captured sketches 
and maps established the location of several positions which 
had already been overrun by the 4th Division and thus had 
lost immediate value in the enemy situation. The place-name 
maps issued by C~2 aided in the translation of these documents 
and locating enemy installations. 

(3) A clear cut policy for recovery and 
disposal of captured materiel should be stated. Difficulty 
was met in reporting, recovering, and turning in captured 
materiel in that there was no apparent understanding as to 
cognizance between the 2-section and the 4-section in higher 
units. A directive from Division would clarify this situation. 

(d) Propaganda. 

(1) Ten propaganda shells were fired by the 
14th Marines. No direct observation of the effect of this 
propaganda on the enemy was made, 

(e) Counter-Intelligence. 

il) P'rior to the operation, battalion com- 
manders and certain regimental and battalion staff officers 
were familiarized with the target and operation plans. A 
Quonsett hut was set aside as a planning hut in which work 
and discussion of the operation olans could be carried out. 
An NCO guard was placed over the hut. 

(2) During the period proceeding embarkation 
the enlisted personnel indulged in the usual round of rumors. 
All hands were cautioned as to the danger of rumors, and con- 
structive efforts were made to squelch rumors. Nevertheless, 
some of the conjectures as to the target were "too right." 

It is not believed that the target was compromised within 
this regiment, since the information in the rumors was frag- 
mentary, and partially incorrect . 1 ^Ai^u^ JJa&t^correct 

Intelligence ( 10 ) 


2. Intelligence (Continued). 

(e) (Continued) ' 4 

(2) ( Continued) . guesses grew out of the ob- 
vious strategic location of the target rather than actual 

(3) . Censorship regulations and special' 
censorship instructions were followed by all personnel 
throughout, and were believed to be adequate. 

(4) In combat the principle means of counter- 
intelligence used was pamouflage of guns and installations. 
Heavy activity on the beach in the vicinity of position 
areas, and the valuable commanding ground held by the enemy 
for the major part of the operation nullified our attempts 

to conceal the location of our guns and command posts. 

(5) All forward observers/ liaison officers 
and OP personnel, were, instructed to keep their maps free 

of marks showing friendly. Installations. As far as is known, 
none of their maps were lost or compromised, but the pre- 
caution is believed to be a wise one. 

(f ) Public Relations. 

(1) The Regimental combat correspondent 

and a public relations .photographer • temporarily attached from 
Division were embarked with one of the direct support bat-, 
talions. They landed early, in the afternoon of D-day with 
the- reconnaissance party of that battalion. During the 
operation ashore, they visited the battalions of the regiment 
daily and picked up stor.ies of the activities. .and deeds of 
Individuals for publication. A total of 95 stories were 
.'filed'- by the combat correspondent and the public relations 
photographer took 150 pictures. 

(2) ' The combat correspondent stated that 
cooperation from all officers and enlisted men left nothing 
tp.ytse desired, and had no suggestions for improvement of the 
present public relations system. 

Intelligence . (11) 



2. Intelligence (Continued). 

(g) The Enemy. - . • 

This report will be confined to' the enemy's 
utilization of artillery and heavy , weapons. 

(l) Enemy artillery. 

a. The Japanese artillery on I T -0 JIM 
was organized as • an artillery group under the command of 
Colonel G-AIDO, This group consisted of artillery and mortar 
units of the army* forces only. It 'did not include Army AA 
units, Naval Guard Force AA and CD units, or Army or Havy 
rocket units. These units were under 'separate commands,, or 
'assigned as subordinate units to the various island sector 
commands. Infantry ■ battalion and regimental guns were 
assigned in accordance with standard T/0, to infantry gun 
companies, and added to ttye enemy artillery strength but not 
to the artillery organization. 

b. Units and portions of units of the 
artillery group which were in the 4th Division Z/A are listed 

2nd Mixed Brigade Artillery battalion: 

2 or 3 '75mm Batteries (75mm Mtn. Hows., . 

or 75mm guns . ) 
1 105mm Howitzer Battery. 

1 120mm howitzer Battery. 

3rd Medium mortar Battalion: 

3 15cm Mortar Cos. (4 Mortars each). 
1 90mm Mortar Co. (3 or 4 Mortars). 

20th Independent Mortar Battalion: 

Portions of this unit were enrolaced in the 
4th Division Z/A. The entire battalion had 
12-32cm (spigot type) mortars, probably 



2. Intelligence ( Continued) * 

(g) (Continued). 

(l) ( Continued) . 

b. (Continued) located between 
Airfields No. 1 and No. 2 and another along 
the coastal road, TA 202-219. 

c* Army and Navy rocket units are 
known to have been located in the 4th Division- V^, 4 but 
information on the organization of these units is so meager 
that no analysis of them can be made -at present. 

a* The Naval Guard Force of TWO JIM 
had a large number of artillery type weapons in the sector 
defense organizations. Their weapons were AA, DP, and CD 
types and many were sited for secondary missions of firing 
on our ground troops and beaches both by direct and indirect 
fire methods. 

Naval guns and -organizations believed to 
have been in the 4th Division. Z/A are 
listed below: 

Northern Sector CD Battery Group: 

2 15cm. CD guns. 

4 12cm. "short" guns. 

Northern Sector AA Battery Group-: 

6 12cm. AA guns. 

tot. Tamana Land Force: 

. 12 Light (81mm or 90mm) mortars. 
400 #6 (Probably 20 cm) Rockets. 

Eastern Sector AA Battery Group: ; 

10 12cm. AA guns. 

Intelligence ( 13 ) 




ItoO JIhA (Continued). 

2. Intelligence (Continued), 
(g) (Continued). 

(1) (Continued). 


d. (Continued). 

Southern Sector CD battery Group: 

(Note Only a portion of this 

group was in the 4th Divis- 
ion Z./A, but all its art- 
illery weapons are listed) 

6 12cm. CD guns.- 

2 12cm. "short" guns. 
1 8cm. DP gun. 

6 Light (81mm or 90mm) wortars. 

Southern Sector AA Battery Group:- 

(Note Only a portion of this 

group was' in the 4th Divis- 
ion Z/A, but all its art- 
illery weapons are listed) 

3 12cm. AA guns. 

(2) Tactical use of Artillery, Mortars and 

a. Enemy artillery was emplaced in well 
i constructed covered fortifications of reinforced concrete. 

Any guns in the open without cover, or in lightly constructed 
field fortifications,, were knocked out by the pre-D-day bom- 
bardment and by post-D-day artillery and naval firing. 

b. Even though the covered f ortif ie- 
ations were invulnerable except when taken under direct attack 
by infantry and assault engineers,! ^iiberate attack by 
medium artillery., they were so cor jM ImP| fl^?^f j^*** a " 8:u,m 

Intelligence (14) 


2. Intelligence (Continued), 
(g) (Continued)* • 

(2) (Continued). 

b. (Continued) had extremely limited 
traverse, and dispersal of the artillery fortifications broke 

'up normal artillery functioning and massing of fires. Even 
so, a number of positions were set up with observation, fire 
control, and communications to adjust, and deliver accurate 
fires on areas and installations occupied by our troops, 
jflany reports indicated that the fires of two guns were massed* 
on one target. Very seldom were three or -more guns used on 
one target.. Ordinarily, only one gun fired on a target at 
any one time. 

c. On D/7 and D-/8 enemy artillery 
became almost completely silent, but mortar activity increased 
markedly. This shift in fires later proved to be caused by 
the movement of one or two batteries to the vicinity of T.a.235-- 
219, the mortars taking over the fires and covering the dis- 
placement. In the new positions these guns were emplaced in 
shacks and houses with little cover, and were taken under 
counterbattery fire as soon as they were definitely located. 
Artillery fire was light and sporadic from that time on, but 
mortars fired very much and with good effect. 

d. Hortars were emplaced in deep 
draws and gullies, with open emplacements., but with deep 
dugouts and caves immediately adjoining the positions for 
protection of personnel. In some of these caves as many as 
six spare mortar tubes were found, apparently placed there 
to replace damaged materiel lef J z out in the open during 
shellings. 15 cm, artillery mortars were used with positions 
well behind the enemy lines (iuc not as far back as field 
artillery) in positions smaller than, but similar to artillery 
positions. They were in defilade, with mortars in detp open 
emplacements. These positions were organized as companies 
(batteries) of 4 mortars each. Whenever the medium mortar 
positions drew our artillery fire they became silent, some- 
timea for a period of two 'or three 

Intelligence (15) 


ill: . 

/ iU^jsX I J El-- 1C l)-/^^ICK OPERATION hiPORT - IUO JlhA (Continued) 

2. Intelligence (Continued). 

' ( g) (Continued). 

> : (2) (Continued) 

d. (Continued) but not confirmed, 
th&t the, enemy had alternate positions for his 15 cm mortars 
that were occupied during these silent periods. It was noted 
that an, ^alternate position" became active shortly after a 
located position was fired on and silenced, and that iirhen the 
first position became active again the alternate was silent. 

* : e. Light (81mm and 90mm) mortars were 

ustd extremely close to the front lines. Sometimes they were 
so j close that they could only fire on our 0? 1 s and CP's. 
"Ehfcse -close-up mortars were covered by a few mortars to the 
enemy ' a rear thr-t could fire on our front lines. Thus the 
mortars^ were used in an artillery as well as a mortar role. 

- - . f . Another interesting note on the 

driemy'.a technique in using mortars Was the coordination of 
maj&ssd light and medium mortar fires. Enemy 81mm mortars - 
TIGttld *f ire a concentration of time (air burst) fire on our 
tjpfitot lines, and just prior to lifting their barrage would 
fir.e ;one or two high air bursts over the target. This air 
buret, was probably a signal and aiming point for the medium 
mortars as they would then commence firing on the same area. 

g. Heavy (32cm. spigot type) mortars 
W&r& -.used In the 4th Division £/A and were at first . thought 
to'fce rockets. The weight of the projectile is very great 
tabomt -675 lbs) and the mortar base is permanently emplaced-. 
For these reasons the weapon must play a piracy *&ef ensile 
role. The emplacements were found to be well built of 
concrete and offered adequate protection for personnel and 
the launcher, which is so si:..cO e that it is practically 
Indfc struct able. This weapon, together wi th the 15cm mortar 
and %h& various rockets, were used to good effect by the 
eridr^y on both front lines and rear installations. 

h. The Japanese had some experimental 
rockets which he used to good effect despite their ineffec- 
isnciea*. One of the rockets consiallllili ijecjLct motor 



________ 'trfcr- - 


2. Intelligence (Continued), 
(g) (Continued) . 

(2) (Continued). 

h. (Continued) and tail assembly- 
attached to a 63 Kg. aerial bomb. This rocket was observed 
fjt Saipan but was not used by the enemy there. Another 
rocket had a motor of similar outward appearance, but it 
was much larger in diameter, and the explosive body was 
specially designed to be used as a rocket. This rocket had 
exceptionally long- range, and became known as the "buzz bomb" 
or "flying. boxcar due to its size and the terrifying noise 
it made in flight, a third type noted was adapted from an 

8" (20cm) gun shell with a rocket motor of singular design 
permanently attached to the base of the shell. None of the 
rockets observed used liquid fuel, and as far as can be 
ascertained the rocket motors were simple gun powder jet 

i. The tactical principles followed 
by the enemy in the' use of their rockets are fairly obscure . 
They were used for harrass'ing our rear areas for the most 
part but, since the weapons themselves are experimental, 

the tactical possibilities a*nd uses are probably also exper- 
imental. ' In firing rockets the enemy would use a number of 
positions and fire from these at irregular intervals. These 
positions were ' ordinarily in deep draws or gullies and consis- 
ted of ( a series of rock and clay abutments or dams across the 
draws to minimize the effect of. enfilading naval gunfire. 
In the walls of the gullies were caves and ammunition storage 
dugouts. The rocket launchers consisted both of long V-type 
troughs, and light two-wheeled metal tubes. The former were 
more or less permanent, but, the latter were very mobile, and 
could be moved under cover br could change positions with 
ease. One drawback noted in the design of "the mobile launcher 
Xv T as that they were constructed of very light metal and over- 
heated upon expenditure of only three rounds, and required 
45 minutes to 1 hour to cool off. The enemy could continue 
firing rockets throughout a long period only through the use 
of many launchers and positions. This technique at first 
gave our troops the impression that the^_ 

his launchers from position to p^|)Ml«IB>b|^V7VHbU4)'e^ 

Intelligence . ^ - ^ . . . ( 17 ) 


lti>% tO DIVISION OPERATION REPORT *- S^Qi Jli-iA (Continued). 

— \- »»•• — *— • — -» — — — — — — -— — — — — — — — — — — — — — •— — 

"2. Intelligence (Continued), 
(g) (Continued). 

(2) (Continued) 

• • .. v i. (Continued) roads in his rear 
ar#as. - Toward the end of the battle when the enemy rocket 
positions became too close to the front, and when he was 
preparing, -to abandon these positions, he would fire his 
rOj&keta and jsther heavy ammunition with no apparent attempts 
to aim the rockets or to conserve his materiel.- The sing- 
ular fact about this "last gasp 11 expenditure of heavy ammunit- 
ion was that the tighter his area was compressed the higher 
became- his firing angle, until at the very end he was firing 
rockets- very nearly, straight up in the air. 

j. The effect of rockets and large 
mortar shells on rear areas was slight. Whenever large 
mortars and rockets fired on our front lines they seemed 
ta ,bave effect and cause casualties. The terrific blast 
and Concussion would shake up end neutralize troops within 
-a 5Q--to: 1QO yard radius of the point of impact. The sound 
of ..tkese large projectiles in flight is loud and terrifying 
when japproaching^ and this noise coupled with the .terrific 
blast, had a demoralizing effect on troops in the vicinity 
of che impact area. 

* - - , (h) Recommendations. 

. , <- (l) To improve the functioning of intelligence 

*i'n. e<$$, it is recommended that all schools stress training 
or.- of Sheers in intelligence work as much as training for any 
other .staff section duties is stressed. Energetic and con- 
stant effort by intelligence minded officers of all arms 
should bring excellent results in the amount of information 
gained of the enemy in combat. The training of artillery 
officers in stateside artillery schools should equally stress 
standardized artillery intelligence methods, and the importance 
of intelligence work in- combat, with the training in other 
staff functions. 

/ (2)- It has been recommended., as a result of 

6"2flperience in previous operations, tf ~ 

* Intelligence (18) 




2. Intelligence (Continued), 

(h) (Continued).^ 

(2) (Continued) sections consist of two 
enlisted men, instead of the one authorized by the present 
T/0. This recommendation is repeated; the artillery im-2 
sections should consist of one sergeant, intelligence clerk 
and one corporal, intelligence clerk. It is further recom- 
mended that these men be given elementary training in 
artillery instruments and in scouting in order to be of aid 
to the Bn-2 on reconnaissance. 

(3) In the discussion of map &> .and aerial 
TDhotographs it was recommended that the enemy situation be 
left off the Air and Gunnery Target Maps because the symbols 
are confusing to detail, ?nd the early date at which the 
plates for these maps are made up places an erroneous sit- 
uation on them by the time of the invasion. 

(4) It is recommended that the number of 
sorties given widespread distribution be decreased in favor 
of an increased distribution of the best unobstructed large 
scale sorties down to include artillery battalions. 

(5) Oblique photographs made in the field 
from OY-1 planes should have greater and more rapid repro- 
duction and distribution. It~is further -recommended that 

the target area grid be transposed and printed on the oblique 
photos prior to distribution. The most desirable distribution 
of these and other low altitude photographs would be suffici- 
ent copies to reach all echelons including artillery forward 

(i) Conclusions. 

(l) The only conclusions that can be drawn 
as the result of the intelligence work of this operation are, 
that no matter how much is known,. of the enemy, there are 
always many more facts not known, and many more riddles about 
his Suctions as yet unsolved, and that as we continue our 
attacks on enemy held bases, he seems^tp le aj?q^ iaQja«^rA more 
defensive tactics. Through mori " 



2. Intelligence (Continued). 

(i) (Continued). 

(l) (Continued) training, .through more 
efficient intelligence methods, we should enable our forces 
to learn enough about his defenses and methods to completely 
nullify his efforts, and reduce the cost of strategic bases. 

3. Operations and Training. 

(a) Preparation. 

(1) Due. to limited reorganization following 
the Marianas Operation it was necessary to start the training 
period with individual basic training and progress rapidly 
into battery training. Due to time limitations, only two 
weeks were devoted to each of these periods. 

(2) The three week period allotted to 
battalion training x\ras utilized in tactical 'firing field 
problems. The battalions stressed control and organization 
of observation and individual and organizational camouflage, 
while maintaining the same high standard in conduct of fire, 
fire direction and survey. 


(3) A five day regimental tactical firing 
field problem, stressing massing of fires, use of sound and 
flash ranging and displacement of the regiment, completed 
the first helt of the training period. 

(4) The battalions, during the next phase, 
conducted field problems with the infantry regiment that they 
normally supported. Regimental and Division Ci'X 1 s and one 
Corps CPX, all stressing coordination of fire support, were 

(5) Prior to embarkation for rehearsal, 4th 
MarDiv made available to the 14th Mar three (3) LSTs for two 
(2) periods of three days each during which time the regiment 
experimented with and perfected the_ landing proceedure to be 
followed in the ensuing operation. 


( 20) 

*# » • * • ♦ 


'^NNLX ITBM TO DIVISION OPERATION R£PO$£ - 11*0 Jlto* (Continued) 

3. Operation and Training (Continued). 

(a) (Continued). 

(5) (Continued} (3) day period the 3rd and 
4th Battalions and H&S Btry, 14th Mar conducted exercises 
using the 476th Amphib Trk Co (Army). During the second 
period the 1st and 2nd Battalions and H&S Btry, 14th Mar 
conducted exercises using the" 4th Amphib Trk Co (USMC) . 
This period of training just prior to rehearsal was inval- 
uable in that all personnel immediately concerned with the 
landing were thoroughly indoctrinated in landing procedure 
and control. 

(b) Planning. * 

(1) Upon receipt of the tentative operation 
order "for the I WO JlkA attach, a Quonsett Hut was fitted as 
a Planning Room. Initially the Regimental Commander, Exec- 
utive Officer, Operations, Intelligence, and Supply Officer, 
Battalion Commanders and Operations Officers had access to 
this room, planning progressed, additional regimental and 
battalion staff officers were admitted as they were found 
needed and necessary. Maps, photos, orders, and all avail- 
able' intelligence pertaining to the operation were made 
av&ilable in the room. An wCO guard was maintained 24 hours 
a day. 

(2) Information and orders were received 
sufficiently early to permit a well organized planning phase. 
A rough draft of the Regimental Operation Plan was circul- 
ated to battalion commanders and certain regimental staff 
officers for comments and recommendations. A copy of 
Regimental Operation Plan No. 1-45 was issued to Battalion 
Commanders on 2 Jan 45, to facilitate planning. Regimental 
Operation Plan No. 2-45, the alttrnate plan, was similarly 
issued, on 10 Jan 45. All other copies of the plan were 
packaged, and distribution effected during rehabilitation at 
Pearl Harbor, with instructions . to open after departure from 
Pearl Harbor. 

(3) The rehearsal exercise at Maui on 15-16 
January, 1945, were carried out as planned with no difficult- 
ies experienced in procedure or c 
ammunition carriers) were emb'-rke 

Operation and Training (21) 


3. Operation and Training (Continued), 
(b) (Continued). 

(3) (Continued) Re embarkation after rehearsal 
'was not satisfactory as the DUKWs were required to make a long 

haul over water to the LSTs and did not reembark dry, although 
the rehearsal plan called for dry re embarkation. This factor 
contributed to the difficulties experienced in the landing 
on I WO JlkA (see Appendix 5 to Annex Item). 

(4) Twenty-four (24) hours prior to the 
departure of the tractor group all artillery and DUK'W officers 
aboard were briefed in the operation plan by the artillery 
regimental operations, intelligence, and communications 
officers. Twenty-four (24) hours prior to departure of APAs 
from Pearl Harbor and Honolulu all battalion commanders and 
staffs were similarly briefed. Enroute to the target, all 
personnel were briefed thoroughly in the operation plan, 
summary of the enemy situation, and topography of the object- 
ive. Relief maps,' 1:5,000 and 1:10,000 Special Air and 
G-unnery Target maps and large scale photos were particularly 
useful in this respect. 

(5) During the rehabilitation period at 
Pearl Harbor, 25/& of the officers and men were granted liberty 
daily and 50/6 of those remaining were permitted to leave the 
ship on organized recreational parties. The personnel on the 
LSTs at K^NEOriE were unable to take full advantage of t he- 
period devoted to rehabilitation • due to lack of transportation 
to move personnel to recreational facilities ana the lack of 
those facilities near K^NEOh^. 

(6) During rehearsal exercises at staging 
area on 13 Feb 45, only battalion reconnaissance parties, 
forward observer, and liaison parties physically participated. 
These groups boated, proceeded to ED and then returned to 
their &hips. ^ue to lack of boats regimental headquarters 
did not physically participate in the rehearsal. Radio 
communication with Division was checked and found to be 
adequate. Regimental Voice Command was also checked. 

Ope ration and Training 


3. Operation and Training (Continued), 
(c) Loading. 

(1) This regiment was embarked aboard five 
(5) LSTs with overflow cargo and personnel embarked on APas. 
The battalion headquarters and overflow personnel were embarked 
in the same transport division as 4th Marine Division head- 
quarters. Each battalion was allocated an LST. The fifth 

LST was utilized to load ii&S Battery, 14th Marines, and 
additional ammunition. 

(2) Headquarters of regiment and battalions 
were split between LSTs and APas. 

(3) Forward Observer and liaison parties 
were embarked with the infantry organization that they were 
to support. Four air observers were embarked on battleships 
and cruisers for pre-D-day and subsequent naval gunfire 
spotting. Three air observers were embarked on CVEs to 
provide carrier based air observation for artillery prior to 
operation of QY-ls. Two air observers were embarked with 
five (5) OY-1 planes on LST 776 fitted with Br die device. 

(4) Detailed Loading. 

a. 1/14 LST carried a tank deck load 
of 5 U/F 75mm ammunition. 2/14,, 3/14 4/14 and ndcS, 14th *" 
LSTs each' carried a tank deck load of 3 U/F of 105mm and 1/2 
U/F of 75mm ammunition. Dunnage was placed over the ammun- 
ition and the preloaded DUKUs were run in on top of the dun- 

b. LST 726 embarked the 1st Bn, 14th 
Mar (75mm Pack Howitzer) in twenty- two (22) DUKWs of the 4th 
Amphibian Truck Co. 

c. LST 764 embarked the 2d Bn, 14th 
Mar ( 105mm Howitzer), in eighteen (18) DUKVs of the 4th 
Amphibian Truck Co. In addition two (2) LVT(4)s were alloc- 
ated this battalion to land radio J ton vehicles. 



3, Operation and Training (Continued). 
( c) ' (Continued) 

(4) (Continued) 

d. (Continued) ian Truck Co. This 
LST was damaged during rehearsal, necessitating transfer of 
personnel and .equipment of 3/14 to LST 648 at Pearl prior to 
departure for the target, 

e. LST 1032 embarked the 4th Bn, 14th 
Mar (105mm Howitzer) in ' twenty- two (22) DUKH"s of the 476th 
Amphibian Truck Co. 

f . LST 763 embarked B&S Btry, 14th 
Mar plus ammunition handling details from each of the 105mm 
How bns. Light (8) DUKWs from the 476th ~mphlb. Truck Co. 
were embarked to land the personnel and equipment of H&S Btry, 
14th Mar. Ten (10 ) DUKWs "of the 4th Amphib." Truck Co. were 
embarked preloaded with 105mm ammunition. Two LVT(4)s were 
embarked, preloaded with radio i-ton vehicles of H&S Battery, 
14th Mar. ' . 

g. Equipment was preloaded as follows: 

75mm Howitzer Bat tali on- See appendix 
1, Page 1- 

105mm Howitzer Battalion 
Dukw Numbers 

1st Firing Btry ' 1 

2nd Firing Btr y 

3rd Firing Btrv II 
Personnel embarked in IXJKFs 20 





Operation and Training 



3. Operation and Training (Continued), 
(c) (Continued) 

(4) (Continued). 

(g) (Continued). 



i i 


! 1 


1 -l 1 


Section Chest w/contents 

i — ~T" 


__p - 

' 1 

Camouflage Nets and Poles 

! '1 | 



' 1 



— i ~L 


' ■ 1 

i 1 ' 

i 1 

Ammunition 21 rounds 

—l u 


... . 


610 Radio 

i i 


— i — „ — 


m 4.»s 

S 2 | 


— hn 

; 2 


EE 8 A or B 

1 2 \ 



■ 2 

! 2 

1 „—.,)— 

— L 

Water Can. 5 Gal. 

! 1 

vii uan. "5 uai. | 

Howitzer Slin?? j 

i 1 

— t 

L — i 



1 s 



1 j 

Buckets ! 

2 I 

- 2_J 


2 ■ 

2 4 

Sand Basra. | 


100 J 

100 j 

100 \ 

Aiming Stakes, scares 


1 1 

M.G. .50 Cal. complete 

w/ <»rounc| 

w/ r {round i w/l i ght 
mount \ AAmount 

w/li^ht j 
AAmount j 

Spare .50 cal barrels 


' 2 ! 2' 

r 2 

.50 cal ammo chests 

w/ ammo 

3/reels | 
n/ ammo 


3/reels ! 
w/ ammo 

.60 cal amtno 


• 1200rds 

1200rds 1 



TT ,G. Camo\ifla.Te Nets j 





Snare Part JI.G. Box 



1 . 


B a z oka * w/ amm . box 



h 1 

STTitchb-vard w/contents 




Wiv-e. 130 miles. 



Aim:'. Circle 




Ordnance Chest (Section Chest) 


1 ! 

Art-Pi ery Chest (Instrument -Gear 

First Aid Chest. Unit L 

1 | 

Chest (Snare sistfit mount and 
Ran.Te Quadrant Mount 





Hotr?t.7.fir Cleaning Chest 

! 1 



! 1 

"■' 1 -■• - 1 1 : 1 1 

Pinrififir Tools * \ \ 


Chest. Chemical 


Operation and Training 

iSTCW OPERhTIOIj Rr-rOnT - I WO 'JI&A (Continued) 

3. Operation" and Training (Continued) 
(c) (Continued). 

(4) (Continued) 

ig) (Continued), 


Dukw Humbert 

liq&perv mattery 

16 f 17 ' 

18 ■ ' j 19 ' \ 20 " 

"ppye? DTI Tip! 

Radio Jeer) (608) 



10 j 


20 j 

1/w light 
AA mount 




M.G. .50 Cal. 

1 w/.qrnund 

1 w/'rround 

I w/li^hl 
AA m un j 

M. G. .30 cal. 



, ,1 " J 

.50 Cal Ammo Chests 

3 chests j 

3 ^eels 
w/ ammo 

3 reels 
w/ammo i 

3 reels j 

Camouflage Nets 


1 1 j 1 

Spare Parts, Box 



l ! i-i 

Wire (DR/J 

.... A- 



Telephones (EE 8 A or B) 

5 1 



5 Gal rr ater Cans 




■ i 

1 ! 1 





tSand Barrs 



1" 50 j 50 


1 (72) 

1 (71) 1(71) 

Rar»io Batteries, (Sets) 

2 2 

Aiming Circle 

! 1 

Small 1 Arms A?1T10 

1 box 
j carbine 

1 box 

1 box 'h box 
carbine carbine 


! 1 box 

Ordnane Chest 


.50 Cal Ammo 

1200 rds 

1200 rds |1200 rds 

1200 rds 


1 1 



j 1 box | 1 box 

Picks • * 


3 j 3 13" 



. i 4-1 — ~4— 1 

610 Radio 

11 \ 2 

TtiK Rn.rlio 

. 4_.I L_l- 

Radio Chest 

1 1 1 | 1 

Plotting Tables 

■■■■■ ■ 111 ■" - ■ B I\'»fl " ■ " 11 m."fk~H>-» — » ■ & i — — — - 

•$ Ope1ra%ion% arid- Training 



.3. Operation and Training (Continued) 
(c) (Continued). 

(4) (Continued). 

(g) (Continued). 

Wire .y-13Q., 

Chest, Chemical 

Medical Units Numbers. 

Note : 

Each firing battery lands 5 officers and 49 enlisted. 
Ha&Serv Batter-' lands 6 officers and ^4 enlisted. 
This does not include the Reconnaissance Party of 4 officers and 
2B enlisted who land in IT, VP. 

In general twelve (12) DUK^e 
on each battalion LST were preloaded with one (l) howitzer, 
personnel of howitzer section, twenty rounds of ammunition 
and section gear. Each firing battery headquarters was 
allocated one (l) DUKW. The remaining DUK^s were loaded with 
battalion headquarters, communication equipment, ammunition 
and local security personnel. 

(h.) Each LST carried an average of 
ten (10) officers and two hundred and forty (240) enlisted 
men from port of embarkation to the staging area. At the 
staging area total embarked personnel was increased to eighteen 
(18.7 officers and three hundred and ninety (390) enlisted men 
per LST, This increase was effected by shifting personnel 
from APAs to LSTs. Regimental and battalion command posts 
remained on APAs. 

(d) Landing. 

(l) On D-day battalion reconnaissance parties 
embarked in LCVPs from AP^s at about n-hour (0900). The recon- 
naissance parties proceded to -Baker control, vessel (^th^arUiv) 
to aw^ait orders from the Div Arty^^ 
proceed to~ the beach. ^ 

eration and Training ( 27) 

im****.-^ - 

nm&Ji ITEM TO DlVIbiOiNt OPERATION REPORT - 1W JIH^ (Continued). 

5. Operation and Training (Continued). 
'(d) ( Continued) . 

(2) Battalion reconnaissance parties 
landed between 1247 and 1438. (lst-1247, 2nd-1342, 3rd-1430, 
4th- 1438). 

(3) Upon landing the reconnaissance parties 
found that the infantry had not advanced beyond preselected 
position areas. No routes of egress' from the beaches had been 
•ore-Dared thus making it impossible for vehicles (DUK^s) to 

get "''off the beach. The beach was under heavy artillery, mortar 
and machine gun fire. It was impractical to land the artillery 
at this time. 

(4) 4th Mar Div order to land 1st and 2nd 
Battalion, 14th Mar was received at 1405. Landing of 1/14 and 
2/14 DUKVs commenced at 1500. Due to beach conditions the" 
landing proceeded very slowly and with considerable difficulty. 
The 1st Bn had less difficulty moving the 75mm Pack Howitzer 
into position than did the 2nd Bn with the 105mm Row. Each 
DUKW of the 2nd Bn had to be dragged onto the beach and into 
position with an angle dozer. The ernplacing of the howitzers 
was an extremely difficult operation accomplished under heavy 
artillery and mortar fire. The 1st Bn was in position, reg- 
istered and firing direct support missions for RCT 25 at 1740. 
The 2nd £n was in position, registered and firing direct sup- 
•port mission for RCT 23' at 2130. The 3rd Bn was launched from 
the LST but was ordered to reembark late in the afternoon of 
D-day. The 4th Bn was not ordered to launch on D-day. The 
regimental recon party left -^PA at 1610 and was enroute to Baker 
control vessel when orders were received not to land. The recon 
party went aboard LBT 763 and established the CP thereon. 

(5) On D/l, the 3rd r>n was ordered ashore and 
commenced landing at 1500. The 4th Bn experienced a delay of 
about three hours in launching DUKUs due to the LST receiving 
oraers to launch its ECT at the time the order was received to., 
launch DuKVs. The 4th Bn. commenced landing. at 1725. 3/14. -was' 
in position and firing .missions &t .1728. $/3,4 had. .five ■' howit- 
zers ashore and ready to fire by mi< l|^|^ft| §L ^ffitT**^^ 
Operation and Training (28) iliyiil MjflW fri'jfes lT |j 1 


IivO JIMa (Continued) 

3. Operation and Training (Continued). 

'(d) (Continued). 

(6) Regimental command group landed at 1705 
and the advance CP 'was e.stablihsed ashore at 1715. The remain 
der of the regimental staff landed on D/2 and the remainder of 
H&S Battery landed on D/3. 

(e) Survey. 

(1) Initial attempts to locate the Corps 
IP (intersection of unimproved road and railroad spur) were 
unsuccessful as the unimproved road was unrecognizable and 
thb railroad spur non~existant . The 1st Bn registered by FO 
and set up an observed fire chart on D-day. On D/l a position 
area survey was accomplished,, batteries being located by 
resection. The battalion was registered by Air Observer. 

(2) Tne 2nd Bn located its bat teryposi tion 
•by inspection and registered by high burst on D-day. On D/l 

a position area survey was accomplished and registration com- 
pleted on an identifiable base point. 

(o) The 3rd Bn located its initial point by 
aligning the' nearer with the farther of the Futatsu Rocks and 
using the point where this line intersected the shore line. 
Direction was taken from a line between the IP and the eastern 
most point of the Northern shore line visible from the IP. 

( i) The 4th Bn ran a position area survey by 
a three point_resection using as reference points, the shore 
line on the SE coast near flit. _ SURIBa CHI, the shoreline on the 
NE coast and a corner of Airfield No. 1. 

(5) On D/3 regimental _ control was carried 
from Corps IP to battalion position areas. . The Survey Officer 
13th Marines, furnished the 14th Marines burvey Officer with 
all available data and points located by each were sent to the 
other until 1st Prov FA Gp was established ashore. Thereafter, 
all -survey information was sent to the 1st ^rov Fa Gp Survey 
Officer and disseminated by him. 

Operation and Training (29 


3. Operation and Training (Continued). 

(f) Observation. 

(l) Observation was very limited. Forward 
Observers seldom had observation more than 100 yards to their 
front. Air observers could locate very few targets due to 
enemy installations being under ground and expertly camouflaged. 
Enemy weapons could be observed and located only when active. 
Air observers and flash teams were particularly effective 
in the latter instance. 

(g) Fire adjustment. 

(1) Forward observers and Air observers were 
the chief agencies utilized in fire adjustment, a regimental 
OP was established on SUnlBACHI at 1345 on D/4 and adjus- 
ted fire on targets of opportunity. A flash team, established 
on kT SURItUCnl at the same time, adjusted fire on counter- 
battery missions and located targets for the OP. Sound 
Ranging was established on D/3 and located enemy artillery 
and mortars and adjusted fire on these installations. Sound 
Ranging %\ras especially effective at night. 

(2) Night- air observation was attempted but 
fire could not be successfully adjusted. : ; . 

(<3) In many instances lack, of observation 
dictated that forward observers adjust by sound in placing 
defensive concentrations near our lines. 

(4). Sound Ranging. ' This section first went 
into operation on D/3 on lv*0 Jlk^ a nd located their first 
target that evening. Six targets were located and fired on. 
At this time the setup consisted of two positions with a front 
of 800 yards and using a microphone base of 600 ft. On D/5 
the base was extended to 1300 yards, using three positions 
instead of two- This facilitated location of targets and 
that evening twelve enemy targets were located and fired on. 
On all targets located by Sound Ranging, the Artillery was 
adjusted by Sound Ranging methods. On D/12, the microphone 
positions were moved forward to aid in the location of enemy 
mortars and smaller £uns., In the new positions the overall 
front measured 2100 yards and the Individual microphone bases 

1 Opera tion and- Training (3(3) ||M| |C| 


• ♦ 


3. Operation and Training (Continued). 

( g) ( Continued) . 

(4) (Continued) were out down to 400 feet. 
These forward positions were occupied by the section until 
secured on D/21* The main source of trouble on this 
operation came directly from the use of long wire "lines 
from the microphones to" the instruments. These wire lines 
were continually being broken by bulldozers and other veh- 
icles. This difficulty could be remedied by the more expen- 
sive use of overheads. 

Several times the microphones were, 
pulled out of .he ground or covert d up by bulldozers. >»hen 
the engineers were notified of the importance of microphone 
positions very little further trouble was experienced wi 'ch 
engineer equipment. Later, when time was available, barbed 
I'lira enclosures were used to protect the microphones. 

; , -The iXoXwHS were greatly effect, d by 
dampness and had to be dried in the sun', after .several days 
"of constant- operation. Dampness caused erratic readings 
due to- a variance of capacitance in the instrument. The 
microphones functioned very well. The batteries had- to be 
changed every ?A hours, and eleven "diaphragms were r& 

set of microphones 

in 18 days of operation; Double set of microphones ver 
installed in each position with 'lines laid by different 
routes. when a line or -a microphone went out tthe^lines 


routes. when a line or -a microphone went out tthe^lines were 
switched at. the instrument and ' operation was not stopped. 
Some difficulty t- T as experienced trying to operate in daylight 
3; this was due largely to small arms fire., heavy traffic 

hours ; , 

near the microphone positions, anci a large volume or rr 
artillery f Ire felling 'in enemy territory. *t night wh 
front was quiet, and" when artillery fire was reduced to 
hf rrr ssing fires, the' best plots a were obtained on enemy 

When small arms fire had moved far 
enough away not to disturb' the microphones it became difficult 
to Pick up enemy small mortars, though larger mortars and guns 
could still be located-.' It' was riece'ssary to displace micro- 
phones- as" soon as the front lines hr.dmrvdd more than 3,000 
yards- ahead - of the* microphone" osltioh because of the._-rLi.rf 
ul ty of lo c a t i ng , e h e my mor tar s - r at 

large volume of friendly 
*t night when the 


O-o e 




3. Operation and Training (Continued). 

(g) (Continued). 

(4) (Continued) Some guns were located 
at 7000 yds, however. Because of the low frequency of a 
mortar discharge they are difficult to pick up at a very 
great range. c.i* 10 to 15 mil error was noted in left 
deflection of all targe cs fired in T^'s 184, 185, and 202. 
This was due to she map and was corrected on all targets 
fired in those areas. On this operation, Sound Ranging 
conditions were excellent and seventy-four targets were 
located. Sixty-seven of these were fired on by either the 
14th marines or Corps Artillery, 12th marines or 13th mar- 
ines. Adjustment on targets was completed with an average 
of two or three shifts and fire for effect used was gener- 
ally battalion 3 volleys. Several targets Xirere loca ted which 
were believed to be roving pieces because of the inconsistency 
of their location. Sound Ranging was originally designed for 
use on a broader iront chan it was possible to use on IV.O 
Jli'itx, but the restricted ra%e balanced out with the short 
front and good results were obtained. Some further training 
in survey adjustment of fires on targets and care of equipment 
is needed. The Sound Ranging CP was located near the Regime- 
ntal CP for security purposes and close liaison with the 
Regiment a 1 1 w o a nd Three Sections. In a fast moving situation 
it nay be found necessary for the CP to be maintained closer 
to the microphone "oositions. 

( h ) Fire Direction . 

(l) Regimental Hq. used Special Air and_ 
G-unnery Target &ap 1:10,000 in exercising fire control. The 
battalion FDC's used Special Air and Gunnery kap 1:20,000 for 
fire direction. Normal fire direction procedure was used. 
Fire direction was flexible and the- massing of fires effect- 
ively handled. Hetro section was established ashore on D/3 
and sent soundings to the battalions daily at 0730, 1130, 
1330, 1930, and 2230. Surf ace read, ings- ^Rre furnished sound 
ranging hourly from 1900 to 2400. 

(i) Organization for combat. 

formal organ! 

$ t j 'battalion supporting each assault w 

\ : ' I 

■* f • *"* ' Opfeifetton- and Training (32) ■ 



3. Operation and Training (Continued). 

(i) (Continued). 

(l) (Continued) 105mm Howitzers reinforcing 
the 1st Bn (75mm Howitzers) and one battalion in general sup- 
port, ^ith two RCTs on the line, each normally had two art- 
illery battalions firing harrassing, defensive, and preparatory 
fires. 1st Prov FA Gp reinforced these fires on call. 

( j ) Liaison. 

(1) Battalion liaison officers landed with 
infantry regiments and assisted in the control of all fires 
by continued close contact with infantry regimental COs andi, 
their staffs. Liaison officers at infantry battalions 
coordinated fire* and observation of forward observers, sup- 
ervised relief of observers and maintenance of communications. 

(2) Reinforcing battalions established and 
maintained liaison with reinforced battalions. , — 

(<3) The 14th Marines established liaison 
with 1.3th Marines as soon as landed. Upon landing of the 
12th marines the 14th Marines . liaison officer was transferred" 
from the 13th to the 12th Marines as the latter was the adjac- 
ent regiment. • ' .... ■ 

(k) Communications. 

(1) Communication within the artillery 
regiment proved adequate and highly satisfactory'* '.are lines 
to other units remained intact remarkably well except the long 
lines to 1st trovFA Gp end 13th Marines. All lines were 
overheaded as soon as materials became available. Drivers 

of tracked vehicles particularly. LVTs, appeared to be much more 
cognizant of the importance of not destroying wire lines. (The 
fact thf t LVTs stayed on. roads to avoid mine fields may have 
accounted for this).. 

(2) ' The radio SCR (510 proved to be a depend- 
able set but it \tfas not a satisfactory radio fp r_ u§e_ bv _. £ft£wa r d 
observers . This set was not satisf . 

Op era tioti^ and draining * (33) 

ON OPERATION RLPQRT - I\<0 J Ik* ( Continued) . 

3. Operation and, Training (Continued), 
(k) (Continued). 

(2) (Continued). 

a. There is no means of maintaining 
communications while moving on foot. 

b. The weight of this radio is so great 
that additional men are needed in each forward observer section 
to act as carriers. 

c. The radio is not flexible enough for 
field artillery use. With only two pre-set channels immediately 
available for communications, employment of this set is seriously 

d. The set is so bulky it is easily 
spotted by the enemy and operators were subjected to heavy fire 
of all types. 

(3) Very little frequency interference was 
encountered during the operation. No enemy interference of any 
kind was heard on any nets although a fire support destroyer 
operating on a nearby frequency caused some interference on our 
air spot net on one occasion due to its being 30 Kcs. off 
assigned frequency. 

(4) The basic system of radio nets was adequate. 

• (l) Maps and Photos. 

(l) Adequate for artillery needs. (See para- 
graph 2, subparagraph (&) and (b)). 

(m) Personnel. 

(l) (See paragraph 1, subparagraph (a)). All 
personnel of the regiment were highly trained in their duties 
with adequate replacements available for key positions. 
Replacement officers were received late in the training period. 
Field artillery replacement officers performed their duties 
very satisfactorily during the operation. Officer replacements 

. r h^4 r'-f-# . 

rixNii^A Il'Lii TO jJlViSiOiM uPi^U'i'XOu Kb^Ox-xT X'A^ J j Xi'iA ^Continued) 

3. Operation and Training (Continued), 
(m) (Continued). 

(1) (Continued) without previous field 
artillery training received insufficient training to perform 
general field artillery duties, due to lack of time, but 
performed assigned duties satisfactorily. 

(2) MoraXt and efficiency of troops was 
high throughout the operation. Battalion personnel emplaced 

•their howitzers under the most difficult circumstances 
possible, but accomplished their mission rapidly and effect- 
ively. Personnel worked willingly night and day to keep 
the howitzers supplied and firing. 

(n) Motor Transport*' 

(1) Due to thv : ; nature of this operation, 
motor transportation was adequate but operational only 
where roads had been constructed. 

(2) The carrier i'i-29-C (Weasel) was oXCel- 
"lent for wire laying and could traverse successfully any of < 

the terrain encountered. 

(o) Training Deficiencies. 

(l) The last training period was sufficient 
to bring the regiment to a high state of proficiency.. It 
was and is felt that this regiment was ready for combat when 

(p) ammunition expenditures./ 

(l) ammunition expenditures by item: 

75mm Pack nowltzer 

M8 Fuze H54 Fuze k57 Fuze M62- Fuze Total- 

31,524 19,873 7,819 ' 3,617 62,833 

105mm Howitzer 

■46;US\rr 42,155" : -'-5 i 

* lpfca€ifen~and Training 

fjf L /i,..., 

XSIOiM OPERATION R&I&RT* -*Iltf) ^TI^ ^ Continued) . 

3. Operation and Training (Continued). 

(p) (Continued). 

(2) Ammunition expenditures by type of 
fire missions: x 


Counter battery 640 22,653 

Rarrassing & Defensive 3843 28,447 

Targets of Opportunity 774 31,033 

Preparation 508 62,851 

Registration 159 1 . 614 

TOTAL 5924 156,598 

(a) Enemy Artillery. 

(1) Methods ustd to locate enemy artillery. 
See paragraph 2 subparagraph (b) (6). 

FO, Air Observers, Flash Ranging, OP's, 
API, interpretation of shelling reports and sound ranging 
were used to locate artillery targets. Of these agencies, and air observers were the most effective. 

(2) Enemy action against our artillery. 

The only enemy action against our art- 
illery was counterbattery fire. Rockets, artillery and 
mortars were used by the enemy to effect counterbattery. 
This action was not particularly effective as personnel 
casualties were light, and materiel casualties negligible. 
This ineffectiveness is concributed to inaccuracies of fire 
received and the slight fragmentation effects of the heavy 
rockets. The concussion effect of rockets was considerable, 
however. This regiment encountered fire from shrapnel for 
the first time. Effect from this was nil, as adjustments 
were poor. Due to emplacements of .enemy artillery their 
deflection was limited. 

(3) Tactical.e^i^ment of enemy artillery. 
(See paragraph 2 subparagraph (] 

Operation and Training ( : wr* iaOftJlf IF 


i*NNLX ITEk TO DIVISION OPL.Ri-.TIOK REP0$12*w |^ 5.1^ '(.Continued). 

3. Operation and Training (Continued). w 
(q) (Continued). 

(3) (Continued). 

Enemy artillery was usually fired by 
a single gun or by a battery firing one gun at a tine. Rocket 
and mortar fire fell in barrages, however, during the early 
stages of the operation. Enemy artillery fire was not accur- 
ate, a fact which indicated thet adjustments were not being' 
made and that predetermined data was being fir-ed. 

(4) Effectiveness of enemy artillery. (See 
paragraph 2 subparagraph (h) (2j): 

Enemy artillery was hot effective in 
deep support or counterbattery fire. However., artillery, 
rockets and mortars inflicted heavy casualties on front line 
personnel, forward OP's and CP's. 

(r) Effectiveness of Our artillery. 

(1) The effectiveness of our artillery 
varied with the tyoes of emplacements and targets encountered. 
Targets in the open were quickly and effectively destroyed. 
Enemy mortars, guns, and rockets firing from positions well 
defiladed and covered were not so easily dealt with. Areas 
from which these weapons fired were neutralized by our art- 
illery but fire for destruction was limited. 

(2) Sound Ranging, 'although its operation 
during daylight hours was limited. (See Para & } subparagraph 
2 a (l)) accurately located enemy guns and mortars firing at 
night. These counterbattery targets were adjusted on and 
effectively silenced. The firing of enemy rockets could not 
be kicked up. 

(3) Smoke was effectively used when weather 
conditions permitted in screening movement of our own troops 
and the evacuation of wounded. Attempts Wtre made to mark 
point targets for the Air Coordinator using yellow smoke 
■-•shell M84. These attempts met with only partial success as 
•the cannisters scatter, on bursting of, the shell,, over a rel- 
atively large area (200 to 600 

* i|^ ^ |a^c ffi ^ntftfolAing ( 37 



fegrl Oi\i OPERATION REPORT - ItfG dl.^ (Continued) 

3. Oper; tion and Training (Continued), 
(r) (Continued). 

(4) Preparation fires were effective but 
the number 'of enemy installations underground made it impos- 
sible to* maintain neutralization for our troops to nove 
forward 'for any great distances. The enemy wo-uld hole up 

in the maze of caves and covered positions during the prep- 
aration. ' As soon as our fire lifted, the enemy would cone 
out of his underground hiding to fire on our advancing 
troops. Preparations were repeated at irregular intervals 
to try to catch the enemy off balance but his, too, r^t only 
partial success due to the great number of enemy weapons in 
strongly fortified underground positions in the 4th Division 
^one of >icti'on. " 

(5) The 105mm howitzer, using normal and 
high angle fire with fuze delay was employed against fort- 
ifications but was not heavy enough to effect destruction. 
The 155mm howitzer, using w62 fuze, was found to be the most 
effective weapon of the artillery against fortified positions* 
There was little evidence found to indicate that this weapon 
destroyed any enemy Installations, although reports of damage 
were received from observers. 

4. Supply. 

(a) Ail types of mounting out supplies were adequate, 
but it is recommended thu t this Regiment have all of its init- 
ial water and rations placed under artillery regimental con- 
trol and not under control of the Regimental combat teams. 

(b) ^11 types of re supply were adequate, but it is 
recommended that steps be taken to expedite the re supply of 
ammunition. Experience on the past two (2) operations has 
shown that ship to shore movement of ammunition has been Very 
poor. This has been due to weather and lack of proper small 
craft. It is recommended th; t greater use of ESTs be made in 
this connection, It is recommended that the use of Palletized 
Ammunition be continued. 

Efficiency of all shore based sup- ly facilities ~ 


-Supply . v , 


4. Supply (Continued). 

(d) Salvage - Excellent. 

(e) Transportation, wheeled transportation of this 
Regiment was adequate. This was due only ' to the fact that no 
displacements were made. It is recommended that on larger 
operations, where there Is a greater movement of Artillery, 
that this Regiment have greater use of its prime movers and 
not have to rely too greatly on DUKVs. The cargo carrier 
&29-C proved excellent as a wire layer. It was not used in 
any other capacity. 

Maintenance facilities - Excellent. 

(f ) Efficiency of Supply Communication - Very Good. 

5. Naval Gunfire. 

(a) Fires on targets of opportunity. 

(l) The elapse of time between the reporting 
of targets and firings upon tiftm- was entirely' too- great even- 
though some of targets had a high priority. " One 
instance occurred on the afternoon of D-day when the air 
observer reported an enemy battery of four guns firing on the 
landing beaches. Instead of delivering fire the shit) ordered 
him to search out an adjacent area for possible gun positions. 
Only after a delay of fifteen (15) minutes. and complete 
refusal of the air observer to search out further positions 
until these were silenced, was any fire placed on these guns 
which were inflicting casualties on the beach. There was no 
reason for this occurence since the ship's batteries were 
not firing at the time and the assigned mission .for the ship 
during this period was taking targets of opportunity under 
fire. To alleviate such delays in the future, targets of 
opportunity located by the air spot or ships' spot should be 
fired upon immediately when possible, without further adfiaa. 
All observed targets should be destroyed before seeking naw 

(b) Fires with Air Spot. 

(l) V/hen air spot is firing on a designated 
target, he should have complete control of the guns and no 
interference from "top spot" or " " 

+ hf * - 

'* Wval 'Gunfire ' (39) 

ITOtOH OP LR ATI ON REPORT - I".0 JIi*A (Continued) 

5. Naval G-unfire (Continued). 

(b) (Continued). 

(2) On . numerous occasions, air spot mad.e 
spots on targets which were not applied because "top spot" 
disagreed with his estimates. This ; only tends to confuse 
the air spot because often he and top spot were looking at 
different targets. The only way to alleviate this problem 
is to give complete control of the guns to whoever may be 
spotting. This will result in faster and more accurate 

6. Transport Quartermaster-, 
(a) Loading. 

(1) Prior to the embarkation of this 
Regiment, loading plans itfere prepared for each battalion 
and for Regimental " RdcS Battery. One L3T xxas available for 
each battalion and for H&S Battery to load all organizational 
gear, vehicles, and howitzers the t would be required ashore 
during the initial phase of the operation. This equipment 
was pre-loaded in DUlUi's and LVT(4)'s either at camp or on 
the beach at Kahului. DuKk's were loaded on the tank deck 

of the LST on top of ammunition. LVT(4) ! s were loaded on 
the tank deck forward of ammunition and just inside of the 
bow doors. 

(2) Vehicles and equipment not required 
ashore in the early stages of the operation were loaded 
aboard APA's and" AKa ! s along with similar equipment of the 
infantry regiments. This loading was controlled by the 

(3) The average time required to load the 
APA' s was between twenty-four (24) and "thirty (30) hours. 
In some instances the loading was confused and delayed 
because final loading plans for the shi were not adhered to. 
The main difficulty seemed to be insufficient control over 
vehicles prior to their loading. All vehicles were marked 
with priority and hold numbers,, but were not "spotted 11 on the 
dock near their respective holds^, <^nse£uently_ there were 
some that could not be located 

T ransport Quartermaster 


*>Ni<bX ITLi* TO DIVI&ION QPLit^TIGw RbrOHT - I'UO Jli^ (Continued). 

6. Transport Quartermaster (Continued), 
(b) Unloading. 

(1) Upon arrival at designated areas off 
the beaches of TO JII'U, LSTs commenced unloading upon orders 
of the Regimental Commander. DUKy* s and LVT's were launched 
in a moderately rough sea and encountered many difficulties 
before reaching the beaches. >-fter their initial trio to 

the beach with personnel and equipment, DUK V '* s returned to 
their respective LST' s to unload ammunition, water, rations, 
etc. adverse weather conditions continued to hamper the 
progress of unloading. Cables supporting bow ramps of LST ' s 
Wore snapped each time the ramps were lowered, bow doors 
were jammed by the terrific- pounding of the sea, and could 
not be opened; or when opened could not be closed. The 
repairs necessary to correct these conditions sometimes 
required several hours to complete, and while undergoing 
repairs, no ammunition could be unloaded from that ship. 
DUK'w's could not be taken aboard during repair- periods and 
some were swamped end sunk when their fuel was exhausted. 

(2) When LST 1 s were permitted to beach, 
unloading progressed rapidly and in a satisfactory manner, 
delays being caused only during condition "red." 

(3) In general, the unloading of .^'s and 
.TiKi-i 1 s was accomplished in a satisfactory manner. No difficulty 
was encountered by ships in obtaining sufficient landing craft 
in which to unload their cargo. Cargo nets, vehicle slings, 
etc., as provided by the ships were adequate. 

(4) The chief criticism regarding transports, 
is the apparent lack of cooperation of ship' s officers with 
Troop Tick's. In one instance the ships' executive ■ of f icer 
controlled unloading, and oomole tcly ignored the ships' T<*>i 
and the 'Troop TW'i. &ear was unloaded and sent ashore regard- 
less of . whe ther ■ it was needed on the beach or n~-t. Vehicles 
were landed without drivers, mess gear and tents were landed 
when ammunition and water was needed. r The chief concern of 
the ship was to unload and withdraw. Spe'e-d in unloading is 
es.sent.ial and desired, but„ not when the material unloaded 

is useless in the early » stage s . 

. T r an bp q r t Q,uar t er ma s t e r " (4 

6. Transport Quartermaster (Continued).. 

(b) (Continued) . 

(4) (Continued) It is recommended very 
stongly that personnel of transports used in combat be 
thoroughly indoctrinated in the principles and importance of 
combat loading and unloading. 

7. Ordnance. 

(a) weapons. 

(1) Thirty-two (32) 105mm Howitzers and 
twelve (12) 75mm Howitzers were used during the operation. 

(2) Eight (8) 105mm Howitzers and one (l) 
75mm Pack Howitzer were lost in ship to shore movement. 

(3) No malfunctions of Ordnance encountered. 

(4) Spare parts and accessories - proved 


(5) No recommendations as to modifications 
on present types employed. 

(b) Combat Vehicles. 

(l) None employed. 

(c) Ammunition expended. 

75mm Pack Howitzer . 
1*48 Fuze ii54 Fuze ^57 Fuze 1462 Fuze TOTAL 
31,524 19,873 7,819 3,517 62,833 

10.s5mm Hgw itzer 

46,113 42,155 5,474 23 93,765 

(l) Lost in ship to shore movement approx- 
imately, three hundred (300) rounds m|H|; j 

QfftoaiiCie : - ' (42) 


7. Ordnance (Continued), 
(c) (Continued). 

(1) (Continued) unknown, damaged rounds 
?5mm Pack Howitzer, sixty- six (66). 

(2) Initial supply of ammunition was adequate, 
but it is recommended that all initial' u/F- be placed under 
this- Regiment 8> QO'ntr.D.1. 

(3) Storage was a simple problem but due to 
re-supply it was 'impossible to have any large amount in dumps 
at any one time. 

(4) Packaging of ammunition proved to be 
excellent. The continued use of two (2) rounds of 1C 5mm 
howitzer ammunition ft . E . , peeked in boxes is recommended. 

u/F table. 

(5) Ijo changes ere recommended in the latest 

(6) ho new tyoes of ammunition recommended, 
(d) Miscellaneous Ordnance, 
(l) Material. 

a. . i-one used by this ' organization, 

no comment. 

8. Chemical. 

(a) Prior to embarkation all men of this regiment 
he 6. be^n trained in the proper use and upkeep of their gas 
masks which had been tested rnd proved ef f ; ctive. -<Lso' all 
personnel' had been indoctrinated to detect ell the principle 
known gases according to their characteristics v • *11 oerson- 
nel were give-n practical demons tret ions in carrying out first- 
aid procedures for gas casualties. ^11 men had been instructed 
in the duties of gas sentinels as well as decontamination 
procedure.. In addition, each b attery formed a • special 
3 * c,o.h.t a.£tX n-/\t la- h. * squad*: "tfc t: underwent detailed Ird- 
deconte.^ine tir.n of areas' end equip " ~ 

' ' ■ AlAiJaf * '* (43) 


8. Chemical (Continued). 

(b) -f-0.1 defensive chemical warfare equipment, with 
the exception of th?t carried by individuals, was crated and 
well marked to insure safe transport and easy recognition. 
This gear was loaded as general cargo with top priority. In 
case of emergency this equipment could have been obtained 
readily in a minimum amount of time. All first aid equipment 
was carried in the gas mask carrier. 

as the situation did not warrant immediate need 
for chemical warfare- gear, it came in with general cargo on 
an LSk. From the beach it was transported to Battery dumps. 
Individual gas masks were not collected and placed in unit 
dumps as there was no displacement of the artillery. The gas 
masks x^rere left at the individual' s respective foxhole read- 
ily accessable ; t all times in case of gas attacks. 

(c) There was no use of chemicals by the enemy 
against this organization. 

(d) This organization neither received nor discovered 
any enemy chemical warfare equipment. 

(e) As best observed, without actual enemy chemical 
warfare attack, the gas discipline and defensive chemical 
warfare proficiency of this organization was good. That of 
enemy troops was unobserved. 

(f) Due to issuance of waterproofing kits and the 
•oroDer use thereof the unserviceable mask is -practically nil. 

A few masks were lost when DUK^'s were sunk. This organize tion 
did not turn in any masks for salvage, or repair any, as no 
masks were found seriously defective. 

9. Medical, 


( a. ) Embark at ion. 

(l) Personnel. 

a. Medical personnel were embarked, 
in the following manner: Two Corpsmen of each battery 
embarked on APA's with their respective. ^S jma &&£&&n\ 


IWO Ji^xi' (Continued). 

9. Medical (Continued). 

(a) (Continued). 

(1) (Continued). 

a. (Continued) Battalion surgeons 
and their remaining corpsmen embarked on.-LST.'s with respect- 
ive firing batteries. The Regimental Surgeon, Regimental 
Dentist and one corpsmen were placed on an with the 

reconnaissance party of ha 5 Battery, 14th Marines. 'The 
remaining corpsmen embarked on the LST with the main body 
of H&S Battery, 14th Marines. 

.. b. This distribution proved to be 
effective and efficient. 

(2) Material . 

a. Material was combat loaded in such 
a way that immediate and essential supplies were placed in 

the personal care of corpsmen. These materials were carried 
in waterproof containers and were landed personally by corps- 

b. Supplies of less importance, but 
entirely essential, were embarked in pre-loaded ambulances. 

c. Resupply, necessary for a prolonged 
operation, was loaded in the holds' of the AP^'s. 

(b) Aboard Ship: 

. (l) Sickness: throughout the regiment tne 
health of the troops was excellent. 

(2) Sanitary Conditions: Daily inspections 
were made, in conjunction with ..the ships company, and the 
heads, living quarters, messes, galleys, cooks and messmen 
were maintained in an excellent sanitary condition., 

(3) Special Precautions: 

SION OPERATION ili-JPORT -,r.-<t> Continued) . 

9. Medical (Continued). 

(c) Debarkation. 

(l) Personnel. 

a. Medical personnel were adequately 
distributed and landed with a minimum of grouping with their 
individual units. There was considerable improvement over 
the last operation in the distribution of medical personnel. 
In so far as practicable, each landing group had medical 
personnel included. 

(2) Material. 

a. Lssential material was brought 
ashore under the supervision of medical personnel. He-supply 
was preloaded in ambulance jeeps and was landed as s>on as 
possible after D-day. Having preloaded ambulance jeeps with 
high priority proved to be of great value. 

(3) Losses of Personnel. 

a. No comment. 

b. Loss of material in the 1st and 
4th Battalions was extensive due to unfavorable landing 
conditions, which resulted in loss of several DUK'.: ! s. 

(d) Ashore - Assault phase. 

(l) Medical Installations. 

a. 'When . .set up; - Immediately on 


b. Location with regard to: 

1. Cover: No natural cover 
was available. Excavation were overheaded with dunnage and 
sand bags.. 

2. lUlMUBiir^ JLcl'iJL. iiUie . 1 

crowded conditions* 

• Medical (46) 


__-. — —. — — «» — — — — -» — — — — ^ 

9, Medical (Continued), 
(d) (Continued) 

(1) (-Continued). 

b. (Continued) 

Adequate . 

3* Other Medical Installations*. 
4. .Proximity to critical points: 

c. Protective measures taken. 

1. Local security. 

2. Cover. 

3. Concealment. 

4. Shelters and dugouts. 

5. Blackout precautions v/ere 
greatly improved over the last operation and entirely 
adequate due to the increased dunnage, increased number of sand 
bags, and the availability of bulldozers on the beach. 

(2) Evacuation. 

a. Rapid and effective via landing 
craft from the beach to hospital shi^s. Evacuation continued 
throughout the night during the early phases of this operation. 

(3) Casualties treated. 

H&S 1st 2nd 3rd 4th TO I AL 


. radical/ » (47) 

















51 , 





i'O^BiVlSIO^ OPERATION tfiPOM* - !l^'0 ^C^tinucd) 

9. Medical (Continued). 

(d) (Continued). 

(?) (Continued). 

H&S 1st 2nd 3rd 4th TOT^L 

Stretcher "1 45 15 34 10 105 

Ca s e s 1 , , 

TOTaL 3 145 119 114 39 420 

(±) Sanitation. 

a. . Special Measures: The elimin- 
ation of the use of mess gear and the early installation of 
barrel type heads with prefabricated covers, supplied by 
the D-4 section, greatly improved the sanitary conditions 
in this ^operation. 

b. Food: a marked increase in 
quality and quantity over last operation. 

c. vvster: Supplied by Division in 
5 gallon containers which were ample throughout all phases. 

(5) Epidemics or Unusual diseases in troops. 

(o) Cental Service. 

a. Sudd lied by Regimental Dentists 

pnd Corpsmen. 

b. Additional duties of Dentist was 
assisting in first-aid and general sanitation. 


. medical / ( 4§¥' 

(7) Medical Personnel: Adequate in all 

(8) Field Medical Equipment. 

a. Adequate and entirely suitable. 

(9) i^otor Vehiclj^:^ ig*!! 



p • 

rt iu^X I'X'Lk TO JJiVioIOi* OPLR^TIOiNi RLPOrlT - I WO JI^A (Continued). 

9. Medical (Continued). 

(d) (Continued) . 

(9) (Continued). 

a. All ambulances allotted by T/0 
were landed and utilised chiefly in the evacuation of wounded 
and in the transporting of medical supplies and equipment. 
Ambulances proved to be of great value and entirely necessary. 

(10) Quartermaster equipment and supplies., 

a. adequate and far superior to 

previous operations. 

(ll) Malaria and Epidemic control equipment. 

a. 'The Malarial and Bpidemialogy 
control unit worked efficiently and there was ample DDT at 
all times for spraying which proved of grea.t value in 
eliminating flies and other insects. 

(e) he commendations. 

(1) It was proven in this operation that 
spraying and dusting of clothing was entirely inadequate. 
Impregnation of clothing aboard ships in some cases proved 
efficient only when the individuals religiously preserved 
this clothing intact until D-day. Insufficient clothing 
made this system impractical. It is therefore recommended 
that unit Quartermasters 'impregnate extra clothing by 
immulsif ication, to be issued just prior to debarkation. 

(2) The increase in the quantity and quality 
of foods during this combat period was an excellent improve- 
ment to health and morale of troops. 

10. General Recommendations. 

(a) Intelligence Personnel. 

(l) That artillery schools stress training 
in intelligence work as much a's training; f £ r^JME tt HWMT is t a f f 


General Recommendations. 

Mlm wfafeiON OPERATION REFORT • IUO JliaA (Continued). 

+ T - - - - - ; 

10. General Recommendations (Continued). 

(a) (Continued).. 

(2) That present table of organization be 
changed to include (2) enlisted men in Bn-2 section as: 

one sergeant - intelligence clerk, 
one corporal - intelligence clerk. 

(b) Haps and Photos. 

(1) That enemy situation be omitted from 
Air and Gunnery Target i^aps to be used by artillery. 

(2) Number of photo sorties given wide- 
spread distribution be decreased in favor of increased dis- 
tribution of the best scale photos, down to and including 
battalions. ' '" 

(3) Oblique photos made from 0Y.-1 planes 
have greater and more rapid reproduction and distribution. 
That target area grid be transposed and printed on these 
photos prior to distribution. 

(c) That fire support ships be instructed in 
importance of targets of opportunity as given by air spot 
and necessity of relying on spotters' judgment. 

• (d) That firing table for HEAT be put on reverse 
side of high angle fire slide for OFT. 

(e) That specific color be design; ted for target 
marking purposes to avoid confusion with front line marking 

(f) That camouflage nets be fire proofed. 

(g) That ammunition be loaded with HE loaded last 
and forward on LST and with eannister and HEAT loaded first 
and aft. 

(h) That total elapsed time between embarkation 
and debarkation of personnel and i/uKiv's aboard LST sj>e^j£i ra- 

•General--. Recommendations ( 50 ) JO 


10. General Recommendations (Continued). 

(i) A better system for control and salvage of 
amphibian trucks be instituted. In accordance with this 
it is recommended: 

(1) Each DUKW be equipped with radio 


(2) An LCVP be assigned for initial landing, 
as control and salvage boat, for erch DUKw platoon. 

(3) An LCT ; LSM or LST be" available as 
DUKW salvage vessel and be stationed between the line of 
departure and the beach, equipped 'to "wench in" disabled 
DUKw' s. ( Be a china's ter would not' allow DUKU' s with "dead" 
engines to be towed onto the beach, no salvage vessel was 
available to pick these DUKW' s up. As a result, DUKw's, 
and vital equipment loaded in them, were lost). 

(3) Bow ramps on LST's be ; sufficiently reinforced 
to prevent breakage in heavy sea. .ox LST's move to sheltered 
area, near the beach, to land DUKV 1 s and thereby prevent 
breakage of ramps. 

(k) Closer control and liaison be maintained between 
various echelons of control - boats and between control boats 
and the beach. (In numerous instances DUKlv's were ordered 
launched from LST's, sent to control vessels only to be told 
they could not land and be sent back out to sea. This lack 
of coordination was apparent and caused loss of DuKw 1 s con- 
taining vital materiel). 

(l) That landing point be designated for DUKw's and 
kept- clear of all other traffic. 

(m) The t LST's housing DUKV. ! s carry 80 octane gas, 
pumps and hose for refueling DuK* ' s . 

(n) Th^t after rehearsal DUX';. ' s be allotted time 
for complete servicing and be re embarked dry. 

(o) That the artillery regiment have all of its 
initial water -and rations under artillery regimental control 
(and not under 'control of ROT ' s ) . mm »4*a -ft rffcfMMFMTr 

, Srener. al. Re C omm e nda t i o n s 

ITu, TO DIVISION Of ERriTION Rj^ORT - 1UO Jlk* ( Continued) 

10. General Recommendations (Continued). 

(p) All of the initial U/F be placed under 
regimental control and resupply of ammunition be expedited. 

(q) That, assault transports be tho%^ufehlf .-indoc- 
trinated in basic principles of combat i§43j- n f> %nd 'unloading. 

(r) That impregnation of clothing be accomplished 
by imrnulsif ication and this clothing be carried by unit 
quartermasters for issue just prior to debarkation. 

(s) Communications: 

(1) That the SCR 609 radio be made into an 
ultra-por table set which can be operated on "the march. 

(2) That regimental headquarters and service 
battery and each battalion headquarters and service battery 

be equipped with two SCR 608 radios in place of the SCR 808 
radios with which we are. now equipped. (The SCR 808 radio 
has space for only four pre-set channels which is not 
sufficient) . 

(3) - That regimental headquarters and service 
battery T/0 be increased by two additional wire teams: 

2 corporals, wire team chiefs. 
6 Pvts and PFC's linemen. 

The present allowance of four wire 
teams is not sufficient for the number of wire lines this . 
regiment is required to install and maintain. (Two wire lines 
each to four battalions, two wire lines to division, and one 
wire line to each adjacent artilie ry regiment. 

(4) oCR 658 be issued to supplement theo- 
dolite in order to make possible meteorological readings of 
sufficient altitude to support high angle fire. (Rain squals 
and cloud formation restricted vision throughout most of the 
operation) . / ^ 

if. Gr. £>b fcUiVJLU, 

";.•/£• v 'ii •* * 

' *v-i.'- (52) 










Paragraph A - Organization and Planning ♦ ..,» 1 

Paragraph B - Training , • 8 

Paragraph C - Rehearsal. . . , , . . . . 8 



Paragraph A - Rehabilitation.. «... 9 

Paragraph B - Ship-board Training * 9 

Paragraph C - Forward Area Rehearsal 10 


Paragraph A - Tactical Plan for Landing 10 

Paragraph B - Control Plan 10 

Paragraph C - Description of Landing . . 11 


Paragraph A - D~Day . . .11 

Paragraph B - D plus 1 12 

Paragraph C - D plus 2 12 

Paragraph D - D plus 3 ,..12 

Paragraph E - D plus 4 ...4.13 

Paragraph F - D plus 5 * . .... ...13 

Paragraph G - D plus 6 , .....14 

Paragraph H - D plus 7 14 

Paragraph I - D plus 8 ...15 

Paragraph J - D plus 9 15 

Paragraph K - D plus 10 .16 

Paragraph L D plus 11.,... ,16 

Paragraph M - D plus 12 • , 16 

Paragraph N - D plus 13.... 16 

Paragraph - D plus 14.. .....17 

Paragraph P - D plus 15 . 17 

Paragraph Q - D plus 16 18 

Paragraph R - D plus 17, .18 

Paragraph S - D plus 18........ .18 

Paragraph T - D plus 19..,.. 19 

Paragraph U - D plus 20.,,..,... 19 

Paragraph V - D plus 21 .....19 

Paragraph W - D plus 22 , ... ...19 

Paragraph X - D plus 23 .« 20 

Paragraph Y - D plus 24... 20 

Faragraph Z - Summary of Fires..., • 20 


Paragraph A - Loading ,..,..21 

Paragraph B - Communications..., 21 

Paragraph C - Personnel,.,.,. 21 

paragraph D - Motor Transporation. , . , , , * 22/ 

Paragraph E - Miscellaneous ♦.. 22 



(1) Personnel: 

The personnel of this battalion were distributed as follows: 

(a) 22 314 APA Group 

(b) 7 168 LST Group 

(c) 4 AKA Group 

(d) 2 12 Assigned BLT. 1-25 

(e) 2 8 Assigned BLT 2-25 

(f) 2 12 Assigned BLT 3-25 

(g) 1 Carrier M29-C driver at- 

tached for transportation 
to 14th Regiment. 

(h) 1 Aerial Observer on Carrier. 

(i) 1 Aerial Observer on Cruisef 

TOTAL: 37 519 

(*) - Two (2) enlisted men received promotion to Second Lieutenant enroute to target 

The battalion was organized into three (3) main groups for 
this operation. The first was the personnel aboard the LST originally; the second 
was the personnel that were on the ApA and transferred to the LST at the staging 
area; the third group remained aboard the APA to the target. Since practically all 
of the combat equipment was loaded on the LST, the personnel on the LST were chosen 
so that they could function as a battalion in oase the APA was lost. The LST was 
loaded originally as follows: 



Total: lstBn,14th Marines 
4th Amphibious Tru< 

Total on LST: 

The officer from each firing battery was the Executive Officer, 
The enlisted personnel from the batteries included six (6) men from each gun section 
The remaining firing battery personnel were from the ammunition, instrument, com- 
munication, and machine-gun sections. The officers from "H&S" Battery were the 
Battalion Executive Officer, the Battalion Surgeon, and the Battalion Supply Officer. 
The enlisted personnel from "H&S" Battery included one (l) complete Fire Direction 
Center team, one-third (l/3) of -"H&S". Battery communication personnel, one-half (-|) 


















of the Battalion survey section, five (5) medical corpsmen, clerks, and a few men 
from the machine-gun section. 

The personnel that were transferred from the APA to the LST 
at the forward staging area were as follows: 


"H&S" 5 36 

"A" 1 38 

"B" 38 

"C" 2 38 

Total: 8 150 

The officers from "H&S" Battery were the Battalion Adjutant, 
the Assistant plans and Training Officer, the Survey Officer, the Battalion 
Chemical Officer, and the Ordnance Officer. The enlisted personnel from "MS" 
Battery included one (1) complete Fire Direction Center team, one -third (l/3) of 
the communication personnel, most of the machine-gun section, and a few clerks and 
corpsmen. The officers from "a" and "C" Batteries tha t transferred were the 
battery maintenance officers, and, in addition, the Assistant Executive Officer of 
"C" Battery. The enlisted personnel from the firing batteries included three (3) ; . 
men from each gun section, the remainder of the machine-gun sections, the remainder 
of the ammunition sections, and some communication personnel. 

The following personnel remained aboard the APA to the target? 


"H&S" 6 50 

"A" 2 38 

"B" 3 38 

"C" 2 38 

Total: 13 164 

This group included the Battalion Reconnaissance Party, The 
remainder of the personnel were not essential to the initial operation of the 
battalion and had low priority on landing. 

The officers in the Reconnaissance Party were the 

- 2 - 

Subject: Operation Report (Co 


Battalion Commander, the Battalion Plans and T r aining Officer, the Battalion Intel 
ligence Officer, the Battalion Communications Officer, the Assistant Battalion 
Adjutant, the three (3) battery commanders , and the Reconnaissance Officer of "B" 
Battery. Four (4) officers remained aboard the APA to bring the rest -*of the men 

The battalion had nine (9) Forward Observer teams organized; 
three (3) in each firing battery. Each battery* s teams were organized as follows: 


1 4. 
1 4 

4 (included Scout 

Sgt as senior 

The three (3) teams from "A" Battery were embarked with BLT 
1-25, The three (3) teams from "C n Battery were embarked with BLT-3-25. The two 
(2) officer teams in "B" Battery were embarked with BLT 2-25. The third team from 
"B" Battery remained' with the Battalion on the APA. The Battalion Liaison Team, 
consisting of one (1) officer and five" (5) enlisted, was embarked with RCT 25. 

Four (4) enlisted personnel were embarked on an AKA with 
their vehicles. One (1) enlisted man was embarked cn the Fourteenth Marines' LST 
with 'a 'carrier, •M29-C. The Battalion left one (l) officer and forty-nine (49) men 
as rear echelon. . . 

(2) Equipment r 

The combat equipment of the First Battalion, Fourteenth 

Marines was loaded on one (l) LST, one (1) APA, and one (1) AM, with ninety- five 

(95) percent of the equipment on the LST. The "Weasel" (Carrier, M29-C) was 
aboard the Fourteenth Marines' LST. 

The equipment loaded aboard the APA was as follows: 

7 J- ^-ton 4x4 with 808 radios 
1 - 7; -ton- 4x4 cargo ■ 

' 1 - Ir-tdh: 4x4 cargo, w/l-ton water trailer 
All Chemical Gear 
Galley Gear . 

In addition to the above, the individual men kept radios, 
telephones, aiming circles, etc., with them. 

»* . ' 1 ' , * 'it 




Subject: Operation Report 



On the AKA the following' vehicles were loaded r 

1 - "Bulldozer^ 

1 - -|-ton 4x4, , anibu lance 

1 - ^— ton 4x4, cat go 

1 - 1-ton 4x4 cargo, w/l'-ton water trailer 

The LST carried the remaining combat equipment. 

The First Platoon, Fourth Amphibious Truck Company was at- 
tached to this battalion for the operation. .This unit consisted of twenty-one (21) 
DUKW's. In addition, there was one (1) DUKV» r from company headquarters. The 
twenty- two (22) DTJ^v"' s were preloadeH and carried in the Tank Deck of the LST, 
Each firing battery had five (5) DUKJv's and "H&S" Battery had six (6). Each DITKW 
carried an initial load of approximately seven thousand (7000) pounds, including 
personnel. Four (4) of the firing batteries 1 five (5) DUKW's were designated as 
gun section DUKft rt s and the fifth as the ammunition DUKW. Each of the gun sections* 
DUKtFs was loaded as follows: 

1 - Howitzer, 7 5M<', and accessories 
30 - Clover leaf s of H«E. ammo 

2 - Cloverleafs of H^AT ammo 

3 - Cloverleafs of Srioke afcmo 
12 - Rounds of C muster ammo 

1 - Camouflage net / 

1 - Machine-gun, .50 C&l';; accessories and amnio (250 rds) 

5 - Water cans, 5-gal. 
1 - Case of Rations 

11 - Men 

Each firing battery's ammunition DUKW was loaded as follows: 

33 - Cloverleafs of H # E. ammo 
17 - Rounds of Cannister ammo 

6 - Drums of wire (110) 
9 - EES Telephones 

1 - Switchboard 

2 - Boxes Radio Batteries 
1 - BC-5 Chest (3'RL-27's 

(4 Sound j> owe r sets 
(2 .Handsets 

(Tape, seizing wire, etc.) 
1 - Machine -gun, #50 C n 1. , accessories and amro (232 rds). 
5 - Vvater cans, 5*gal. 
1 - Case of Rations 
15 - Men • a% 

- 4 - 

follows : 

The DDTO's assigned to "H&S" Battery were loaded as 

No. l ! 1-606 jeep. 

25 - Clover leafs of H.E # ammo 

1 - Message Center tent 

10 - Men 

No. 2 ; 8 - DRW* 

1 - Switchboard and phones 

1 - TBX 

2 - .50 Cal, machine-guns and ammo 
2 - Boxes radio batteries 

10 - Cans water, 5-gal. 

5 - QetSes rations 
Medical gear 

1 - Box grenades 

1 - B8*6oka, ammo and rockets 
FDC gear 

33 - Clove rleafs of H.E. ammo 

16 - Rounds of Cannister ammo 

15 - Hen 

7 - PR-4 

.W. ...\' .^''-'jCanj5 water," 5*^1. , ... 1" Z" i 

id - Cases rations 
1 - TBX 

1 - Switchboard and phones 

r ; ... t . r.-r.. _ , Small arms ; ammo; ' Ti 1 

Medical gear 
Instrument gear 
- i, 33 r ^ove^leafs of H.E. ammo 
iy - $f^fy-'o£. • ammo 
K> - Men : ^7, "Z r 'iZZZ; 

No. ^ : 90 - Cloverleafs of H.E. anmo 

% . 2 r ,5Q Cal. machine-guns and ammo 

^ ^ ^jjpo^, ammo, r and r rpckets 

i _ EDS gear 

10 - Men ... 

No. 5 : #0 r Cloverleafs 9/ H>E. anno 
jjfogical. gear. 
15 - Men .. 


Subject: Operation Report (Continued^ &1'i1$Fl$#W l-14Mar. 

No. 6 : 1 - Jeep TCS 

25 - Clove rleafs of H.E. ammo 
10 - lien ; 

In addition to the * equipment' preloaded in the DUKW's, 
the LST carried the following: 

15,945 - Rounds of 75MM Pack Howitzer' afffio (A % total of five (;) 
units of fire was loaded cn the LST) f " 
200 - Cases of rations " " ^ 

900 - Gallons ' of water 
Comniunication gear 

Ordnance gear 3- * ' . . .. 

■ 2 - Units small arms^bmS ' ' - ■ ^^ tTjT ^ r 

(3) Organization for Landing: 

The personnel and equipment o^'thds' 'battalion wore to bo 
landed in four (4) main groups^ the Reconnaissance Par%;' !J the' fiiain landing of 
the battalion; the group to be landed in subsequent trips made by the DUKVJ' s; 
and the group to be landed from the APA by'LCVP. 

The Reconnaissance Party, consisting of nine (9) officers 
and twenty (20) men with two (2) SCR-610 radios, was to land in an LCVP. 

The main landing was to be made ^bm the LST in twenty- 
one (21) DUKVPs, landing to be made by batte^oe on call from'tne Reconnaissance 
Party. This group- included twelve (12) officers, two hundred «thirty-s even (237) 
enlisted personnel, and the following ractin "items of equipment: 

12 - 75Hi Pack Howitzers: <■ \ 
2055 - Rounds of 75131 Pa^#^ta^ /tap . 
16 -iItv5Q^al. r&chl&ei'gi^'wp&'gmfy ■ H<?fe* ct- - 

Sufficient coj!municat:k>,n, <FDC^ survey, and 

medical jgear^ to /operate initially. 
Rations and watery r 

y <* ]■>*?'- .fcr % irwt..;o* - s ;yt? it ><:■:■:< ; 

All Dte7 f s were -to ^etni^ 
maining personnel, ammunition/ and. equipment. -$w©- -^);^^$<ip«'<Qnd; suvonty-nino 
(79) men remained aboard the LST. Of these, one (1) officer and sixty (60) men 
were designated as a working party to unload thtgf LST. -* 1 

M -* •^•mrr'sj r 'ox'- QtririMf -:;'-;o 
The-personnel cgS «qu^pe^3Wpwi)^^p £lP4rjBft£ a low 
priority and were to be landed as LCVP^ were jymilftbl^ SdSwr (4) officers and 
one hundred forty-four (144) men remained aboard; -jtfctf WAat, It was expected that 

" 4 " '? '--'n -V'JS vvkti ' '' -• ; 


Subject: Operation Report. ( c ontii»f^l f\fcoJk'jCllRI^ tV 1 \ 27I.lar45. l-14flar, 

four (4) LCVP's, returning from the eighth wave, would be available to this bat- 
talion to land three (3) 808 radio jeeps, and seventy-five (75) men. 

All vehicles loaded aboard the AKA, except the "Bulldozer", 
had a low priority. The "Bulldozer" was to be landed in the first LCii made avail- 
able to the AKA. The "Weasel" was to land when the Fourteenth Marines' LST was 

(4) ConmunicatiDns : 

To maintain communications during the landing phase, the 
battalion had fifteen (15) SCR-610 radios, and, in addition, after launching, one 
(1) 808 radio jeep. The "610*8" were distributed as follows: 

1 - Reconnaissance Party "A" and "B" Channels 

1 - Reconnaissance Party "Reg" and "A" Channels 

8 - Forward Observer Teams "A" and "B" Channels 

1 - Liaison Team "A" and "B" Channels 

3 - Firing Battery Executive Officers "A" and "B" Channels 

1 - Battalion Executive Officer "Reg" and "A" Channels 

Total: ~TT 

The Battalion Executive- Off icer had an "808" radio jeep 
in his DUKVJ set up on the Battalion "A" channel, and the Regimental Channel, for 
communication with the Reconnaissance Party and the officers in charge of the 
four batteries. 

When the battalion landed, the "A" channel was to be used 
for fire commands, and the "B" channel for tactical information, and, in addition, 
when it was desired to fire another battalion directly with our Forward Observers* 
Normal wire communications were to be maintained. 

(5) Survey: 

It was planned to run a position area survey as soon as 
practicable. A road junction near the battalion area was selected for initial 
control and the road from Airfield No. 1 to the quarrygwas to be used for direc- 
tion. A flash team was to be established as soon as the situation permitted. 

(6) Aerial Observers: 

One of the battalion's aerial observers embarked on a 


Subject: Operation Report (Con 

Cruiser to fire naval gunfire prior to "D" Day and as long thereafter as was 
necessary. The other embarked on a CVE to fire artillery. He was to remain on 
the CVE until it was possible for spotter planes to land ashore. When the first 
artillery battalion landed, an aerial observer was to be sunt up, and was to be 
used for registration if Forward Observers could not bo used. 

(7) Maps and Photos: 

The battalion was furnished one hundred fifty-six (156) 
maps and sixty (60) aerial photographs, plus various beach studies, intelligence 
bulletins, and diagrams. It was planned to use the gridded 1/20,000 map as a 
firing chart. Since the infantry was using the gridded 1/10,000 map, the Forward 
Observers were issued this type. Vertical and oblique photographs were used for 
briefing and for preliminary selection of positions. 


(1) Preliminary Phase: 

Since the battalion had undergone extensive re-organiza- 
tion after the previous operation, preliminary training was routine and elementary. 
Greatest stress was laid on section training, including gun drills (at night as 
well -as during the day), FDC and survey schools, and physical training. Exten- 
sive use was made of training films during this phase. 

After the howitzers were calibrated, the battalion began 
conducting field exercises. Initially, each firing battery hold battery RSOP's 
to correct individual errors. Battalion RSOP^, which followed, stressed forward 
observation and fire direction. 

(2) Advanced Phase: 

Advanced training consisted of combat team exercises, a 
Regimental RS0P, several CPX's, and ship-to-shore exercises in DUKW f s. Through- 
out this phase, battalion positions were selected in areas that were barren and 
free of cover* and camouflage installations and discipline were stressed. For- 
ward Observer teams, whenever possible, operated with their infantry battalions. 

During both the preliminary and advanced phases, officer 
and NC0 schools were conducted several times weekly. 


(1) Embarkation: • • *' •. ' ■ 

Troops embarked aboard the APA on 28 December, 1944. 

- 8 - 

Subject: Operation Report (Con 


Beginning 6 January, 1945, after a period of rehabilitation, all troops participated 
in debarkation drills to train the ship f s personnel. 

Personnel embarked aboard the LST on 10 January, 1945 and 
proceeded to the rehearsal area. 

(2) Maneuvers: 

This battalion did not participate in the division maneuvers 
conducted daily from IE January, 1945 to 14 January, 1945. On 15 January, 1945, 
the Reconnaissance Party and personnel from the LST participated in the rehearsal. 
Landings were made according to plan, troops remained ashore overnight and reem- 
barked the morning of 16 January, 1945. * 

One purpose of the rehearsal was to check all communication 
facilities. Accordingly, all "610" radios were set up and found no be in good 
working condition. 



A . REHABILITATION - 19 January, 1945 to 26 January, 1945 : 

(1) This period was spent in conferences with the Forward Observers who 
'Were billettcd aboard other ships, and with officers from our LST. This period 
also included a conference with Regimental Headquarters on 26 January, 1945, at 
^hich officers were briefed on the forthcoming operation, 

B. SHIP-BOARD TRAINING -27 January, 1945 to 11 February, 1945; 

(1) APA 

(a) First Phase • A general briefing was given by Lt. Col. Sustain 
to all officers. 

(b) Second Phase - A general briefing was given by Major Edgar and 
staff officers to all officers and NCO's of the First Battalion, Fourteenth Marines, 

(c) Third Phase *■ Specific briefing was given by Battery Commanders 
and junior officers to battery personnel. 

(d) Daily schooling was combined with briefing for Fire Direction 
Center personnel, Survey personnel, Communication personnel, etc. 

{e) A final conference with all Forward Observers was held at 
Sniwetok aboard the APA on 6 February, 1945, 

(2) LST - 23 January, 1945 to 11 February, 1945 : 

(a) The same plan as used by the Battalion Commander was followed 
by the Battalion Executive Officer aboard the LST. 

(b) The second string Fire Direction Center, as well as the gun 
sections, held school daily. 

C. FORWARD AREA REHEARSAL - 12 February, 1945 to 14 February, 1945 : 

(a) The Reconnaissance Party boated on 13 Februa-y, 1945 and proceeded 
to the Line of Departure. There were no other troops participating, 

(b) As the main purpose of. the rehearsal was to check communications, 
a 1 ! the battalion ! s radios were set-up and proved to be in excellent working 

ci ~nd\tion. 



It was planned to have the Reconnaissance Party boat at H-30 
on "D ,! -Day and proceed to the Division Control Boat. There they were to await 
oiders from the Regimental Commanded who was on the control boat. As soon as it 
was feasible for the party to go in' to' the' beach, he was to order it to the Blue 
Beach Control Boat. From there the Reconnaissance Party was to clear as soon as 
possible and hit the beach. The personnel aboard the LST were to launch on order 
from the Regimental Commander. This was to be done to insure that the DtTK'A rf s would 
not be launched too soon before they could land so that they would not run out of 
gasoline circling in the water. Upon launching and as soon as they were organized 
by the Battalion Executive-Of f icer , the DUKW T s were to proceed to the Division 
Control Boat. There the R gimental Commander was to send the battalion to the Blue 
Beach Control Boat. The plan called for the batteries to land in the order Able, 
Baker, Charlie, "H&S" , with an interval of ten (10) minutes between batteries. The 
first battery was to leave the Line of Departure on order of the Battalion Command- 
er. After the DUKV s had discharged their personnel and equipment, they were to 
return to the LST to pick up additional men and ammunition. 


In order to carry out the above plan, the following communi- 
cations arrangement was put into effect. The Reconnaissance Party -had two (2) 
"610" radios with it. One radio was set up on the Regimental frequency and one 
on the battalion net. The Battalion Executive Officer also had two (2) radios set 


up exactly like the Reconnaissance Party's. In this manner both the Battalion 
Commander and the Battalion Executive Officer could contact Regiment and the 
various batteries of the battalion. After the batteries left the line of depar- 
ture, the Battalion Commander directed each battery to the exact spot on the 
beach where he desired it to land. 


At 0830, the Reconnaissance Party boated and proceeded to 
the Baker Control Boat to await orders to land. At 1200 the order was given by 
the Regimental Commander and the Reconnaissance Party proceeded to the Blue Beach 
Control Boat where it was ordered to stand by to land after the Reserve Infantry 
Battalion. At 1220 the order to land was issued and the Reconnaissance Party 
proceeded to the beach, landing at 1247- 

After making his reconnaissance, the Battalion Commander 
at 1330 advised the Regimental Commander that DUKW' s could be launched, but, <iue 
to the rough terrain, DUKI7 f s would have to unload at the beach. At 1500 the 
Battalion Commander ordered Able Battery to land, with Baker Battery coming in 
on caH instead of on time schedule in order to see first if Able could get into 
position. At 1600 Able Battery landed and managed well enough for Baker Battery 
to be called. IThile Baker was coming in, , the Battalion Commander decided to 
bring in "H&S" Battery next instead of Charlie because the fire tvas so heavy and 
the beach so crowded it was still debatable whether or not three batteries could 
get into the position. At 1615, Baker Battery landed, followed by "H&S" Battery 
at 1630, By the time "H&S" Battery had come ashore, conditions were such that 
Charlie Battery could be called. At 1645 Charlie Battery landed. 

In the meantime, contact had been made with the Forward 
Observers and although no point could be. found on the ground that was also on , 
the map, we started registering the Battalion at 1715 in front of the Third Bat- 
talion, Twenty-fifth Marines. This necessitated using an Observed Firing Chart 
for the first period, but this method proved satisfactory until we were registered 
by an aerial observer the following day. 


A. »D» DAY : 

After all elements of the Battalion landed and reported 
ready to fire, we started to register at 1715 and completed registration at 1740. 
We then fired targets of opportunity in support of the Twenty-fifth Marines. We 
fired defensive missions throughout the night on call from the Forward Observers. 

B. "D" PLUS ONE - 20 February. 1945 : 

Forward Observers reported a counter-attack in the Second 
Battalion, Twenty-fifth Marines' zone of action at 0315, which we took under fire. 
The results were reported as excellent. At OSZfD we fired a preparation in support 
of the Second Battalion, Twenty-fifth Marines, which attacked in the central sec- 
tor of the Regimental zone of action. $y 1500 troops had advanced as far as the 
"0-A" line all along the Regimental zone of action. Reported as of 1500, there 
was a total of thirty-three (33) casualties, of which two (2) were killed and 
thirty-one (31) wounded. We had expended one thousand four hundred ninety (1490) 
rounds of ammunition during this period. Survey had been completed and batteries 
given place mark on orienting line* As no control points could be located in 
our area, the batteries were surveyed in by resection. \Ihen control was brought 
down by regiment, it was found that the survey had been excellent. Air observer 
registered us on a base point in 1&5-H by 1500. Forward Observers registered in 
their defensive fires for the night at approximately 1700, and we prepared to 
harass the enemy throughout the night. 

C. "D" PLUS TWO r- 21 February . 1945 : 

Fired a preparation at 0800 in support of Twenty-fifth' 
Marines, but no advance was made in their zone of action* Total number o^ casual- 
ties for the twenty-four (24) hour period, as of 1500, was thirty (30), of which 
one (1) was killed and twentynalne £29) 'wdunded* two thousand nine hundred 
ninety-seven (2997) rounds of ammunition were expended during the same period. 
We fired eighty (80) missions, thirty-nine (39) of \vhich were in harassing, twenty 
(20) on targets of opportunity, four (4) for preparation, and fifteen (15) miscel- 
laneous. Forward Observers fired in their defensive concentrations at 1700, and' 
we harassed during the night. A counter-attack was repulsed ifi Second Battalion, 
Twenty-fifth Marines' zone of action. The first report concerning the enemy 
rockets was at 2350. 

D. »D" PLUS THREE - 22 February. 1945 : 

We 1 fired a preparation at 0925 for Second Battalion, 
twenty-fifth Llarines, and continued to fire targets of opportunity in their zone 
of action. Aerial observer reported enemy artillery position at' 1010, which we 
took under fire. At 1135, fired preparation for First Battalion, Twenty-fifth 
Marines. Assigned mission of supporting First Battalion, Twenty-fourth llarines 
at 1400. Reported as of 1500 that the infantry had advanced five hundred (500) 
yards in the central sector, while the flanks had moved up about one hundred (100) 
yards in the Regiment's zone of action, i- Twelve (12) casualties, one (1) killed, 
and eleven (11) wounded, were reported at 1500. • Report on ammunition expended 
as of 1500 was three thousand- s, even ^hundred twenty-£ive (3725) rounds, with 
seventy-nine (79) missions a^^^^s^td^ ^pf whic^ftri^1^r|inine (39) were harassing, 

- 12 - 

Subject: Operation Report 



thirty-eight (38) targets of opportunity, and two (2) in preparation. Started 
firing defensive fires at 1625 and prepared to harass during the night, 

E. * »D» PLUS FOUR - 23 February. 1945 : 

Orders arrived at 0625 placing us in support of Regimental 
Combat Team Twenty-four. Fired approximately two thousand (2000) rounds of am- 
munition on a counter-attack, results were reported that the enemy was completely 
routed. Fired counter-battery mission at 0825 and received reports of mission 
accomplished. At 0920, fired attack preparation for Twenty-fourth Marines. 

At 1300, the Battalion Commander was asked by Regiment 
as to the advisability of displacing our battalion further inland. The Battalion 
Commander pointed out that we were firing urgent missions for the infantry and 
that to displace would mean rendering us incapable of giving the desired support. 
It was, therefore, decided not to have us displace. It was reported at 1500 that 
we had suffered fourteen (14) casualties during the period, all wounded. 

During this period, we fired five thousand four hundred 
fifty (5450) rounds of ammunition, a total of one hundred thirty-five (135) 
missions, ninety-seven (97) of which were harassing, thirty-five (35) targets of 
opportunity, -one (1) for preparation, and two (2) miscellaneous. 

At 1?00 it was reported the left flank of the Twenty- 
fifth Marines had moved up about one hundred (100) yards. 

Our next mission thereafter wr.s to fire a smoke screen 
for the Second Battalion, Twenty-fifth Marines to aid the evacuation of casualties 
from the front lines (1753). At 1808 we started adjusting in defensive fires and 
prepared schedule for harassing missions for the night. 

F. "D" PLUS FIVE - 24 February. 1945 : 

At 0700 orders were received from Regiment putting us in 
direct support of Regimental Combat Team Twenty-four plus Fox Company of the 
Second Battalion, Twenty-fifth Marines. The order also called for a preparation 
which we fired at 0844. By 1300 the infantry was reported to have advanced about 
two hundred (200) yards. At 1331 we were requested to fire a preparation for a 
tank attack. Battalion complied with a five hundred (500) round preparation. It 
was reported at 1500 that for the period the battalion had suffered eighteen (13) 
casualties, of which one (l) was killed and seventeen (17) wounded. F or the 

period we had fired three thousand five hundred eighty -eight (35#£) rounds of 
ammunition, one hundred twenty-five (125) missions, ninety-five (95) of which were 
harassing,, twenty-six (26) targets of opportunity, one (1) preparation and four 
(4) miscellaneous. We started adjusting in our defensive fires at 1955 and at 
about the same time began setting up our Flash Team for the first time. The 
first flash they reported was at 2245, which the Battalion took under fire. . At 
2105 we fired on enemy personnel massing for counter-attack with good results 

G. »D" PLUS SIX -25 February. 1945 : 

At 0130 received Operation Order No. 4-1945 from Third 
Marine Division putting us in direct support of Regimental Combat Team Nine with 
Fourth Battalion, Thirteenth Marines reenforcing our fires. At 0500 we received 
the Fourteenth Marines' operation order giving, us the mission of reenforcing 
Third Battalion, Fourteenth Marines' fires. At 0900 these contradictory orders 
were cleared by verbal orders from Regiment assigning us to Third Division. In 
the meantime wo had been registered in on front of Third Division's zone of action 
by their Forward Observers. A% 0910 we fired preparation for Ninth Marines 1 at- 
tack. At 1104, 1206, 1247, F ourth Battalion, Thirteenth Marines r ^enforced our 
fires on targets of opportunity. By 3300 Regimental Combat Team Nine had advanced 
four hundred (400) yards in their zone of action. For the period we fired three 
thousand two hundred twenty-nine (3229) rounds, accomplishing one hundred forty- 
two (142) missions; one hundred seven (107) harassing; twenty-five (25) on targets 
of opportunity; and ten (10) on preparation fires. 

Word was received at 1350 that there would be a tank 
attack, so at 1356 battalion fired preparation, ^lso fired another preparation 
for an infantry attack at 1537. After the attack we adjusted in defensive fires, 
completed at 1750, gave harassing missions to Fourth Battalion, Thirteenth Marines, 
to supplement ours. 

H. "D" PLUS SEVEN - 26 February. 1945 : 

At 0630 Battalion received oral order from Regiment to 
revert to direct support of Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five as of 0700. At 
that time we re-registered in front of Regimental Combat Team Twenty-f ive 1 s zone 
of action. For preparation to- be fired at 0735, we were reenforced by Third 
Battalion and Fourth Battalion, Fourteenth Marines, plus Corps Artillery. At 
0903, we fired another preparation for the infantry 4 s attack, followed by a smoke 
screen at 0937 on left flank of Regimental zone to cover the advance. It was re- 
ported at 1235 that the infantry had advanced four hundred (400) yards on the 
right but had failed to gain in the left sector. He fired seven thousand six 
hundred twenty-f iv^e (7625) rounds during the period, the maximum for any one day. 

- 14 - 

Subject: Operation Report (CfsSJiEll «clJJElML»L |i27^r45 1-lijtfar. 

One hundred twenty-six (326) missions were accomplished, ninety-five (95) of 
which were harassing, twenty-nine (29) targets of opportunity and four (4) for 
preparation. No casualties were reported for the period. At 1700 we began de- 
fensive fires and made preparations for harassing missions. 

»D" PLUS BIGHT - 27 February. 1945 : 

Continuing in direct support of Regimental Combat Team 
Twenty-five, Battalion fired preparation at 0755, then again at 0800, 0825, 0910 # 
At 1100, we fired the first HEAT ammunition to determine its accuracy for indirect 
fire. Adjustment had excellent results, and it was decided to use it for har- 
assing fires and emergency close-in fires. Received word of another attack 
scheduled for 1215 and were requested to fire short preparation. At 1212 wo 
fired the preparation. It was reported that troops, as of 1300, had advanced 
one hundred (100) yards on left but held to no rain on right. No casualties were 
reported for the period. We expended three thousand seventy-four (3074) rounds 
in ninetv-nine (99) missions, of- which fifty-eight (58) were harassing, twenty- 
four (24) targets of opportunity, six (6) preparation, and eleven (11) miscel- 
laneous. On call of Forward Observers, we began adjusting in defensive fires 
and harassed throughout the night* 

J. "D" PLUS NINE - 28 February. 1945 : 

Continued in direct support of Re'gimental Combat Team 
Twenty-five with Third Battalion, Fourteenth Marines reenforcing our fires. 
Started preparation at 0730 in front of regimental zone and infantry started at- 
tack thereafter. At 0850 on request of Forward Observers, Battalion fired on 
left flank of zone of action to protect advance of troops. We continued this fire 
until 1105. 1100, Battalion Executive Officer left for Twenty-fifth Marines' CP 
on reconnaissance of direct fire mission requested by the Twenty-fifth Marines. 
1100, Assistant Bn-2 left for reconnaissance for direct fire mission requested by 
Division through Fourteenth Marine Regiment. 1330, one (1) gun- (75MM Pack Howit- 
zer) went forward on a direct fire mission in Second Battalion, Twenty-f if th 
Marines' zone of action. Returned to Battalion area at 2100 after acdoniplishing 

Front line reports at 1300 showed that troops on left were 
four hundred (400) yards behind previous day*s reported positions while troops 
on right had advanced approximately four hundred (400) yards. We fired two 
thousand six hundred- eighty-three (2683) rounds during the period, one hundred 
forty (140) missions, of which one hundred six (106) were harassing, twenty-three 
(23) targets of opportunity, and eleven (11) proparational* Three men were 
Wounded during the period. We wore given mission at 1650 to fire smoke screen for 
evacuation of troops and again at 1830.- Starred defensive fires at 1900, 

* If f JS " 1 I 


,,. .^vhm h*m** ... 

- 15 - 

Subject: Operation Report (C 


K. "D" PLUS TEN - 1 March, 1945 : 

Continued in direct support of twenty-fifth Marines, 
Reinforced, by Fourth Battalion, Fourteenth Marines, for preparation fires. 
Started preparation at 0820, continued until 0850, after which infantry started 
attack. As of 1300 troops were reported advanced about four hundred (400) yards 
in left sector with no advance in right. At 1300 again fired smoke screen for 
evacuation of casualties suffered in morning's attack. During the period we suf- 
fered six (6) casualties, all wounded. The Battalion fired four thousand six 
hundred forty (4640) rounds for- one hundred thirty-five (135) missions, of which 
ninety-four (94) were harassing, thirty-one (31) targets of opportunity, six (6) 
preparation and four (4) miscellaneous. Battalion started defensive fires at 
1640 and made preparation for harassing throughout night. Received message from 
Sound Ranging at 2000 that enemy artillery had been located. Battalion was then 
adjusted on target by Sound Ranging with good results. 

L. "D" PLUS ELEVEN - 2 March. 1945 : 

We continued in support of Regimental Combat Team Twenty- 
five and our fires were re enforced by Fourth Battalion, Fourteenth Marines. The 
infantry attacked at 0820 and we fired a preparation. The 1300 report of front 
lines showed that the troops on the loft of the Regimental zone of action had 
been reported incorrectly the preceding day. There were no casualties for the 
period. Total number of missions for the period as of 1500 wore one hundred 
eight (108) harassing, fifty-two (52) targets of opportunity, one (l) prearranged 
preparation fire, and two (2) miscellaneous, making a total of one hundred sixty- 
three (163) missions for the day. We expended two thousand eight hundred nineteen 
(2819) rounds of ammunition on these fires. 

M. "D" PLUS TWELVE - 3 March. 1945 : 

Started early preparation for Twenty-fifth Marines at 
0637, and continued in support of their advance. Liaison Officer reported a 
number of known mortar positions, and wc harassed them from 0931-0938. This 
proved helpful to the advance of the troops. By 1300 the troops had gained four 
hundred (400) yards in the center and right flank sectors, while the left flank 
made no advance. The casualties for the day ending at 1500 were one (l) wounded. 
Fires for the period consisted of eighty-seven (87) harassing, eighteen (18) tar- 
gets of opportunity, and six (6) preparation fires, making a total of one hundred 
eleven (111) missions. On one (1) we used two thousand seven hundred twelve 
(2712 rounds of ammunition. Defensive fires were adjusted in at 1652 and we 
harassed throughout the night and morning. 

N. "D" PLUS THIRTEEN - 4 March. 1945 : 

We reddivocl' opera tioh orders stating that Regimental 

- 16 - 

Subject: Operation Repor 

27Mar45 l-14Mar. 

Combat Team Twenty-three would replace Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five on the 
line, using one battalion of the Twenty- third Marines and two from the -^wenty- 
fifth Marines, There was no change in zones of action. An attack was scheduled 
at 0730, and we fired a fifteen (15) minute preparation for it. Regimental Com- 
bat Team Twenty-four was advancing rapidly, and we were assigned the mission of 
covering their exposed flank from 1034-1245. This proved to be an important 
factor in their advance, /is of 1300, there were no changes in the regimental zone 
of action. There were no casualties during this period. We expended three 
thousand seventy-five (3075) rounds of ammunition on the following types of fires: 
One hundred sixty -three (163) harassing, twenty (20) targets of opportunity, four 
(4) preparation, and eleven (11) miscellaneous, for a total of one hundred ninety- 
eight (198) missions. Defensive fires for the night were light and were adjusted 
in at 1650 by Forward Observers. Wo harassed throughout the night. 

0. "D» PLUS FOURTEEN - 5 March. 1945 : 

We reverted back to direct support of Regimental Combat 
Team' Twenty-five at 070Q, as specified in operation order. There was no prepara- 
tion, but we registered the battalion in front of each infantry battalion on the 
line. This was for security reasons, as the infantry regiment's orders were to 
hold until units on their left came abreast. At the request of the infantry 
battalions, we harassed In front of their "lines" from 0945 throughout the day 
and used the same fires for the night. There was no change in the front lines as 
of 1300. There were no casualties during this period, /jimunition expended as of 
1300 was eleven hundred ninety-two (1192) rounds, fired on one hundred thirty- 
two (132) harassing missions, six (6) targets of opportunity, one (l) preparation, 
and four (4) miscellaneous, for a total of one hundred forty-three (143) missions. 

P. "D" PLUS FIFTEEN - 6 March, 1945 : 

We continued in support of Regimental Combat Team Twenty- 
five, and, since they were holding in their zone of action, we were assigned to 
fire a preparation on Hill 362 using smoke from 0615 to 0715. This was in the 
Third Division's zone of action. Then at 0840 we fired a general preparation over 
the oitire Fourth Division's zone of action. There was no change in front lines 
as of 3300 and no casualties in this period. The fires consisted of two hundred 
sixty-six (266) harassing, twenty-one (21) targets of opportunity, one (l) pre- 
paration, and seven (7) miscellaneous, making a total of two hundred ninety-five 
(295) missions using three thousand four hundred seventy-nine (3479) rounds of 
ammunition. At the infantry's request a smoke screen for the evacuation of cas- 
ualties was fired at 1308, and again at 3355. We adjusted in defensive fires 
and prepared to harass throughout the night. At 1825 we received a Corps order 
stating that we were limited to fifteen hundred (1500) rounds of ammunition from ' 
1800 this date to 1800, 7 Har,c>", , %9kfo - 

-17- • r 

Q* "D" PLUS SIXTEEN - 7 March. 1945 ; 

We were still in support of Regimental Combat Team Twenty- 
five during this period and at 0800 fired a neuteralization preparation in support 
of their attack. Fired a five (5) minute preparation for Regimental Combat Team 
Twenty-four at, 1225, and the same for Regimental Combat Team Twenty-three at 1240. 
These were requested by Division via Fourteenth Marines ♦ There was no advance 
reported along Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five's zone of action, as of 1500. 
During this period there were no casualties. The total expenditure of ammunition 
amounted to one thousand four hundred fifty-two (1452) rounds, and our missions 
were one hundred seventy-three (173) harassing, eighteen (18) targets of oppor- 
tunity, seven (7) preparations, and twelve (12) miscellaneous making a total of 
two hundred ten (210). 

Issued one hundred fifty (150) rounds of ammunition to 
Amptracs 1 at 1530. Adjusted in our defensive concentrations at 1630 and prepared 
to harass during the night and morning. 

R. "D" PLUS SEVENTEEN - 8 March. 1945 ; 

We remained in support of Regimental Gombat Team Twenty- 
five and at 0620 fired a preparation in support of an early attack. There was no 
change in front lines as of the 1300 report, and there were no casualties. We 
expended two thousand sixty-four (2064) rounds of ammunition. Our fires were one 
hundred eight (108) harassing, nine (9) targets of opportunity, three (3) prepara- 
tion, making a total of one hundred twenty (120) missions for the period. Forward 
Observers registered in their defensive fires at 2007, and we prepared to harass 
throughout the night. It was a very quiet night. 

S. "D» PLUS EIGHTEEN - 9 March. 1945 ; 

During this period we were in support of Regimental Com- 
bat Team Twenty-five less Third Battalion, Twenty-fifth Marines with Second Bat- 
talion, Twenty-fourth Marines replacing them. Fourteenth Marines ordered that we 
fire a preparation for Regimental Combat Team Twenty-three which we complied with 
by firing one (l) battery from 0700 to 0748. At the same time, we fired a pre- 
paration using two (2) batteries from 0700 to 0730 in Regimental Combat Team 
Twenty-four 1 s zone of action. The 1300 report failed to show any advance in 
Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five's zone of action* There were no casualties for 
this period. We fired one hundred ten (110) harassing, twenty-six (26) targets of 
opportunity, four (4) preparation, making a total of one hundred, forty (140) mis- 
sions, expending one thousand eight ^uj^red fifty-five (1855) rounds of ammunition 
upon them. At 1350 we issued one hundred v fifty (150) rounds of ammunition to the 
Amphtracs'. Forward Observers adjusted in defensive fires for the night. We 
harassed throughout the night. 


- 18 - 

Subject: Operation Report ( 

27Mar45 l-14Kar. 

T. "D" PLUS NINETEEN - 10 March, 1945 ; 

Still in support of the Regimental Combat Team Twenty- f if th 
Marines, the operation order for this period called for a general preparation 
over the entire Division T s zone of action, with which we complied from 0735 to 
0825, «e fired targets of opportunity during the morning for both Air Spot and 
Forward Observers. At 0950 Air Spot was ordered to secure for the operation. By 
1300 troops on the left flank had advanced five hundred (500) yards in a south- ; 
easterly direction while the center and ri ht sectors had orders to hold. No 
casualties reported in 1300 reports from batteries . Our fires consisted of one 
hundred twenty-five (125) harassing, fifteen (15) targets of opportunity, five (£) 
preparation and eight (8) miscellaneous, making a total of one hundred fifty- three 
(153) missions in which we expended two thousand six hundred sixty-seven (2667) 
rounds of ammunition. ~Mq returned one thousand seven hundred eighty-five (1785) 
rounds of HEAT ammunition to Division upon Regiment's order. 

Registered in defensive fires at 1850 and prepared to harass 

during the night. 

U. "D" PLUS TWENTY - 11 March, 1945 ; 

Our orders were the same as the preceding period and no 
preparation was fired due to the' fact that zones of action were so small that it 
did not permit the use of artillery. At 1220, Forward Observers were ordered to 
return to the battalion area. At 1300 there was no change in the front lines, and 
no casualties during this period. We expended one hundred sixty-nine (169) rounds 
cf ammunition in our fires, which consisted of five (5) harassing, and six (6) 
targets of opportunity, making a total of eleven (11) missions. There were no 
harassing missions tdf the night* 

V. ' "D" PLUS TWENTY -ONE - 12 March, 1945 ; 

Ordered by Fourteenth Marines to fire preparation in Fifth 
Division's zone of action, which we complied with by firing two hundred seventy- 
seven (277) rounds of ammunition, .ve returned all W,P. shells to Division on 
order of Fourteenth Marines, total amount returned one thousand forty-two (1042) 
rounds. There were no casualties during this period and only one (1) preparation 

W. "D" PLUS TWENTY- TWO - 13 March, 1945 ; 

Received oral order from Fourteenth Marines that there 
would be no preparation,, but to be ppepj&red to fire on call. At 0810, given order 

to secure Fire Direction Center but leave guns in firing position. Also to secure 
from firing in Fifth Divisions 20 ne of action. No casualties or ammunition ex- 
pended during this period. 

X. "D" PLUS TWENTY- THREE - 14 March, 1945 : 

At 0800 given orders to start loading equipment aboard ship. 

Y. . "D" PLUS TWENTY -FOUR - 15 March, 1945 : 
> »' . < 

At 1330 order to prepare to board ship at 1400. At 1730 
embarked aboard APA-172. 


This battalion fired a total of sixty- two thousand eight 
hundred thirty-three (62,833) rounds during the operation. The expenditure ac- 
cording to types of ammunition is as follows: 



HE, M48 

31,524 50 

HE, M54 

19,873 31 

Wp, M57 

7,819 13 

AT, M62 

3,617 6 


62,833 100 

The expenditure 

according to types of fire is 



Defensive and Harassing 


Targets of opportunity 








* - Miscellaneous fires include registrations, marking concentrations, testing 
ammunition, etc. 

• - 20 - 





The ammunition, as loaded, at Pearl Harbor, did not lend it- 
self for maximum efficiency in unloading. It was loaded from Bow to F p ntail to per- 
mit unloading by various types of fuze. This caused a mix-up of fuzes when the am- 
munition was piled against the bulkheads (See Diagram No, l). In the future, it 
would greatly facilitate unloading if all H,E. were loaded onto the LST last (See 
Diagram No, 2). Ammunition should be loaded with aisle down the center of the Tank 
Deck., but in such a manner that when dunnage is removed it can be stacked against the 
bulkhead by fuze without mix-up. Piling ammunition in the center of the Tank Deck 
vsry often causes loaded DUKW T s to wait until the damaged DUKW's are repaired. By" 
piling ammunition against bulkheads, the damaged DUKW's can be maneuvered so that 
loaded vehicles may leave wi thout delay. 


j. JL< 


|7- j i 'i a 

r A 

AS LP A D rl D 



S &Glz±T£ D 




It was found that the SCR 609-610 radio was unsuitable for 
an amphibious operation. Great difficulty was experienced in keeping the sets 
alligned. Also, because of its great weight, the Forward Observers could not give 
the set the care it required in handling. In addition, the long unflexible antenna 
was a constant menace to personnel in front line positions. It was imperative that 
they keep the antenna below a mask which resulted *in poorer communications and the 
necessity, in many instances, of a relay station. 

It was also found that, although we had two channels within 
our battalion, we were still hindered by not being able to contact other units. It 
is recommended that some set similiar to the "300" with variable tuning be used in 
the future. 



* > Itr i£ Vecommenkifeci that Forwar 

d Observer Teams be landed 

Subject: Operation Report (f#V«#ll) HfiCwWPlf lf 7Mar45 l-14Mar. 

no sooner than the Infantry's fifth wave. Experience has shown that by the time 
artillery has landed and set-up, the Forward Observers have had plenty of time to 
locate their respective units, 


The one (1) Carrier, M29-C provided the battalion for this 
operation proved invaluable. It is suggested that more be issued each unit. 


DUKW' s were constantly in need of repairs and fuel. The 
designated repair ship could not adequately handle the damaged vehicles. As a 
r. suit, many sank for want of minor repairs or fuel. Bowser Boats could not always 
ro found. 

LST's housing DUKW ! s should be equipped with hoses for re- 
fueling the vehicles alongside, without being taken aboard. Provisions should also 
bo made for emergency welding of DUKlAF's on the Tank Deck. 


- 22 - 


2nd Battalion, 14 th Marines, Operation Report. 



STgrvPIfW, Is Planning and Preparation. 

Organisation • • 1 

Planning. 1 

Training 2 

"°ehearsal 2 

TOTIOff lis Movement to the Objective. 

"Rehabilitation 2 

Shipboard Training 

Forward Area Rehearsal* ^ 

S^CTTOT Ills Shl-o to Shore rovenent. 

Tactical plan for landing • * 

Control plan* • * •♦• 4 

description of landing. j , .... 5 

STjTIOff IV; flarrativa of Operation.. 

Survey > 7 

Fire Adjtistnent - * ^ 

^ire Direction ® 

""Jnamv action against our Artillery ^ 

35?#RTrtiv«n*sfl-5*f .oiar .Art illary. 10 

Bomattn^c&tions 10 

Manage • Center • 10 

!a*!4t>V.*vff 1(5 

Telephone ...11 

Telegraph . . ........... 12 

Air Earning* IP 

Signal SuppIv . 1? 

Signal Repairs . I* 5 

Intelligence 1"> 

Ammunition Supply. • . * 1** 

Supply. J. 14 

Ordnance 14 

Motor Transportation. . 1 A 

Administration . , . . 14 

Training Deficiencies IB 

Personnel. , . . 15 

loading.. . 1* 

Transport Quart e master 16 

Load ing. . • . • 16 

TThloading 16 

ywioyr v,s Consents, and ^ocomnendations . 


ng and Preparation. 


"he battalion was organized in accordance with the -nr«sent tables 
of organization Into three 105MM howitzer firing "batteries? and a 
Headquarters and Service Battery. A rear echelon of one Officer an* 
48 enlisted men was formed within the "battalion and remained at the 
Bane ^ajrro. This 'battalion was assigned the mission of direct surmort to 
BCT P,^ 9 and the normal forward observer -parties -nlus a liaison -narty 
was assigned to the BCT Headquarters. These parties traveled to the 
target area with their r^s-nective BLT's and with the POT Headquarters. 

The firing batteries were snlit into two grouns for the movement 
to the target area. The "battery' executive officers and the. howitzer 
sections of the firing "batteries traveled aboard an IjST with the 
howitzers and essential combat equipment nreloaded in "nTTFTT 1 The 
remainder of the firing battery .officers and enlisted -personnel 
travelled aboard the Headquarters A^A of ^CT 93. 

Headquarters and Service Battery was also sn 1 it into two grouns. 
"he battalion Commander and his staff, plus the majority of Headquarters 
and. Service Battery T>ersonnel were aboard the Headquarters ABA of "°CT 93. 
^e battalion Executive Officer with an auxiliary staff and ordnance • 
•personnel, nlus the remaining personnel of Headquarters and Service 
Battery, were embarked aboard the 1ST. 

At the transfer araa eight officers and one hundred and -fifty (l^o) 
men from the firing batteries and Head quarters and Service Battery ware 
transferred to the LST.' In ad.dltibn twenty men were transferred to the 
artillery regimental TjST as an ammunition working narty. Bemaining aboard 
the APA vrere the Battalion Beconnaisance party, one hundred and six men 
and one officer from the batteries, and the unloading detail -nlus the 
vehicle drivers* 


'Prior to leaving *the base canm a regimental -planning hut was 
established where roans, aerial •ohotogranhs, and intelligence studies 
vrere made available to the Battalion Commanders, executive officers, 
operation of^ic^rs, and intelligence officers. This material was 
carefully studied I, ' and. the assigned -position areas were gon^ o^er in 
detail. The routes of approach, the nature of the beaches, and all 
■possible obstacles that might "be m^t were given careful attention. As 
the nlans for the operation were made available, these were studied in 
detail, and the -plan f or the employment of the Bivision Artillery was 
formulated. The staff became thoroughly familiar with' its mission, the 
mission and plan of tVs division and that of BCT 23 in •particular. All 
conceivable -problems that might arise were discussed and, so far' as 
•possible, .solutions worked out. As a result of this study a Battalion 
■plan wa"s formulated and was nut into effect so far as conditions- 
■permitted during the rehearsal. 

training! * 

The Battalion had reached, a high state o^ training prior to leaving 
for the Iwo Jlma operation. }Tra in ing had been completed in "battery, 
battalion, and .regimental firing exercises. This battalion had just 
recently been converted from ?5T$M -pack howitzers to 105MK howitzers, but 
the personnel readily adapted themselves to the new weapons. In addition, 
training had be<*n completed in smail ems, local security,' chemical 
warf are, .first aid, field sanitation, and - In landing operations. It was 
felt that the battalion was trained an* ready for combat* • ' . 


■ x , The Battalion partici-na'ted in a rehearsal for the Iwo Jlma operation 
on I faui Island, , during the period 1* January 1945 to 1** January 1945, 
"lie battalion was landed only in the final Phase of the rehearsal on 
15 January 19^5, where the artillery plan was' wit into effect. 

The battalion r econnai sane e -party was boated, at K-hour end proceed e* 
to Baker, control where It *was ordered to land on beach Tel low *> after 
checking in with the P.CT 2^ commander or Tellovr control. The 
reconnaisance party landed at 1^20 on beach ▼allow 2 and -proceeded to 
select a battalion -position area and route of aimroach. The preloaded 
ETOCVP s were ordered launched from the" 1ST by Baker control ah* were 
directed to land on beach Tellow ?. f The f iring batteries were .dispatched 
from t^e line of - departure by t^e Battalion %:ecutive Officer at ten. . 
mimute intervals^ and proceeded to the beach. The TRWfin vrere met by 
battery agents an* guided 'to the -eosition ar^a. Oommunicatiotis were 
tested on the rehearsal and found to be satisfactory. Th*v battalion 
remained in -nnnition overnight and reembarked. the following morning* 

. The plan as executed followed in detail that drawn up prior to the 
rehearsal, an* no difficulties wer^ encountered. 

Section lit Movement to the Objective. - t v . 


Following the rehearsal tl^e battalion underwent a rehabilitation 
period at Pearl harbor, T. P., from 18 January 1945 to January 1°a% 
•with the exce-ntion of the personnel aboard, the L^T who were at T'aneoha 
-Bay from 18 January 1945 to 22 January 1945 for the seme purpose, during 
this period the officers aboard the LST were briefed for the Iwo, «7£ma 
operation by the artillery regimental staff and a similar conference was 
held in Pearl Haybor for the battalion staffs aboard the ^Artillery 
Peadeuarters APA, Other conferences- vrere also held during this period by 
the Pegimnntal Commend nr , " . ■„ _ h . 

While at the rehabilitation area liberty was granted to *fche jfcrpops, 
and organized recreation parties conducted for troops not on liberty. 

.'Shortage?^ of clothing and individual enui-ement vrere *ravm while at 
Pearl Harbor, and. the battalion sailed for the target ar^a well ermiPDsd* 

TTnon leaving the rehabilitation ar^a daily briefing was- held for all 
troops and officer*?. These conferences began with the overall plans being 
■nre«?p>nt«d by various staff meiab«rs to all personnel of the battalion. 
The briefing was then "broken down to battery discussion and then to section 
discussion, "^very attanrot was made to assure every individual's knowledge 
of the minutest details of the operation, ^ach individual was thoroughly 
briefed as to his own job. (what* he was to do, where he was to £0, how he 
was to get t^ere, and. what he was to do when he arrived, there.) "^ach man 
was also thoroughly briefed, as to his sections mission, his battery 1 s 
mission, and. his battalion** mission. All available mar>s and. -nhotogranhs 
were used, extensively in these briefings, and. these same maros and 
photographs were available for individual use at all times. A set of maps 
and -photos was also dis-nlayed on the bulkhead .in the troo-n comnartment« 
All artillery officers embarked aboard the APA attended daily conferences 
conducted bjr the ?CT ?3 staff and thus became familiar with the infantry's 

The battalion staff had access to the late aerial photographs 
received by. the ^CT, and these were of great advantage in preselecting 
base points and check points. 

In addition to the briefing', classes were held in local security, 
care and use of individual weanons, anil parachute attack procedure, 
system for marking of mine fields* first aid k and chemical warfare. Also, 
daily periods of physical drill and weapons and enuipment inspection 
were conducted. 

Foreward Area Rehearsal! 

$he only participation by this battalion in the rehearsal conducted, 
at the forward area was to boat the battalion reconnaissance narty, -orocend 
to the line of departure and return to the ship. The forward observer 
•narties and ■ liaison parties were also boated but did not land. 

Thiring this period a conference was held with the forward observers 
and liaison personnel to go over all plans for the landing and to ; 
identify preselected, base no in ts and check points on the lates aerial 
photographs. A conference was also held aboard the LST wher rt the final 
plans for the operation were coordinated. 

Communications were again checked at this time and found to be. 
satisfactory. . . 

Section III: Ship to shore movement. 

Tactical -elan for landing: 

• The following tactical plan wag devised for 'landing this battalion. 

'"^Phe forward observers were to land with their respective BLT*.s f . one 
£ party landing with the reserve company and the other -party plus the 
* liaison personnel with the battalion Comman^ffti^ ?tfhw Battalion ^Liaison 

vnrMf^TfZG UTJ »w*With'the head.puart«rs group of the ^CT. Accom-oanying 
the b^t^alion liaison officer was a group consisting of a ?ire "nirect-iqn 
team ^nd survey -personnel whose mission was to survey In a -position for the 
tanks and conduct fire on defensive fire missions in the event the artillery 
did not land on ^-day. 

The battalion reconaissanca -party (consisting of Bn-6, Rn~?, ^n-**, 
Bn-4, Ass't Bn-' 1 !, CommO, ^ firing battery commanders, each with one agent, 
Sergeant Major, O-peration Sergeant, ^ire Chief , Radio 'Thief, Survey (Thief t 
Intelligence "WJOj^ CP**, 6 Survey -personnel^ one. corosman, and 4, BAP men.) 
was to "be "boated at ^-hour and -proceed, to Baker control reporting to the 
Artillery Regimental Commander. The reconnaissance "party was to "be ordered 
ashore via yellow control when* the -preselected position area had "been 
cleared of the enemy "by. the infantry. This -party was to reconnoiter the 
"beach, locating routes of a-p-oroach to the -position area, nick battery 
•positions, and CP location, start initial oce/iroation of -position, institute 
survey, and guide the remainder of the "battalion to the Position ar-^a. 
This -party was also to re-port to the Artillery Regimental Commander and POT 
3* Commander if a route of approach was available, condition of "position 
area, and recommend time 'of landing for remainder of the battalion.' 

The firing battery '-personnel and enui-pment Preloaded aboard "HTTKTfig 
on the LST were to be -pre-par^d to launch at H^fiO, on order, an* to -proceed 
to the line of de-parture re-porting in to vnllow control for orders to land. 

The batteries wer° to be dis-P^tched from the line of departure by the 
Battalion "^ecutive Officer at ten minute intervals with Headnuar.ters and 
Service Battery landing last. The remainder of the Keadpuarters and, » 
Service Battery and firing battery -personnel aboard the APA (with the 
exception of the working -party and vehicle drivers) were to boat at 
in two (2) LCH , «? (each containing 1 buHdoser and 1 water trailer) and 
three (3) LC^'s, -proceed to the battalions I*ST where they would Join the 
VHJV'P s and accom-nany them ashore. The two t jCM' q were to leave the line 
of departure ahe-d. of the ^TP^T' s so as to make available the bulldozers 
for whatever -Pioneer work might be necessary on the beach. The LCVP* r 
.were to land with the firing battery W&l* n m . 

Vehicle drivers were to land with their vehicles when orAnrnfl, and 
the working -party was to land with the battalion epuinment as it was 
unloaded # 

The remainder of the -personnel aboard- the LST were to be landed on 
subsequent trios of the ' "TO^'s; • 

Control Plan: / 

The landing' of the artillery wa,s to be controlled in, accordance with 
the following -plan* The Battalion' flommander and his reconnaissance- -party 
" ™*H.4^were ordered to land by the Artillery Regimental Commander, with * * ' *• p 

f. - 

instructions* to re-port to Tellowcontrol before proceeding to the b^ach. 


■narty was to report to ^CT 23 Commander and tha % • 
il |Commander when conditions were satisfactory to land 
s. The wpr-' 5 to be launched on order of Baker eentrol. 

(Artillery Commander aboard) The Artillery Pegimental Command «r was to 
order the W'f a to land through fallow control ( PCT 23 Commander aboard) 
Tha actual landing of the flTO -T 1 s vae controlled "by the Battalion Executive 
Officer. The two LCM 1 s and the three LCVp 1 * were in the charge of an —* 
officer aboard one of the 1/W's, and landed under tha control of the 
Battalion %acutlva Officer. 

• Intra" battalion control was maintained bfr ^C^-SIO radio during tha 
shin to shore movement. "During the shi-n to shora movement, contact with 
the artillery regiment -was also maintained, by. SO^-filO radio. Contact was 
also maintained with ^CT 23 by means of one SCTU^on radio with tha 
Battalion Commander, ^a^-^fi radios were caroled as a secondary means of 
communication in the av^nt of failure of the "battalion $C"P-.filrv set. One 
^CH-610 was" carried "by the Battalion Command ar and was on the artillery 
regimental net and also- on the Battalion Commander -nat.^ 4 The Bajbtalion 
■Executive Off t C nr also had an <?CP-610 on tha artillery regiment net an* on 
the Battalion Command net. ^ach Battery ""btecutive Officer (who wa^ in 
charge of the, firing "battery* s TO"* 1 a)- had an 'SCH-610 on the Battalion 
Command net. The officer in charge of the two LCM 1 * an* thrae t/JVP 1 s had 
an .-W.-610 on the Battalion Command net. There was an SCP-808 get u-n on 
the APA on the Battalion Command net, and the WTKW nlatoon maintained, 
contact with the LST "by means of- SGP.-filO radio (one on the heach and one on 
the L<?T). 

Description of lan^jngt 

debarkation of troorw from A^A's -or oc a ed.ed according to nlan,^ The 
forward observer parties and liaison parties landed with their infantry 
units as planned. The tfb* and TjCVP r^rsonnal boated at A830. and T)rocef>dr*d 
to the tfi m where they reported to- the Battalion "^ecutive Officer.* The 
reconnaissance "narty boated at °922 and -nrocaeded to Baker control . boat 
and reported to the Artillery Regimental Commander, At' 1254 the 
reconnaissance -oarty was ordered to land on Yellow. Beach 1 checking ftn at 
Yellow control. The reconnaissance -narty arrived at Yellow control at 
1^24 an* d«T>arted for th^ beach at 132R. At 1342 the reconnaissance narty 
landed on Yellow Beach 1, 

The situation on landing of "the reconnaissance -narty wag. as follows; 
The, inf an t r^ , had" not' -advanced beyon<i our rvreselected -position ar^a, the 
T$&^p ^$ff$fy *&*k**-Hon was in the -nroceas of landing, *no route of * the 

-b' had bean cut through the terraces, there were vehicle* on the beach 
..that had bogged down in the soft sand,' th^ nature of the beach and the 

. high terraces mad « ..the mov«yrient of T)TTT , -f t s inland doubtful 1 , t^e bench was 
under henvy «nemy- mortar and machine" gun fire. As a result o^ th« abov* 
no inland reconnaissance was mad a at this time t and it was recommended 
that th« landing- of the artillery he 'delayed until 'conditions improved, 

• A1r .tha • XPJJW 1 a were ordered to difjaribarfe and. 'to' tiroc^ad to 
allow control, " At ISOifV alA TCTFF* s war* launched, and t>r©ee«d*d to "fallow 
two l/3M»a and the three LCTP's, At 1530 the T^TTf* were 


ft 1 low Beach 1. 

Tr faen the WYffl n were ordered to land, the reconnaissance rjarty 
selected, "oositions for the firing batteries on the first terrace and for 
the command r>ost, as further Inland wo^m of the s wag not 

f easable at this time. Unemy artillery and mortar fire was stil* 1 heavy 
and machine sun fire on the beach vras smrodic. 

1700 the two LCM' s landed on Yellow Beach 1. 

1730 W B" Battery TXflC'P g and LOT arrived at Yellow Beach 1. 

1745 Battery DOKtf 1 9 and I>O ir P arrived at Yellow Beach 1. 

1R10 M ' l!,,l Battery *0TTKW f s and LCVP arrived at Yellow Beach 1. 

3125 H&| Battery TKJKW's and LVT4 f s arrived at Yellow Beach 1. 

2245 the last TAWl landed on Yellow Beach 1. 

Prom the time o^ the first tJHKW 1 s arrival on the "beach at 1730 until 
the landing o* the last WTKW at 2^45 considerable difficulty was 
encountered in landing the T )TTK T, 7 ! s. Only one DTFH'f was able to land at a 
time ^ue to the condition of the surf and beach, en* it wee necessary 
to mill each "THKty ashore with a bulldozer* ""hiemy artf 1 e r y and mortar 
fire also slowed tit) -the o-eeration. Wo OTW s were hit by enemy fire f but 
some personnel casualties were- suffered due to near misses. Ther* was 
also a Condition Hed during the landing end all "OTTVW' q still afloat wera 
•ordered to the line of departure. to the conditions of th« beach it 

was necessary for severe 1 "OTTVTf 1 s to malre two or three runs to the beach 
before .they were able to reach drv land. 

Ten howitzers wer in -nosition, laid, and ready to fire, and 
registration completed by 2130. The two remaining howitzers -were ashore 
by ?245. 

Section V T : Ifa.rratlve of proration. 

This battalion in direct flutnort.of ^OT 23, was registered in 
position on the right flank of Yellow Beach 1, and ready to fire by 2130 
on D~night. The battalion fired, in the VCH * on e of action during the 
first-night and continued at this mission firing, harrassing fire^ call 
missions, (both unobserved and misgions observed by forward observers and 
air sr>ot) defensive fires, nre-naration fires, and registration fires until 
the morning of 22 February when the 2lst Marines Massed through the 23rd 
Marines. The battalion* s mission was then chenged to direct surmort of th 
21st Marines. 


It^WftV continued in direct sup-nort of the ^Is^t Marines from 
the morning of 22 February until the morning of 26 February when the 
battalion reverted back to. direct sur^ort of ""OT 23. "During this period 
forward observers from the 12th ? Marinas fired the "battalion on targets 
of op-nortunity, ^reparation firas, defensive fires, harrassing fires, and 
base point registrations* Air ?spot also fired missions on targets of 
o-nportunity. From the morning; of 2*5 February until 1 March the "battalion 
was in direct su-rmort of RCT 23 an' 1 carried out its mission in the "^O^ *oi^e 
of action. . Air spot missions vara also fired. 

On- 1 March ROT 23 reverted to "Division reserve and this battalion 
was assigned tha mission of general support, reinforcing the fires of the 
3rd Battalion, 14th Marinas. From 1 March until 6 March tha "battalion 
fired general sup-nort missions for ais snot and reinforcing missions for 
^rd Bat'talion forward observers and unobserved, missions aligned, "by tha . 
3rd Battalion, 14th Marines. 

On % March " Dr ' r l? °3 was again placed in assault and the battalion 
reverted back to diract surmort of tha ROT. From 6 March until tha 
morning of 11 March whan RCT 23 reach tha ocaan in their zona of action 
this battalion fir ad observed- and unobserved, missions for tha forward 
obsarvars, harrassing fires, defensive fires, ^reparation fires, end 
missions for air 8T>ot. 

tilhvm RCT 23 reached the ocean the battalion wa.s withdrawn from 
diract supDort and placed, in fcan^ral su-nnort of t^e 5th Marina "Division. 
From 11 March to 13 March tha battalion continued in general support of 
tha 5th Marina T)ivision and fired -nramration firas and harrassing fires 
in tha 5th Marina "Division zona of action. 


Prior to t^e loading a detailed plan of survey was formulated. It 
was -nlannnd to run a Position area survey, in with the mat) by 
the use of -nresel«ctad control points. From tha mart aerial -nhotographs 
of the battalion* s. -nos it ion area and xone of action, control -noints ware 
selected that could be readily identified on tha mar) and on the ground. 
One control -noint was selected in tha vicinity of the battalion* s 
preselected position area as an initial -noint and other control points 
were selected , that could be seen from the initial point as a means- of 
Establishing direction, A series o^ •nos'-ible base -noints were s^lect^d 

- and tha battalion was to be registered by forward, observers or air 

- observers on any of the preselected base points or any point in tha 
battaliQns zona of action identifiable on the map and ©n tha ground. A 
map TC would thus ba obtained and bfr laying the batteries on the base -noint 

-*'as«a result of registration, the map errors in deflection would be corrected 

- later, whan metro data was available, a F-cha,nge ?md def lection change 
^could be -determined thus increasing. tha accuracy of unobserved fires. 

^ifice the battalion did not , occupy its -nreselected position, and since 
_ np^c(jnji!«62 'poin,ts were available In or around tha vicinity of tha Position 
*£mj£-- ^ccii|»l^f. # *,taa a'bova plan was not put into effect. The tactical situation 
Pl^Vf ^K^t«iiEibility of taking control from one of tha -nreselected 

\*Ji*i},kk M ill 

mfTO^SOT.fet li' As a 'moult, tha battary -oositions w^ra located on tha 
mat) by ins-oaction, an * of i Anting lino astabllshad, and stations sat w> for 
a high burst ad Jus tmant. Ona station was inspactad. on tha J ~ma-n dtractly in 
raar of tha num^ar 'two Maca of tha ragis taring ibattary. and tha othar ■■■ - : - 
station survayad in. TTha high, curat ragistraiion was firad, and tha- othar.. 
two battarlas laid by targa* off sat, Sagistration on an id Ant if lab la basa • 
"ooint'wa^ not "oos<*ibla dua to lacV of obsaryation "by tha observers. 

little firing was dona T>~night dua to lack of hictivity* -tha -zona 
of action. Kowavar, tha forward obsarvars ha'd 1 imit ad -obsarvatlon to, , 
th^lr fVbmt and conductad soma fira missions' with satisfactory rasu-lt*.. „ , 

A > On tha .morning of 20 Fabruary tha coord inat as of tha two baachad 
anamy shlrm wara taVran .from tha ' intaltiganca map, and a, mora accurate 
•n'osition araa survay was run. ftaglstration was also cowplatad Qn an 
idant if labia basa -noint. Whan* control was •'brought, to tha battalion araa. 
by tha ragimantai survay taam it was found that tha^sacond survey was out 
forty, yards in the lataral location of fche ba.ttary positions, ' 

Tha l:2O # 000 Bftn wsfl nsad as tha -firing- chart 

Fira adjustraant; 

Mjustmant of fira on targats was conducted by forward .obsaryars and 
air obsarvars using standard forward obsarvar mathods* In soma 1 casas, dua 
to lack of obsarvation, forward obsarvars ad .fustad fira by sound. In 
-addition soma countar battary fira was adjust ad by tha sound ranging unit, 
Mo O.P. mathods wara usad, Ttowavnr, roacision firas warn adjustad on ' 
-aoint targats using forward obsarvar methods with satisfactory rasults. 

In ganaral, obsarvation was- r>oor, and consida^'abla' uinob sarv*ad fira was 
.. dia 1 .iyarad on suspac tad mortar, artillary, and rockat positions' with tha 
forward obsarvars afcarcising ganaral survailanca whara nossibla. 

Fira dirac'tion: 

•Tha Fira "Oir action Hantar was astabllshad on D-day an* functional 
throughout tha or>aration using standard Marina Mortis nrocadura so far- as- 
-nos^ibla. Tha battalion was .usad in fira for aff act on th<= majority of 
targats. Cantor right was usad. as tha normal method of firp -for adjustment. 
In Tjr^cision fir* 3 sin,??!* 3 nipc°s vara usad for adjustmant and fira for 
aff act on -ooint targats, .. At timas two missions wara conductad simult^na- 
ously using, ona and two battarlas in af^ act In accordance with 
of tha targats, . . ■ 

"Oafansiva firas vara rag is tar ad by "tha fprward, obs^rvarq. us ins tha 
battalion for affaet whan rail ad. ' Tha- da-^ansive concantrations wara also 
Usad 'by tha forward obsarvar s as a •aoint from which to shift firas 
thxoiighout tha night ttiaraby giving aorrolata cov^raga to thalr fromt. 

"^ata for harras^^ng firas »nd -or a-oarat ion firas vara -ora-n^ad in 
advanca and sant to tha bat t arias. '* * 

^ !^ainfor'cing battarias vrara utili^ad in all ty-aa* of>'firas-* 

.\ * Matro* data vms* avail ab la ajid usad. IntttYWm rf&Tfc? !S #tk&ft£'\ -was. o^tan 

-8- ' 

so small' "as- to ba * 


tuation was such that only a 'f ew changes in the bas^e 
and frequent reregistration was accomplished. 

- The 1:20,000 ma-p used as a 'firing chart was generally satisf actory. 
However errors armeared in tonogra-nhical features in the north eastern 
nortion of the island resulting in faulty "Vertical control. 

ffii epy action aga inst o u r artillery.. 

" $n TUday and Tonight enemy mortar an* artillery fire was very heavy 
On th« b.each, However it is doubtful if the enemy knew that they were 
shelling nrtlll«T7r Tuitions. } Their ^ire seemed to cover the "beach 
systematically with the intention of searching out any Blue troons or 

After the "battalion had opened did receive counter battery 
fire In varying degrees of intensity* Around noon of D-olusl the 
"battalion t>osition area underwent a heavy shelling. In a s*nace of ten 
minutes 1*8 rounds were counted falling in the immediate vicinity of >the 
command -nost. This shelling continued for the "better -oart of an hour and 
a half with the first half hour "being the most intense, "his seemed to b* 
the height of enemy artillery action in the battalion area. IVom this time 
on there was a noticeable decline in enemy artillery, mortar, and rocket 
fire in this area, ^ire still fell in the area, snarodically, day and 
night, "but most of the *ire Was directed against landing craft that were 
beaching to unload sullies. 

All -oossible methods available were used in attempts to locate and 
destroy enemy artillery » mortar j and racket launchers, Forward -observers 
adjusted fire on known or suspected -oositlons. Air s^ot did the same, 
Missions were fired for sound and flash ranging teams of the regiment. 
At times individual "nieces were called out to fire direct fire on flashes, 
that could be seen directly from the howitzer -oositions, and on one occassiq 
one battery Was called out to fire direct fire at enemy guns shelling our . V! 
position, the flashes of which could be observed. The ensuing artillery 
duel resulted in the silencing of the enemy guns. 

. The results of the majority of our counter battery fire were not fully 
known, Forward observers credited the battalion with destroying several, 
gun .130 sit ions, mortar positions, and rocket launchers. But, since most of 
the enemy positions were located in caves, pillboxes or blockhonses, 
destruction was difficult, however, neutri ligation was effected and ^nemy 
fire vras reduced. 

The enemy also used his old trick of drorming- mortar fire into pur 
front lines during our artillery* barrages , but the infantry was aw^re of 
this trick and it was not too effective. Only slight time fire was 
encountered by this battalion, and the enemy did not mass any great 
Quantities of artillery fire. The enemy* s -olan of fire, other than on • 
front line units^ a-meared to be to cover preselected areas with individual 
•nieces and batteries, thiekening their fires with mortars and rockets. 

f fr*0pN^ f ire seemed to be prearranged on ■ore'vious'ly" survevp»d area? 

unfin, especially" by one or two guns that fired on 
boats an* artillery uosltions, that was obviously- obs er ve* and a* Justed. 

The enemy fire was sunrisingly ineffective* This seemed to he <|ue 4 to' 
several reasons*. One of the contributing factors was the na&ire of the*" 
soil which was loose sand. This t evented ideal fragmentation, and instead 
of the fragmentation being flat it was thrown into the air, thus -nreventing 
many casualties. It took a direct tijt or a near miss to cause personnel 
casualties in even the shallowest of foxholes. * 

S-evenal of the individual gun nits suffered direct hits or near misses 
that caused "but 'little damage and vkry low casualties to personnel* • .The -'. 
howitzers suffered little damage from shelling. At no time during the 
operation wag- '.any howitzer called out of action "because of damage from • . 
enemy shelling except for the short time required "by the gun crews to effect 
repairs to the gun nit or minor damage *6 the howitzer. „ . V ' 

JWf ectiveness of our Artillery. 

The effect of our artillery fire against enemy artillery, mortars, • 
and rocket launchers varied with the emplacements used "by the enemy. Open 
positions offered no problems and were destroyed whenever located end fire 
could he oh served. Positions in caves, -pillboxes and blockhouses could he 
generally neutralised. In a few isolated cases direct nits using fuse* 
delay were observed to severely damage pollboxes and blockhouses. 

Fire placed on enemy troous proved to be very efi >3 4 J. ve as* in at 
least two instances the battalion was responsible for t«?e?.king up counter 
attacks before they could be effectively launched. 

Artillery fire against tanks also proved effective* tfo reports -have 
been received that the ^ire of this battalion was observed to have destroyed 
enemy tanks. However,, the artillery did kee-n enemy troops *"rom" moving in 
the open with tanks, thus forcing the tanks to withdraw, Some tan v s • 
nrohably were destroyed or at least heavily damaged by artillery fire. 
• > • 

Time fire placed ur>on enemy troops in the open and in open emplacements 
also proved very effective, and was user* whenever "oosslble. 

Smoke was used extensive^r in adjustment as a means of aiding the 
observation of the observers. Smoke was also used to scr«°n the 
evacuation of casualties and the straightening of infantry lines. 

Communicr* tlons r 

Message Center? 

Functioned satisfactorily on this operation. 


T3X - Three sets "were carried, on this operation but situations 
requiring their use did not arise. 

'■' TOS - This set -narformed in a highly satisf actor??" manner for air* 
•ound communications. 

v ""„~ iiSipi Acwn r * 

'Proved to be de-oendable set and was used where the 
situation "permitted the operation of the «JeeT>. 
. 3CJt 610 - Considerable difficulty was experienced with this radio as 
a means of communication for the forward observers. The disadvantages of 
this set for this tyr>e of o-neration are? 

1*. It is a two man load, and if one man is se-oerated from the tesm the set 
is useless. The SCR 610 is too heavy to he made into a one man load* ' 

2. The antenna when fully extended, due to its size, draws considerable 
enemy fire thus interfering with fire missions. If the antenna is not 
fully extended the working range is greatly reduced. 

3. When the set is being moved about over rough terrain, the tuning 
adjustments are moved, thus setting it off frenuency. 

4. 5To communication is available with this set xvhen the forward observer is 
moving on foot. Occasionally serious delays in fire missions were caused 
by the time reouired in setting ud the radio. 

5. The short life of the batteries and fuses also work to disadvantage 
on this set as a forward observer radio. 


In this operation telephone communication w^s the outstanding 
feature of this battalion's ability to deliver fire at all times. A 
forward switchboard was maintained at the !P.0T5?3 command -post continuously. 
Two trunk lines were overhead ed to the forward boards facilitating two 
channels for fire commands coming from forward observers to the ?T)C. In 
the event our trunk lines were knocked, out a lateral line was laid between 
our forward board and the "^CT 23 board; This lateral guaranteed a me?>ns 
for carrying on fire missions* *Yom the forward board lines were laid 
to our battalion liaison officers and' the forward observers* 'Whenever 
possible the 3T0 lines were laid through the battery liaison off icers 
"nosition where the liaison officers were rjartied in enabling them to 
monitor any fire mission from their forward observers. If the line to. the 
forward observers could not be advantageously laid through the liaison 
officers -nosition, a separate line was l»id to him from the forward board 
where he was made a T>arty to all his forward observer's calls. In 
addition to this net night all the forward observers were tied in b$r 
lateral lines which was advantageous during mortar barrages or wh^n th« 
enemy cut our lines. At night all our forward observers were cross 
t> lug/red. at the forward, board so each f orward observer would know what the 
other one was doing during the night. It also was a good means of checking 
fire missions*- 

At all times our radio with the liaison officer at SOT 23 maintained 
a 24 hour watch. All forward observers were instructed to come ut> on their 
^CR 6lO f s when wire communications went out* 

Our f orward board and wire lines were an aid to the infantry and their 
lines aided us as well. The infantry battalion laid locals to bur liaison 
officers who could always contact their forward observers if necessary 
through the infantry fihone. To keen un with t^e reserve battalions when 
they moved forward, a line was laid to the rest area. When about to move, 

the battalion, went to their new -nosition, laid line 


d wi^Mf-^O; t^en it was relaid with .W- 11$ 
and #ne forward observers. , 

We also maintained a su^ly" dumn of signal gear At our forward "board 
for both radio «ad wire, work, 1 • & 

Telegraph? • , • -> 

Fot used on this operation. 

Air Warning! ' 

Comnletely satisfactory*!* * " * " ' '• 

Signal Sunnlv! 

' Satisfactory. . 

Signal Penair^ = 1 

Initially all signal renalr was' c«x*riM on within thn bnt tali on, -and 
satisfactory results obtained, Whenever nossible this T)l«n was ■nref^ri'ed 
as' it reduced the time that enuinmont was out of action. 


The following mans and nhotogranhs were su^nliefl to this battalion 
nriof to departure fr on the rehab ili tat ion '^ar^a! •' 

1/20,000 w/grid... ............. .....40 

l/2o t oorv w /o grid.. *tf 

1/10,000 w/grid...... . ...32 

1/5,000 w/grid. 10 

1/5,000 w/o grid... 4 

1/5,000 Assault man... ............ .26 

T/10,000 Mosaic... 35 

1/20,000 Mosaic ?1 

1 /10 p 000 S i tuat ion 0-2 man 6 

H.O. Chart 1 

1/10,000 Beach man "A".. 1 

Man - 2 inches» 1 nautical mile...,* 4 
1/10,000 "^ast Beaches. 1 
l/lo^ooo tf^st Beaches.*; 1 

• • B^ach T)lagram ^ast;.: * 1 

* .Beach Uia ■ram West.. 1 

Beach profile. , 1 

1/7,000 Mosaic... k 1 

Oblinue "Blowuns ,f 3 

In addition to the above, all nhotogranhs and ma-^s, rec« iv^d by the 
BC? 23 aboard shin were made available to the battalion enroute to the 

All mans and nhotogranhs were us^d for briefing. v;ith the exertion 
of the H.O.. Chart and Nautical man t . Uhe .1/5,000 grinded man nrovf** 
exceptionally useful for. briefing largn.grouns. 1?hR 1/20,000 mans were 

Battery firing fcharts. The 1/10,000 mar>s were used "by the Forward Observers 
liaison Officers, Operation Sergeants and Intelligence Section. 

The -nhotos that were made available to the forward observers and * 
liaison officers during ..the .proration were not suf f iciejit. 

The 1/20,000 and l/lO,ono mans of Iwo Jima were inaccurate in certain 
•nor t ions, »e specially 'in the northern portion of the island. That Dart of 
the mar) coul/{ not be v used f or f.irliig hy the forward ohseirveVs errce-^t in 
conjunction with aerial ;nhbWs due tto the inaccuracy of to"oograr>hlc*l 
features. ,. ' ' " . ' .*'*''/ 

The~ sWoty df* mat>s issued was not sufficient. The l/l»\OO0 t^e 
should he increased to 42 instead of 32. The 1/20,000 tyoe increased 
to (50 instead of 40. • - - • " - 

>: . Only one. set. of nho.tos was received after D-day hy the "battalion. 
This set .was .received late in the operation and was .not of -o^rtlrul^r value 
in locating , targets .for unobserved f irj». 'One man was received, after 

G*Jk 'reproduced 4 aheray man, and! was used in conjunction with the 
situation mau. 

Ammunition frtrnrilys 

The initial suTroly of ammunition waV^re loaded in the DTTFI'Ms.- ' The 
to,tal amount of ammunition landed with the first trio of DTT^n s wns 
rounds of H.S. ^.e^u^ly of ammunition was ' hjy the -"battalion TRVPit* g 
unloading from the t&T and by ^gimen-fcal "'5)TJK>r* s unloading from the 
Regimental TjST.' Wo ammunition was received during the liight of D-day.' 
however, four £^54* s were loaded"' hut "landed on the wrong "beach arid did 
not arrive at the Dosition unii'l *dajm"*of Dolusl. By noon of DrP.usl, 
1112 additional rounds had ^been' receive*.' "From "the afternoon of 'Dnlusl , 
until the- initial swmiy of soven units of ^ire^had "been unloaded, the" 
ammunition surely was satisfactory, but at no time during the he«t of the 
operation w*.s. a reserve, built ten. Ihe resurrnly of ammunition was 
extremely glow, in being landed. The de<lay.a-n"oeared to be in the : shir* to * 
shore movement, as once the ammunition was on' the "6e?\ch it'was rabidly" 
-distributed. ,,„Du^ing the latter -neriod kj the ammunition reached dangerously 
low leyels* Toward $h§ end .of the o-n^ratidn . the su"0T>ly increased and it 
was only at this time that the battalion had. a reserve survnly on hand. 

Ammunition emended by tyne of fuse: 
, M-54.. ...19 ,469 .jpounds ^ . . ^ _ . , .. 
M-4S f . ts , jA$f®- : roj^dfl;'* ; ~ '.y V" • ? ^ ' /' 
M-f^..... 2,760 rounds '* % * ' *' "* ' 

Total ,ltoa^dfidj^ f ^fi,605^ . „... ;v 

Ammunition expended hy type .of miss ions r ^ ..... ... 

JVeT>aratipn t .,»>,* . * , . * . 98^ . row &»»^ • 
Targets of o-o-nortunity ,7,079 rpu^d^'J'i^.tr." .^47 missions' ' 4 
, Defensive flr^v*. 'tjQM roundsv** . vrv: ;"'^9 'missions * \ = - 
Jt:4?5|str:ation., 590 rounds... ..... • 58 missions 

1X11013 serve* art* Ke.rrassin^ f ir«««#4 t 554 rounds missions 

Counter "battery. . f . . I , . , . ., , 5.538 rounds. . . . . .25B miAsiftns 

Total ^O t 60f> rounds 1767 missions 

-problems of storage of ammunition were encountered. 

+ I 

Wo.chwvas are recommended for the unit of fire in view of the new 
unit of fire which" armeer** to "be entirely satisf actory. 


All types of mounting out 8UT>Tilles were a*ecjuete. The resu^ly of all 
classes of •euTrolies was adequate, However, the rate of reeuih-oly of lO^mm 
howitzer ammunition was not satisfactory. 

""bccp-nt for the resnnply of ammunition, the "battalion ha* no suxvoly 
problems. In general, surroly on this or^ration was extremely s»tisf actory f 


Twelve lORmn howitzers were used for a "neriod o^ twenty three days. 
JTo ho^it*ers vprp lost during* the o-oaration. It was neces^r^ to .replace 
one tube a.s the lands and f?reo'veq sheared out ai#ht inches ^ron the ' 
forcing cone at sir o* clock. The tube was r enlace*, "by the division , , 
Ordnance, an* the 'howitzer was out of action for arr^roximately • one hour* 
The lower "nur^in^ -r >lu£ on one howitzer was rer>la,ced , and the -oiece was 
out of action one half hour, Five sights were re-nlaea* ft-de to damnnoss. 

One hovrit^er was observed to fire continuously three hun*red yar*s 
short. A M K H was armlie* to the sltfht to correct for this error, an* the 
■oieco Was examined "by Division Or*nanc^ with no defects oh servo*.. 

The "battalion's howitzers stood uo exceptionally well throturhont 
the o-oeration, an* one reason for the lack of malfunction was the fact 
that low charges, wern use*. 

^nare T>e.rts a>n* accessories were adequate. 

Motor Trans-oortat ion? 

The, battalion carried nin^ 1/4 ton 4x A trucks (radio f»nnin^' , ) l two 
1/4 ton A x4 cargo trucks, two 1 ton A x4 trucks, tvro TD-9 tractors with 
angle dolors,, one carrier two w^ter trailers, and one l/ A tone 4x4 

ambulance. On* 5 TD-9 tractor received a direct artillery hit an* w«s . 
rendered unserviceable. 

The attaqhed TJIHTf' s were use* ^or moving surrolies. 

Wo motor trans-oortation problems were encountered on this o-oeration. 

ujetho* use* during 'this o-nnration fo~ renortlnr casu^lti^s an* 
'Ft casualty car*s in re-nortln/r Y.lh an* T ' r IA r>rove* to "be satisfactory 
' n v *. v |V V«- ; * -14-, 

Fo admlnist ration t^roblems were encountered.. 

-* ■ t. • . . . , . 

The morale of the troops of this "battalion was at a high .level 
throughout the operation". The landing an* occupation of -no <j it ion was 
accomplished under the most difficult o^ conditions, "but all hands 
carried out their assigned jobs with determination and ability. At no 
time and under no conditions was there a slacking in the will o^ tha 
troops- to dalivar tha maximum amount of sum>ortin.<? fire to tha Infantry 
with s'*oeed and accuracy. - ■ •'• 

As an aid to maintaining morale .tha trao-os, were ke^t informed of 
t>ie situation-, and tha na.tur'r of targets fired on, and tha results 
obtained ware massed down to the howitzer sections. The early landing of 
ten-in-ona rations and the new type C-rations also ai*ed th^ morale of the 
troops. . . : . . * 

Training "Hef iclencles » . 

Wo training *ef iolencies ware encountered, on the operation with the 
exce-ntion of th« fact that the battalion has several officers that are no£ 
artillery school graduates. Time permitted training t^ese officers only in 
f or ward- ob servers and liaison duties. The performance of duty of thes^ 
officers as forward observers and. liaison officers was entirely satisfac- 
tory.- < ' i \ . 


The only personnel problem encountered on this operation was in 
Veering the forward observer and liaison parties up to strength due to 
casualties. . .. .. 

Ipad',, . . '.. ... , i- 

The battalion 1 s .eoui^ment. was combat, loaded aboard three shi^s," the 
1ST,, .the headquarter,*. A?A of . .iRC* ' o* , and t*e *C5 PA AFA. All essential 
combat equipment , .three units of, fire of arti 1 "'ery ammunition, ,tvo units 
o'f ^'ire .of . small ;ara,s ammunition,: .andean initial supply : of water ah'^ rations 
were load od .aboard, t!)e. General cargo aouiTiment such as chemical 

warfare and. camp .etm^pjne&t* -Tri-Xk* ^vehicles were* loaded aboa'rd the APA. • ' 
Three unijbs of fire of . artillery aWiunition "Olus vehicles were load 'ad. 
aboard .the* AKA. One unit of fir ft of tfte "Wiita lion' s 'initial su-nroly of ' 
s^yen uriit* was loaded ab<>a-rd ihe'ar 'tiller y regimental IS5>.'- -Ia addition, 
one half unit of fire of 75mm pack howitzer ammunition;! wag load a* aboard 
the battali04 ! s IfiT. 

"The bat £a Hon Had " a t6aeh'«'d' Tor ' thi s * or»er a t ioii e ight een WW <?• and 
two 12f$4* s- which ^4r.fe-*^^le'd' v a5d'ay i 'd the "T^T,, 7?ive>; W 7 ^! 1 & wr'T^ assigned 
t"b each f'iring battery "VCnd weye preloaded with the howitzers* ammunition, 
and essential .equipment. Two wpf* s were assigned to H<V? Battery and were 
-bra loaded .with essential eyj'ufpmerit . f ; Qne * T TDTfT' was equ&Tvpefl as -a* mafntainence 
!ftJKvr*piid." was p-f -no. tise' in "unlcfadlrig "supplies o'r' 'rt<*uipment.. . '12h* two •L t ^ At s 
vara ^sigrred -to ''ftt^S- Salary arid were 'r&b&G&Artfi With one: ^l M*\ ton "4x4 struck 
(radio.) eachv' nlii^ -eiif^tial'.^uiTM^V/ '-. • 

' I I,-. . ; 

4 The combat loading of this battalion -proved to "bo satisfactory ^nd 
the *T>riprity of unloading awsignad the vehicles was satisfactory* The . 
two TD-^ tractors with angle dosser were : made available for unload in/? by 
-a Ins ^O which made' the subsequent landing of the dtTjnft $ -nossible. 

Transport Quartermaster! 

Th^ battalion 1 s transport onartarmast^r worked in conjunction with 
thf» "^CT 2^ tr.ansr>ort ouarternaster arid tho following ro-nort covers the 
broad scheme. 


(l) APA: Tha total time renuired to load the TtfJT nlus summer tin,? 
unitls involved ^ A hours. Ona major delay was encountered in hold d n o 
to shin 1 s regulations, which required the reloading of gasoline drums 
cotrorising a-o-nroxinately one half of the cargo, s^ac^ .in that hoi*. This 
reload in.-? necessitated tha altering, 'of. tha organisational gear ' 
distribution for that hold, This delay involved about 2 hours* Otherwise 
loading want according to nlan and wa« very aff iciant. • - • 

(3) XjST: Loading of this shin consumed .12 hours. Tha only ' 
difficulty encountered was tha method of loading ammunition. Tha 105mm 
anr.uniti-on was lord ad behind 75mm ammunition which made tha 105mm 
airf?rriinition difficult to unload until tha t*mn ammunition vras cleared from 
the "shin. " ' 

T ^adfog: ' . 

~ : (l) APAs Tha time involved to unload v V m -olus sunnorting units con— 
frtJMA a total of ?21 hours. High ariority cargo uas unloaded according to 
schedule and dis-oatched to tha beach control boat. High -priority 
tailldading- consumed 3 days and involved a/n-nroximately 26 working hours. 
TMvlayc! encountered during this unloading* war a due to- air raid alarms and . . 
t#ia-,shlT) retiring at night. After tha high nriority gear wa.s d lsTwtchad. 
general unload ing did not begin until I>ntus7 *nd""w&s accomplished by 
"TWlus^. ; The delay between dnluS and Talus' 7 was a result of waiting for 
the general unloading order to be given by higher achelon. Any delay 
fSfcom "Oplu^ to "H-oliiS was from the unaVailibility of lending shlos. # Total 
vMrlfcing hours consumed, for general unloading consumed arrnroximataly 
1<i hours," ' ' ... , 

1ST: *" fjia time involved, to unload the L^T consumed **0' hours* 
On a major 'dalay was* for 1^ hours due to a mechanical d efficiency in tha 
0>SiT) t s ram-a an*- doors. Other delays were due to the lacV of dTTTrwt $ 
^ujfc to o-nerational casualties.* and the retirement of the shia during 
tfAias). ..... 

* *■ ; ■ ■ . .... ' 

'\'^ * "difficulties encountered in unloading "were largely due to weather and 
b'4ach conditions » Tha majority of the time, craft smaller than an. T/5M 
^ouid not be accented at the' beach. During air raids the shin did n ot 
have sufficient -personnel t t o man both their general Quarters stations 
and their unloading stations. >ia to rough weather and beach conditions 
only landing shins and LCE^ a were being used for unloading and ther^ was 

desired shortage of this tyne of craft. If -nossible more LCT' s and 
g^ ^ pg F" ( fy^ lt\ ^^'^^^ ^ or ^ e ^SKA's and the APA 1 s for unloading their 

Standard APA rigging, slings and nets were used, all of which were 

adenUate. Wo changes RTfl suggested. 

SPOT T ION V» i Comments and P.e commendations. 

•'.r.. • • -h ;•>."' -v.---- 'p-^-v ttr. .•>.*• 

The chief nrohlems encountered hjr this "battalion on o-oeration were 
the direct result of the peculiar nature of the island itself c and the 
majority of comments made elsewhere in this re-oort are of value only in so 
far as operations of this ^articular nature are concerned, The exce-ntionr 
ally long -oeriod of time renuired to land the "DTTI n 'i' s was ^ip chiefly to 
the nature of the "beach and the fact that no Pioneering work had "been 
done on the "beaches or terraces nrior to the landing of the "battalion. 
The "battalion's an^rle doners r>roved invaluahle in teaching the ^riT'^c. 
and it is essential that for any future operations of this tyne that the 
full r £BA allowance of angle dozers he landed ahe&d of the firing hatter leg, 

The SCR filo radio did not -orove to he too satisfactory for use "b^ the 
forward ohservors on this -particular o-nerat ion* Fowever, in an operation 
where the tactical situation -nermits. the use hy the forward oh server of 
the 610 mounted in a l/ A ton A x4 trucV s it should r>rove to he r*. 
satisfactory set. '''There the SCR 610 mounted in a vehicle is used f the 
SOP. ^6 would he advantageous for communication "between the forward, 
oh server and his radio station. 






3rd Battalion, 14th Marines, Operation Report « 





Organization - - - - - 1 

Plans and Training 2 

Loading - ■ 2 

Rehearsal n ^ — — — 3 


Rehabilitation 4 

Shipboard Training 4 

Forward Area Rehearsal - 4 


Tactical Plan 5 

Control Plan ~ ~ ~ 6 

Description of Landing 7 


Missions and Daily Operation ------- 11 

Tactical Employment and Effectiveness 

of Artillery - 12 

Summary of Ammunition Expenditure by 

Tyt>es of Firing-- 13 

Survey - - - - 13 

Fire Direction and Fire Adjustment 14 

Liaison --------15 

Communication 17 

Wire -17 

Radio 13 

Observation --20 

Administration - -------- 21 

Motor Transport ------------ 21 

Training Deficiencies 21 

Intelligence 22 

Enemy Action Against Our Artillery 22 

Employment of Enemy Artillery - — 23 

(a) Tactical Employment - - 23 

(b) Types of Material Used by Enemy 
Artillery , 23 

(c) Effectiveness of Enemy Artillery 23 

Supply 23 

Transport Quartermaster --------24 

Loading LST 24 

Ordnance - - -26 

Weapons -- - - - - - - - - - - — - 26 

Ammunl tion- ------------ 27 


Section I - Planning and Preparation, 

At the time eff the I wo Jima operation this • 
Battalion was organized, in accordance with the 
T/0, into three Firing Batteries and a Headquarters 
and Service Battery,.. The only change from the T/0 
made by the Battalion was the grouping of machine 
gun and ingiaeer- personnel of all the Batteries into 
a Battalion Security Platoon in order to insure 
coordinated all-round security. 

For the purpose of the operation Itself the 
Battalion was divided into tactical groups,- The 
Battalion Commander selected a reconnaissance party 
from the Staff and firing batteries. The party in- 
cluded the Bn-2, Bn~3 with Operations Sergeant, 
Survey Officer with Survey Team, Communications Off- 
icer with two radio teams, Security Officer with BAR 
men and engineer personnel, and the three Firing Batt- 
ery Commanders with their .agents. Forward Observer- 
parties were detailed, two to each infantry battalion 
of the Twenty-fourth Marine Regiment, to which the 
Battalion was to give direct artillery support. These 
forward observers were to be emoloyed as the Battalion 
Commander of infantry dictated, A liaison ' part^ was 
detailed from the Battalion to the. support 3d Regiment, 
The remainder of the Battalion was split) into two groups 
an LST group and a Transport group. 

Since the Howitzers of the Battalion were',.", 
preloaded in DUKW ! S loaded aboard the LST, the 
LST group was composed largely of firing battery 
personnel and such headouart ers personnel as were 
necessary to the massing of fires of the battalion. 
The Battalion Executive Officer was Placed in command 
of this group. The transport group consisted of all 
other personnel of the Battalion, less a rear echelon 
of one officer and 49 men left at the Base Camp. 
Nine Officers and one hundred fifty men were transferred 
from the Transport- G-roup to the LST at the forward 
staging area. An additional twenty men were transferred 
at this time to the Regimental ammunition LST for un- 
loading howitzer ammunition, . - , < 

-1- " 

eration report cont ! d. 

Plans and Training, 

The Be ttalion' began to plan and train for .the 
I wo Jima operation in early November, 1944 on receipt 
of Division Operations Order 4A-44 (Training). The 
Battalion in problems with the Battalions of the 
Twenty^- fourth Marines immediately set to work to 
prepare itself for operation in completely bare 
terrain, end, to develop a system of close liaison 
with infantry battalions. 

It was decided that Battery Commanders should 
act as liaison officers to the infantry Battalion 
Commanders, thus providing for a third artillery 
party witji each infantry battalion. 

In anrohibious exercises the battalion undertook 
additional work on the technique of DUKW control in 
the Ship to Shore movement. 

Division CPX's provided opportunity for testing 
liaison agencies, and establishing a communication 
plan with the newly received SCR 610 and 808 radios. 

With the establishment of the Regimental Planning 
Hut, open to the Battalion Commander, the Battalion 
Executive Officer, the Battalion 2, and the Battalion 3, 
Plans and training, specifically for the I wo Jima 
operation, went hand in hand. 

Excellent photographic coverage made possible an 
early estimate of the terrain' difficulties, presented 
by the beach, craters, and terraces. 

By the loading date the Battalion had attained a 
high state of training for this specific operation. 
The early promulgation of orders was a definite aid in 
this resoect. 


Battalion loading commenced on 31 December, 1944 
with the loading 6f ammunition aboard the LST »t Pearl 
Harbor under supervision on the Battalion Ordnance 
Officer, This was complete by 1 January, 1945, On 2 
January, 1945 loading of vehicles and gear on board 
transports commenced under supervision of the Battalion 
T.Q,.M. This was complete by the afternoon of 3 January, 
1945 when Forward Observer Parties, The Battalion 
Liaision Party, The Battalion Reconnaissance ^arty and 
personnel of the Transport Group embarked on their res- 
pective transports: Battalion Headquarters aboard PA 206, 

3rd Bn, 14th Marinas, Operation Report cont f d. 

tha remsindar of tha Transport (3-rouo aboard PA 118, 
Battalion loading was completed when on 10 January, 1945, 
under supervision of the Battalion Executive Officer, 
DUKWS with preloaded howl tzars war a load ad aboard tha LST 
1031 at Maui, T.H,, and personnel on tha LST Group em- 
barked on tha LST 1031, 

At this time an additional 1800 rounds of 75mm 
Pack Howitzer ammunition, and 20 rounds of 105mm yallow 
smoke ware loadad on tha LST, Plus small arms ammunition, 
concertinas, and soma additional watar in fiva gallon cans 

Rah ears al» 

From 13 January, 1945 to 17 January, 19 45 tha 
Battalion participated in a rehearsal'' in Maalea Bay, 
Maui, T.H. On 13, 14, and 17, January, 1945 Forward 
Observer parties particioatad in small boat exercises 
with ths co mo mi 3 b of the Twanty- fourth Marin as. On 
15 January, 1945 the ' Reconnaissance Party and sixteen 
DUKWS were disembarked and landed on Yellow 2 Beach. 

Forward Observer Parties landed with their units. 
The Reconnaissance Party proceeded to Baker Control and 
on order of the Regimental Commander proceeded on to the 
beach. A reconnaissance for position was made, positions 
selected and agents posted on the beach to guide the 
DUKWS into position. On order the DUKWS were launched, 
and after clearing Baker and Yellow control 1 s proceeded, 
to the beach by batteries at tan minute Intervals. 

Control by the SCR- 610 radios was good. The 
batteries landed and were guided to the position area 
where they spent the night. On- the following day the 
Reconnaissance Party and Battaries .re embarked aboard 
their ships. > Due to the fact that conditions were 
limited during tha rahearsal*.all DUKWS were not launch- 
ed, beach- and terrain conditions ware dissimilar to 
those of the objective - the value of 'the rehearsal to 
tire Battalion was limited. The most valuable feature was 
the additional opportunity to test* and practice DUKW 


3rd Bn, 14th Marines Operation report cont'd. 

Sejction II - Movement to Objective. 

Re hEbilltati on, 


Following Jthe rehearsal in Maalea Bay there was 
a period of rehabilitation on Oahu, T,H„ for all per- 
sonnel going into the operation. 

Personnel embarked aboard transports had 25$ 
liberty and 50$ of personnel not on liberty went ashore 
in organized recreation parties. t 

Personnel of the Eattalion embarked aboard the LST 
were not able to take advantage of this, A broken bear- 
ing on the LSI 1031 on which they were embarked 
necessitated complete unloading and reloading aboard ' 
LST 648, This was accomplished 20, 21 January, 194.5.", 
The LST sailed from Honolulu 22 January, 1945, The: 
Transport grout) sailed from Pearl Harbor 27 January,., 
1945. • 

Shipboard Training . 

In transit to I wo Jima all troops were thoroughly 
briefed on the nature of the target, the overall plan, 
arid'' their specific duties in enabling this Battalion 
to perform its mission. 

They were also kept informed whan late intelligence 
r aborts and Photographs were received aboard ship. In '■ 
.addition, section drill, physical drill, and weapon and 
clothing inspections were conducted, 

Fq.rward Area Rehearsal. 

'• Upon arriving at the forward area and after = • 
designated Personnel had bean transferred from the 'trans- 
ports to the LST, the Battalion took part to a . 
limited extant in the final rehearsal. Forward Observer 
parties and th^ Battalion Liaison party took part in 
. small boat exercises. The Battalion Reconnaissance 
^arty disembarked in an LGVP and proceeded to Baker 
Control. All communications functioned satisfactorily. 


3rd Bn, 14th Marines Operation report cont ! d. 

Section III - Shio to Shore Movement, 
Tactical Plan. 

The Battalion was organized to land tactically as 
a direct support battalion. Forward Observer parties 
landed with companies of the Twenty-fourth Marines. 
The Battalion Liaison Party landed with Regimental 
Headquarters, Twenty-fourth Marines, Firing Battery 
Commanders landed with the Reconnaissance Party of the 
Battalion, in order to supervise the emplacement of 
their batteries. They were? to report as liaison officers 
to Battalion Commanders' of the Twenty-fourth Marines 
when those battalions were committed. 

The Battalion Reconnaissance Party was to boat up 
at H-hour, reaeh Baker control by H Plus 1 hour. On 
order of the Regimental Commander, and following the 
reserve battalions of the assault regiments, the 
Reconnaissance ^arty was to proceed to Yellow 2 beach, 
clearing Yellow control, prepared to land by H Plus 
2 hours. Upon landing the Battalion Commander was to 
select a position area off- Yellow 2 beach, and reconnolter 
a route of approach. Battery Commanders were to select- 
positions for the howitzers, dispatch agents to the beach 
to act as guides for their respective batteries, Tjhe 
Battalion 2 and Battalion 3 were to assist the Battalion 
Commander. The Survey Officer with Survey team was to 
commence position are'a survey immediately, tying it in 
by traverse to the Corps IP if possible. The Communication 
Officer was to institute his wire Plan, and Pick CP 
installations. Two radio teams with two SCR 610 radios, 
on the Regimental Command and Battalion Command $ets were 
to provide contact with the Regimental Commander and . 
battalion landing control. The Security Officer with 
demolition and security Personnel was to clear the route 
of approach from the beach and the position area itself. 
An angle dozer was to be loaded in LCM as soon after 
H-hour as possible, prepared to go in with the 
Reconnaissance P-arty, to prepare gun Pits and pull 
DUKWS off beach if it should prove nacessary. 

arxfres Operation report cont'd. 

The LST group, under the Battalion Sxeoutive 
Officer, with howlt&ers preloaded in DUKWS, was to be 
launched from the LST on order after H plus 2 hours. 
This grouo was to proceed* to Baker Control, and on 
further order and aftsr clearing Yellow Control proceed 
to the beach by batteries at ten minute intervals, 
2ach battery was to be met by an agent from the 
Reconnaissance Party who wuld guide that battery 
into position. 

After unloading, the DUKWS were to return to the 
LST making as many trios as would be necessary to 
. unload the shir) completely. 

The Battalion TQ^ was to supervise unloading of 
personnel end gear from the transport. This was to 
be accomplished in accordance with needs ashore and 
as boats became available. 

Control Plan. 

A simole control Plan was adequate to meet the 
reouirements of the tactical plan.' Since both the 
Reconnaissance "°arty and the LST grouo were to 'land 
on order of the Regimental Commander,, the Battalion. 
Commander and the Battalion SxecutiVe Officer were 
provided with SCR 610 radios preset on the Regimental 
Command ^et. the Reconnaissance. Party was to h^ve 
communication with the Regimental Commander via 
the Beach Party as an alternate means. Ship to .Shirr 
radio between Baker Control and the LST provided 
an alternate means of communication for the Battalion 
Executive Officer. 

For intra Battalion Control the Battalion Commander, 
the Battalion Executive Officer, and the Battery 
Executive Officers in command of the DUKWS of each of ■ 
the batteries were provided with SCR 610 radios preset 
on the Battalion's ABL3 and BAK3R channels. Control 
w?s established on the A3L2 channel. Communication 
between the DUKWS and the LST was maintained at all 
times by the DUKW company's SCR 610 normal radio control. 

The Battalion Commander utilized an RBZ radio 
on the Division Reconnaissance Net to keep abreast of 
situation ashore. 
X One means of visual communication was employed: 

each of the battery agents was provided with a blue 
flag in order to indicate. to the incoming DUKWS the 
best landing beach, 

:*>-;.7V;;. u ' ■ ~6- 

ll | f * ■' ' » & 

3rd Bn, 14th Marinas Operation report cont'd. 

Description of Landing, 

Assault waves having landed on schedule the 
Battalion Reconnaissance Party boated up in LCVP 
at 0930 (H Plus 30 minutes) on 19 February, 1945 (Dog 
day) . At 1000 it reached Baker Control and 
checked in with the Regimental Commander, On 
instruction It laid off and stood by. At 1410 the 
L43VP was ordered alongside Baker Control and the 
Reconnaissance Party was ordered to check in with 
Yellow Control, then proceed in and land on the 
right edge of Yallow 1 beach. It was suggested that 
the best route of approach to the Battalion position 
area off Yellow 2 would be found on Yellow 1, The 
Reconnaissance Party proceeded to Yellow Control, was 
told that Yellow 1 was under sporadic heavy fire, 
proceeded to the beach and landed on Yellow 1 at 
1430, As soon as the Party disembarked from the 
north end of the beach. At 1445 the Battalion 
Commander was wounded. He turned over the command 
of the Rsoonnaiesance Party to the Battery Commander, 
"H w Battery. A few minutes later the Battalion 
Commander was evacuated. 

The Reconnaissance Party moved off the beach 
but was held down about ten yards inland, A message 
was sent to the Regimental Commander informing him 
that the Battalion Commander had been wounded and 
evacuated, and that the Reconnaissance Party was 
held down by heavy artillery fire. While the Party 
was thus held down just off the beach four more 
casualties were suffered, two Jellied, two wounded. 
One SCR 610 radio was knocked out by shrapnel. The 
antenna was blown off the other but it continued to 
function. Ths continuous shell fire lasted until 
about 1545. During this time a reconnaissance was 
impossible, A message was received from the 
Regimental Commander instructing the Party to come 
off the beach and report back to Baker Control. 
Shellfire was such that no boats were landing. 
It was impossible . at the time to evacuate the 


Regimental Command er was so informed, 

5rd 3n, 14th Marines Operation report cont'd. 

Aboard the LST arrorder to .launch the. DUKWS was 
received from the Regimental Commander". at 150b. At 
1510 the first DUKW wa& launched and at 1620 launching 
was collate. The unusual delay in launching was 
caused by the failure Qf several DUKWS, to start, 
thus blocking all in tfie line behind them. At 1650 
ell DUKWS were in the water, but the command DUKW,- 
occu^ied by the Battalion iSxecutive Officer, failed 
to start when word was given to proceed to Baker 
Control boat. The Battalion Executive and two radio 
operators transferred to another £UKW, but at 1645 
orders were received to reembark on the LST, This 
was completed at 1805, 'one DUKW of How Battery baing 
lost in the orocess when its engine failed on tha 
ramo of the LST. All others reembarked safely. 
During the night of 19 February, 1945 the army DUKW 
personnel drained the gas tanks of the vehicles that* 
had been giving trouble and refilled them with clean 
gasoline* General maintenance wes done, as far 
as the crowded conditions of the LST tank deck would 

The Reconnaissance Party took advantage of the 
first break in the shelling to move into the area 
about two thirds of the distance from Yellow 1 beach 
to Airfield No. 1, which area seemed relatively free 
of shell fir e. The CP Twenty- third Marines was 
located. The Commander Reconnaissance Party called 
Battalion Commander, Second Battalion, Fourteenth 
Marines, informed him of the situation, and since it 
did not seem oractical&le to land the- Battalion, 
asked him if he needed any of the Battalion 
Reconnaissance Party's personnel. The reoly being 
negative, Commander Reconnaissance Party informed 
Battalion Commander Second Battalion of the 
approximate location where Reconnaissance Party would 
dig in for the night. The Commander Reconnaissance 
Party selected a position in a trench line, and the 
party dug in. A line was laid from CP Twenty- third 
Marines to this position. The remaining radio 
when it was set ut> in this position failed to transmit. 
, At 2400 intense artillery fire was received from 
* '* I'"* " the northeast. At 0200. 20 February, 1945 intense 

mortar fire was received from Mount Suribachi. At about 
0515 intense and prolonged artillery fire was received 
again from the northeast. 

rines Operation report, cont'd. 

At daybreak the beach area being under only sporadic 
fire, the Reconnaissance Party undertook selection of 
position. An area on the second terrace was selected 
generally 150 yards off Yellow 2 beach. A suitable route 
of abroach was discovered. The disadvantages to the pos- 
ition were that there were several anti-tank mines in tKe 
area, and this area as well as any other on the second 
terrace seemed to have been zeroed in by enemy artillery. 
Any passage of vehicles through the area attracted fires. 
The Battalion 3, using First Battalion, Fourteenth Marines, 
radio, reported the above to the, Regimental Commander and. 
to the Battalion ^executive Officer, 

An order to relaunch DUKWS was received aboard the 
L3T. The first DUKW was launched at 0917. Launching was 
complete at 1012. DUKWS proceeded to Baker Control, 
arrived there at 1055, were ordered to land on Yellow 2 at 
a point designated by the Reconnaissance Party. 

The Reconnaissance Party meanwhile received a massage 
from the Regimental 3 to ths effect that Yellow 1 and Red 
beaches, and areas off them seemed at the time most clear 
of enemy fire, and suggested that an attempt be made to 
select a position there without respect of preassigned 
areas. If a. position there could be found, an attempt if 
necessary would be made to get permission to land on Red 
Beaches, Reconnaissance for positions was Immediately 
begun, as the position off ^ellow 2 was under sporadic 
heavy and apparently/ observed fire, and a message was sent 
to the Regimental Commander asking him to hold the DUKWS 
at Baker Control. A position was selected on the first 
terrace 50 yeards off Red 2 beach. Angle dozers which had 
been dispatched to and landed on the beach together with 
an angle dozer borrowed from the. Second Battalion, Four- 
teenth Marines were, set to work preparing gun pits. Per- 
mission to land 'the Battalion on Red 2 Beach was requested 
via Regiment, and the Battalion Executive Officer, who with 
the first battery's DUKWS had crossed the line of departure 
on the way to Yellow 2 beach, was advised to delay landing 
until reply to the request was received, 

1 MPf j|r^" ""^^ ~ 9 ~ 


5rd Bn, 14th Marinas Operation report con^d. 

At 1225 the Reconnaissance Party received word 
on a Second Battalion, Fburtesnth Marines radio 
that request to land on Red 2 beach had been rejected, 
A message was sent to the Battalion Sxecutiva Of ficer 
asking him to. delay landing of DUKWS for thirty 
minutes, until angle dozers could move to the previously 
selected area off Yellow 2 and begin work on gun Pits. 
Reou^st was also made to land batteries at 30 minute 

The Reconnaissance Party then went to th*e ar sa 
off Yellow 2 in ordsr to commence work on gun Positions, 
As soon as it reached the area it was pinned* down by 
intense and accurate artillery fire from the nofcth. 
The Battalion 2cecutive Officer who was informed of 
the situation landed in the lead DUKW, checked the 
area selected off Red 2 beach, decided to put the 
Battalion into a compressed part of this area which 
lay generally between Yellow 1 and Red 2. At 1500 the 
lead DUKW left Yellow 2 beach, proceeded to the left 
edge of ^ellow 1 and landed at 1527, Batteries then 
landed in order, the last DUKW landing at 1700, One 
Battalion Headauarters DUKW was swapped due- to heavy 
surf, and lost just off the beach. The howitzers 
were unloaded and put into oreorepared gun pits. 
The first round was fired at 1728, 

i Of the Batt&lion vehicles, one angle dozer in 
LCM with an officer in charge was loaded soon after 
H~ftour on D-Day, reached Baker Control by -noon, on 
oraer followed the Reconnaissance LGVP to Yellow 1 beach, 
When the Battalion Commander saw tha situation ashore 
he ordered the. LCM to stand off. The LCM reported back 
to Baker Control and w^s sent back to the PA 118 from 
which it had been unloaded. Seven radio jeeps and ah 
ambulance jeep loaded in LCV^ 1 s were sent as a wave to 
Baker Control during the afternoon of D-Day, These 
were ordered beck to PA 118, The LGVP with ambulance 
* • jeep became separat3d from the wave, reported back to 

■■ i "i H^^^^sr Control, was dispatched to the beach and landed 
% on Yellow 1 beach at about 1700 on D-Day, 

• mm . , 

rd Bn, 14th- Marines Operation reports cont'd, 

LCM l s and LCVP's loaded with the angle dozers 
and the seven radio jeeps proceeded to Baker Control 
on the morning of D Plus 1, were dispatched, and 
landed on Yellow 1 beach at about 1000. 

One cargo Jeep was unloaded from the Pa 118 on 
D plus 1 because the Navy Unloading Officer "had 
orders to unload the ship as fast as possible" . The 
LCVP carrying this jeep reported to Baker control, 
was told to stand off. It remained in the water 
off Baker control for more than twenty-four hours. 
On D Plus 2 at about 1300 it was dispatched and 
landed on Blue 1 beach. The remaining vehicles 
were landed on Blue 1 beach on D plus 3. 

Section IV - Narrative of Operation, 

Missions and Daily Operation ^ 

This Battalion commenced registration at 1728, 
20 February, 1945. The first mission assigned was 
reinforceing the First Battalion, Fourteenth Marines 
which mission continued until 0700, 23 February, 1945 
excepting the period 1300 to 1730 22 February, 1945 
when it reinforced the Second Battalion, Fourteenth 
Marines. At this time the Battalion went into 
direct support of the Twenty- fourth Marines and later 
during the day displaced by battery echelon to a new 
Position at 165 V and Q. At 1715 26 February, 1945 
the Battalion again reinforced the First Battalion, 
Fourteenth Marines and retained this mission until 
0800 1 Maroh, 1945 when it again went into direct 
support of the Twenty-fourth Marines. The Battalion 
assisted in a preparation for the Third Division 
the morning of 6 March, 1945, but remained in direct . 
support of the Twenty- fourth Marinas until 0730 
10 March, 1945 whan it assumed reinforcement of 
the- Second Battalion, Fourteenth Marines. It 
continued in' this mission until 0630 11 March, 1945. 
From this time until it secured from firing at 0800 
13 March, 1945, the Battalion fi* ed in the zone of 
the. Division. 

t'i ■:' ' •" r *ih 

3rd Bn, 14th Marines Operation reports cont'd. 

Tactical Employment and Effectiveness of Artillery. 

The Battalion for x the most oart functioned as 
direct support artillery for the Twenty- fourth Marines 
in the line. When the Twenty-fourth Marines was not 
in the line the Battalion was normally reinforcing 
the fires of another artillery battalion. In carrying 
out both of these missions normal direct support fires 
were given. Two factors however limited the employment 
and effectiveness of the Battalion. The first of these 
was lack of good observation, which had the effect 
of converting almost every target of opportunity into 
an area for neutralization. The second factor was 
the extent and. thoroughness of the enemy's prepared 
defences, which seriously limited the destructive 
effect of the 105mm howitzer. These two factors gave 
a definite stamp to the firing, in only a few cases 
was observed enemy personnel or an observed enemy 
installation the target. The predominant part of 
all observed fire was delivered either on areas - 
• where, from counter firs, large concentrations of 
enemy' troops were known to exist, or on areas 
where there were known installations of enemy weapons 
apparently .so emplaced as not to be subject to 
destruction by 105mm shells. Where such concentrations 
were a. sufficient distance forward of the front lines, 
reinforcement by Corps artillery was utilized. 

In spite of the limitations artillery support 
given the infantry by the Battalion was closer and more 
effective than ever before. This was made possible largely 
by ore-operation training with the Regiment which the 
Battalion supported, by the establishment of liaison 
parties to the supported battalions, by the establishment 
of a radio plan such that any reinforcing battalion 
could on short notice contact forward observers 
directily, and by the coordination and cooperation 
between FDG 5 s of the Regiment, All close in fires 
were registered in, often with survellance of forward 
observers of adjacent units, so that casualties 
among our own troops did not result from possible map 
•g v k . errors and incorrect front line reports. 

While it is impossible within the Battalion to 
estimate the effectiveness of the Battalion's fire, 
support given to the Twenty- fourth Marines, within the 
limitation of the weapon and ammunition supply, was 


14th Marines Operation report, cont'd. 

substantially what was wanted by tfte Twenty-fourth Marines, 
Forward Observers attest to the fact that the Battalion 
fire had a distinct neutralizing effect on enemy mortars, 

artillery, and rockets,, 
of shrapnel cases among 

and attest also 
enemy dead* 

to the great number 

Summary of Ammunition j^cpenditure by Types of Firing. 

Defensive Fire 
Targets of Opportunity 
Counter Battery 
Harrassing Fire 


No.of Missions. 
. 301 


No.of Bounds. 

1631 missions 33,753 rounds 

The survey problem presented by the Iwo Jima operation 
was not a very difficult one. This Battalion occupied 
only two positions during the operation and in each case it 
was a simple matter to locate the batteries -with reference 
to a point identifiable on the map. The initial position 
was about four hundred yards from the Corps Initial Point, 
so an attempt was made to locate . i t **and use it for a 
starting point. However at the time th&- survey was begun 
no unit had yet located the point. The Survey Information 
Center had ( <not been established and a through search failed 
to .reveal the point on the terrain. The Survey t^am there*, 
fore located its own initial point by aligning the nearer 
with the farther of the»Futatsu Rocks and using the Point 
where this line, inters acted the shore line. .From this 
point traverse to the center of each- battery ' was .com- 
paratively short. . Direction was taken from a line between 
the Initial Point and the easternmost point visable 
from it along the shore line to the north. An orienting 
line was put in and the batteries .laid, by base angle, 
jir^stional error of the survey proved small. Map error 
5?a£ noV^cliecked by survey method^, but was "determined by 


by registration of the center' battery. The survey team was 
later shown, the Corps Initial Point and .given Its 
coordinates and a direction from it. A recheck of the 
survey using the initial point showed a negligible differ r 
ence in coordinates of batteries, so that this correction 
was not allied, - v .The Ba.ttalion was never called upon 
by sound or flash units for coordinates 'of a station for 
their use, so., none was established, • • " 

The magnetic needle of the aiming circle was never 
used, so no check on declination constants was had. 
Survey in the second position presented similar problems 
which were handled in much the same way, ' 

Fire Direction and Fire Adjustment. 

Batteries upon coming into position were .i&id by 
compass, registration was conducted by a Forward Observer, 
and guns recorded a base deflection, Upon completion of 
survey adjusted base aggies were measured in order to 
check the registration against the survey. 

When the Battalion displaced and at all times there- 
after due to superior observation registration was by 
air observer. At the completion of each registration 
adjusted base angles were measured to determine corrections 

The K ~ change and tha deflection correction change 
were determined from metros taken at the time of registrat- 
ion. Subseauent weather changes were applied. Three fire 
direction teams' were employed in a normal battalion Fire 
Direction Center organization. 

It is considered that three teams is a minimum re- 
, s » auirement for consistent effective operation. Normal 

duties wer e performed by all personnel. Ammunition was 
controlled by weight of projectile. Registrations were 
checked whenever the adjustment of a Battery was in 
question,. A single battery with converged sheaf was 
employed on point targets and on all missions where im- 
perfect battalion massing would have endangered our own 

Fire adjustment was- in accordance with Corps SOP. 
' !; v V|t i; : A modification of procedure was necessitated by the 
^ f ■ • fact that Forward Observers, unable to identify a Base 
*' : Point consistently used previous concentrations as a 

reference -ooint, A replot from the adjusted data of the 
registering battery was found necessary to the effective 
massing of the Battalion 1 s fire. 


- 1 g ' r 

3rd Bn, 14th Marines Operation report, cont'd. 

Li aison. 

The liaison system of this battalion on the operation 
proved to be the most satisfactory yet employed. Once the 
battalion was emplaced, . the Battalion Liaison Officer who 
had landed with the Infantry Regiment support groups, 
assisted in control of all fires by continued close contact 
with the Regimental Infantry Commanding Officer and his 

This along with Battery Commanding Officers at the 
Battalion CP's continued throughout the entire operation. 

Intelligence information of every nature was massed 
along to the 3attalion 2 and F.D.C, as accurately and 
swiftly as possible. - Close liasion was also carried on 
with NG-F and air so that the greatest effect possible 
could be gotten from .the three supporting agencies. 

The very close contact with the Infantry Regimental 
Commanding Officer and. his staff kept the artill ery ' very 
closely informed of the situation at all times, and the 
excellent communication system employed afforded a high 
degree of efficiency. The very close cooperation shown 
by Liaison Officers with all echelons of Infantry was 
commended by Infantry personnel. 

The use of the Battery Commander for liaison with 
the Infantry Battalion Commanders supplementing the 
normal forward observer parties with assault companies, 
provided, a valuable additional link in both the liaison 
and the communication system. The normal Battery 
Commander's liaison party consisted of one radio operator, 
two linemen, and one experienced instrument NCO, usually 
the Chief of Detail or. Instrument Sergeant. The party 
was equipped with an SCR 610 radio and at least two. -tele- 

An. extensive communications system, with some 
duplication to. 'insure constant communi cation , was there- 
fore possible. The Battery Liaison Party was netted with 
the Forward Observers as well as the Battalion Li ai so n 
Party, and the 3attalion FDC on the .normal Battalion' radio 
channels. It was .thus possible, and occasionally become 

Iffii)*/ necessary, for this party to act as a radio relay station 

ffatt^l'tf p era t i o n r epo r t , co n t 1 d . 

between Forward Observers and the Battalion FDC. During 
most of the operation the Infantry Battalion command post 
was far enough forward to enable wire communications to be 
kept in from the Party to the Forward Observers. 

Although difficult, this proved highly desirable in 
that it afforded easy consultation between the Battery 
Commander and his Forward Observers, and enabled him to 
advise them and coordinate preparations and defensive 
fires without clogging the radio channels. It was not 
found practicable to extend these lines to provide direct 
wire communications from Forward Observers to Battalion 
FDC. The Liaison Party was on the infantry wire net and 
could contact the Battalion FDC by infantry communications. 

The line from infantry battalion to infantry regiment; 
was simplex ed to provide direct communication with the 
Battalion Liaison Party. With these varied communications 
the Liaison Party and .the Forward Observers were never 
out of communication with each other at the FDC, and could 
work closely together. The principal functions which the 
Battery Commander 1 s Party was able to perform were the 

1. Advise Infantry Battalion Commander on artillery 
fires and transmit his request to artillery battalions. 

2. Coordinate Infantry Companies ? defensive and 
preparation fire requests into a plan for the Infantry 

3. Assist in coordination of artillery fires with 
air strikes. Air and Naval gun fire liaison parties were 
always nearby in the command post, 

4. Advise inexperienced Forward Observers, and correct 
errors in fire commands and procedure. 

5. Act as relay station for fire commands and 
messages when necessary, 

6. Transmit artillery fire Plans originating 
In higher echelon to Infantry Battalion Commander 
and to Forward Observers. 

7. Submit Battalion Commander* s requests for 
155mm harassing fires to Battalion Liaison Officer. 

8. Act as supply center for wire, radio replacements, 
and bstteries for Forward- Observers. 

The Battery Commander's Party reported to the 
Infantry Battalion as soon as the Artillery Battalion 
was emplaced ashore, and remained there continuously 
until artillery was secured in the Division sector, 



4th Marines Operation report coni 1 d. 

Infantry Battalion Officers were. highly pleased at 
the additional evidence of artillery cooperation. 
The Battalion Commander was able to consult his 
artillery without ruling. out his Forward Observers, 
while the Forward Observers were able tm remain at* 
their OP 1 s without being called away to consult with 
the Battalion Commander, While not indlspensible,- it is 
felt that this liaison was valuable, and it is 
recommended that it be continued during subsequent 
operations, using either the Battery Commander 
or Reconnaissance Officer, The chief obstacle. is that 
it constitutes an additional drain on communications 
. and officer personnel. Unless or until rendered 
imoracti cable by casualties, however, results justify 
continuance of a liaison officer at the infantry battalion 


For the Iwo Jima operation, the Battalion's initial 
mission was to reinforce the First Battalion., Fourteenth 
Marines, second to revert to direct support of the 
Twenty-fourth Marine Regiment upon committment; third, 
be prepared to. take over the Fourteenth Marines 
Regimental communications in case that unit became . 
a casualty.. The communication plan' 'was therefore 
designed to comply with those missions. 

Radio was to be the primary means of communication 
initially. It was also planned that radio should 
be the primary means at all times for communication to 
the forward areas, wire the primary means for rear areas. 
In all cases there was to be dual means as soon as 
possible, . 

Wlre f 

The first lines laid were direct lines running 
from the firing- batteries executives' positions to 
v,'|f1)C^ The Battalion switchboard. was established and 
'* " ink lines were laid to each firing battery, to the 

First Battalion, Fourteenth Marines, Second Battalion, 
and Fourth Battalion, Fourteenth Marines, 

3a oh trunk line was paralleled by a direct line 
laid over an alternate route, running from the Battalion 
FDC to the FDC of the other Battalion, Normal local 
installations were, also established. 

In functioning the direct lines enabled a direct 
and fast means of communication between FDC f s, They 
were used principally as fire command lines, the trunk 
lines for administration. 

The only simplexing was one Regimental line 
with the simplex ending in FDC. For communication 
with the infantry, Liaison Officers, and Forward 
Observers, two lines were laid forward from the 
Battalion switchboard, one to the Twenty-fourth 
Regiment and one to the forward switching central (BD~71) 
established at the artillery Battalion Liaison Officer's 
oosition. The Liaison Officer at the switching central, 
and the Forward Observers laid wire to the Liaison 
Officer with the Infantry Battalion. This provided 
a very flexible and centralized forward wire net, and 
gave the Battalion Liaison Officer direct wire contact 
and control of the forward personnel. The forward 
personnel had contact with any unit connected with the 
switchboard. Wire to the Forward Observers was maintained 
fifty per cent of the time, and to the Liaison Officers 
with the Infantry Battalions at all times. 

As alternate wire system the infantry lines could 
be used. 

Radio . 

The following radios were available to this Battalion, 

610 ! s 
808 ! s 

536' s 

The above radio 1 s were use4 as follows. 
Thirteen SCR 610' s were preset on the Battalion fire 
dirsctlon channel (A) and the Battalion command (B), 
Of this number three were alio ted to each battery, one 


15 SCR — 

8 SCR — 

3 ,_TBX ! s 

1 TCS 

5 SCR — 

2 RBZ' s 

Carinas Operation report cont ! d. 

to each Forward Obs srver, one to the Battery Commandar 
who was employed as Liaison Officer at' the Infantry 
Battalion CP, one to the Artillery Battalion Liaison 
Officer with the Infantry Regiment. 

Two 'ware enroloyed at the FDC, one on Able 
channel, one on Baker Channel. This left one spare 
for replacement, and proved to be inadequate because 
of losses suffered in landing and enemy action. On 
the fire command net four Forward Observers operated 
on Able channel and two. on Baker channel. The Able 
channel for assault, Baker for reserve and for 
administrative traffic. 

The 808* s were preset as follows. Six SOS's or 
two per firing battary on ' Ragimentsl Command, Division 
Command, Battalion Fire Direction, Battalion 
Command, They were to ba used at battery positions, 
on command channel to parallel wire. They were not 
available until D plus 2, Of the six, three wera lost 
to en amy fir a in landing. Two H&S 808 radios: one 
was preset on First Battalion Fire Direction, Second 
3attalion Fire Direction, Division Command, Regimental 
Command, -This was available on D-day for use in 
reinforcing missions. Second was preset on Fourth 
Battalion Fire Direction, Battalion Able channel 
and Baker channel and Regimental command, available 
on D plus 2. These 808 jeeps ware used for reinforcing 
missions. For example if the Battalion was in direct 
support with the First Battalion reinforcing, the 
Battalion would contact four forward observers on 
Baker channel. The First would conttct the other two 
on Able channel. The 808' s provide good communication, 
and are very flexible as the channels can be changed 
without difficulty. The 610 T s provide good 
communication but do not permit a flexible radio net. 
The- 610 ! s are not suitable for assault troops because 
of their bulk,. The TCS was used for air-ground and 
was available on D-day, The TBX was used as an alternate 
and also- on the Infantry Regimental Command. 

The SCR 536 1 s were used- by the Survey section 
JinJ^ heach party, The-RBZ's were used by the Intelligence 

3rd Bn, 14th l-.arines Operation report cont'd. 

section to monitor the Division Reconnaissance 
net, the other was used by the Battalion, to monitor 
the landing Force SAO net. Two SCR 610* s were used in. 
the Reconnaissance Party and were set up as follows: 
one on Able channel and Regimental Command, the other 
on Baker channel and Regimental Command, In such an 
operation it was found that there were insufficient 
radio personnel to operate at top efficiency after 
, five days. . 



There were two general types of observation by 
Battalion Agencies, Forward Observer observation and 
air observation. While there are a few cases of 
employment of OP 1 s the terrain strictly limited their 
establishment. All observation was limited. 
G-eneraliy speaking observation by Forward Observers 
was limited to the front from one to two hundred 
yards and on the flanks to about the same. This was 
due to a series of small ridges usually from 75 to 
200 yards apart with small valleys intervening. As \ 
each ridge was tooled another would appear, cutting 
'off the observation oast it. The terrain was an enemy 
in itself. In some instances fire could be carried on 
by watching the rising smoke from the shell burst and 
adjusting from that. Creeping was necessary. Toward 
the end of the operation, about two days before the 
artillery fire ceased, the terrain sloped down toward 
the ocean an observation was. much better. Some 
observers could see up to five and six hundred yards, 
^rooer defensive fires were necessarily brought -in 
close ana could be observed as the enemy troops 
were always very close to front lines. 

Air observation was of limited value but 
was of great assistance in obtaining base and check 
point adjustments. 

Targets which could be viewed from the air were 
.few in number and mostly of a' nature which coulc 1 not 
be knocked out by artillery, (blockhouses, Pill boxes, 
caves, ) 

Targets fired on by air observer consisted mainly 
of neutralizing an area in which enemy activity had been 
r sorted, and firing in areas from which gun flashes were 
observed. Several instances occurred in which personnel 
were fired on, but the groups were small. 

3*>d Bn, 14th Marinas Operation report, cont'd. 

Administration, . 

1, Casual'ty reports and reports of KIA and 'VIA were 
as follows: 


KIA 3 13 16 

DOW 1 1 

Lost at Sea 1 1 

m£v 4 29 33 

. , 1 27 • 28 

Ret- to duty 2 2 

3k&Jv 2 2 

2, The morale of troops throughout the operation was 
high. The rehabilitation period in this respect was a 
great aid, During actual combat the excellent supply of 
ten~ln-*one rations, frui t juices .and water did much toward 
maintaining high morale.' 

Motor Transport. 

The few vehicles taken on this operation proved 
adequate, "since a DUKW platoon was attached to the 
Battalion, Some difficulty was encountered in getting 
the trucks and .Jeeps across the beach and it was discovered 
that vehicles wi'thout .chains on the tires come across the 
beach as well as those with chains... However only one 
vehicle not disabled by enemy. fire; failed to pull itself 
from the landing craft to the Battalion position. This 
vehicle was later recovered. The light cargo carrier 
(wees el) was especially efficient in the typ 3 of soil 
and terrain. encountered, 

Training Deficiencies. ' • : 

There was no .serious training deficiency in the 
Battalion, At' the same time not every element of the 
command had been fully and completely trained. New 
Forward Obsaryer Of fic ers ,Vho had joined the Battalion 

aeration report, Cont'd. 

In December, 1944, while they did a competent job, showed 
at times lack of training and lack of experience. It was 
soon discovered that a system must be developed for 
registering in close-in fires according to which a Forward 
Observer will automatically check with Forward. Observers ~ 
of adjacent units. This would greatly reduce traffic on 
the fire command net at the busiest time of the day. 
Since the SCR 610 and 808 radioes were received late in 
the pre-operation training period, and since several 
radio operators were joined just before the embarkation 
of the Battalion there was a lack of fully trained radio 
operators who had the ability to assume net control of the 
Battalion Fire Command Net, ] 


1, Listed below arc- the types of maps and photo 1 s 
furnished before the operation, 

(a) 1/10000 gridded and ungridded 

(b) 1/20000 gridded and ungridded 
(ci 1/5000 gridded 

(d) Beach Study maps 

(e) 1/20000 photo mat>s 

(f) Obliques and verticals of target 
(S) 1/5000 Terrain Hap (rubber) 

4 There was an abundant number of photos and maps before 
and during the operation. The 1/20000 gridded map proved 
to be a good chart. The 1/10000 map used by the Forward 
Observers was fair, but the map as far as showing the 
relief in the northern sector was of no aid. The 1/20000 
photograph© issued before the operation were very poor. 
Clouds obscured the targst area to a great extent. ; 

2. No additional maps were furnished during the 
operation. Photos, were received near the end of the 
operation. They were good enough to be used as firing 
charts, but were never needed, 

^nemy Action Against Our Artillery. 

This Battalion encountered no infiltration from 
the enemy. The enemy soon located the Battalion position 
and for the first week shelled the area freouently, prin- 
cipally at night. As the battle progressed the shelllngs 
became less frequent and lighter until they ceased shortly 
before the Island was secured, . 


Sts-Q^VTient of ifti em y Artillery. 

(a) Tactical Employment: 

The Jao artillery 'wqs well concealed and 
dug in. Their guns were not massed but single guns 
were so Placed as to cover the entire island. Their 
observation was excellent in noting the Battalion 
movements, and they could auickly ooen fire on any 

(b) Types of Material Used by Enemy Artillery; 

This Battalion received very few air bursts 
but those were auite effective. Most of 'their shells 
were H.S C of ?7mm and 81mm variety. The first three . 
days the Battalion received 20mm fire. • Sporadic 15cm 
mortars and rockets landed in the area throughout the 
operation but caused no damage. 

( c) Effectiveness of Enemy Artillery; 

Snemy artillery caused very' little material' 
damage to the Battalion, Casualties from it .were ■ 
fairly heavy in the early "stages of the battle but 
later only direct hits caused any damage. Their shells 
harras-sed personnel more than anything else. The few 
air bursts were effective; causing some casualties. 


All types of mounting out supplies were sufficient. 
Hesupply of the mounting out gear was good. Due to the 
unfavorable conditions of the beach and surf palletized 
cargo could not be loaded but had to be broken down. 
No- comment on Wilson Drums. The Battalion Supply 
dump was within the defenses of the Battalion Security 
^latoon, and a two man ^uard was on' duty at .all times. 
• •. Ten7-thousand ■ sand bags were loaded with the Battalion 
but a larger number could have been used. Dunnage from 
the LST-was. sen„t ashore with each load of ammunition 
and was -used in, the construction of fox holes and 
• defensive- positions. 

Operation report cont f d. 

Transport * quart erma e ter. 

One day was sufficient time to load the ^A 118 
completely. This battalion had only about one-fifth 
of the total gear aboard. Loading was especially 
fast and efficient* ifcibarkation proceeded well. 

Loading LST. 

(1) There are no major changes recommended for 
our LST loading plan. Although palletized ammunition 
does require more space than the same ammount loose, it 
is felt that this disadvantage is more than offset 
by the ease and speed of loading, especially when 
adequate loading equipment is available. The Sea Bee 
loading detachment on the Battalion LST used two finger 
lifts and two jitneys with 3 trailers each, finger lifts 
on the dock loading the trailers with two pallets each. 
Jitney trucks carried the ammunition into the tank deck 
where the other finger lift unloaded the trailer and 
set the pallet in position on deck. 

In this way three units of fire (7200) rounds 
were loaded and stored up in less than twelve hours. 
A floating crane saved much time in storing our w,p. 
too side. This crane was also used to great 
advantage in loading extra water and gasoline drums. 
On 20-21 January, 1945 the first LST (1031) had to be 
completely unloaded at Kewalo Basin, Honolulu, and 
the procedure as outlined above was repeated. About 
16 hours were reauired for the reloading. 

Four days were necessary for unloading PA 118 
except for the initial waves. After that the unloading 
proceeded at the Navy 1 s order which was to unload as 
fast as possible with no regard for the needs ashore 
or "the desires of the units aboard. Some gear was dis- 
patched without the approval or even knowledge of the 
TQM's and units concerned. Galley gear, GI cans, etc, 
were dispatched and unloaded on 31ue Beach on D Plus 3 
and casualties were suffered by unloading details. 
Control boats seemed to have too little information about 
the loacation of units ashore and their needs. The initial 

if* ^ .unloading of the LST 648 was done by DUK T \"s manned by 

'colored army troops. The LST launched thevehicles at 
some distance from the beach, at times from six to ten 
miles, this placing a heavy demand on the fuel supply of - 


IMP * 

3rd En, 14th Marines .Operation report, cont^d. 

the DUKW's. The drivers did not perform satisfactorily, 
as valuable ammunition was lost which could have been 
saved by more competent drivers* In saveral cases drivers 
abandoned their vehicles when they failed to start after ' 
"conking out' 1 . 

After the DUKW 1 s had been launched from the LST, a 
striT5 was cleared down the center of the tank dsck wide 
enough to accomadate a DUKW. This permitted seven DUKW's 
to enter the LST and be filled simultaneously from both . 
sides. This system worked as at no time were there more 
than fitfe vehicles on board ready to be loaded. The two 
finger lifts of the LST were employed advantageously in 
loading the ammunition. The wallets were carried to the 
DUKW 1 s and raised. From this position the bands were 
broken and the ammunition was loaded into the vehicle* 
The Palletized 105mm ammunition could not be landed as 
such due to 'the, unfavorable conditions of the beach and 
surf. The pallets had to be broken down and the individual 
boxes landed by DUKW's. and LVT*s, The DUK T <tf f son the 
subsequent trios to thebeach carried seven personnel, 
sixty rounds of ammunition, twenty gallons of water and 
five boxes of rations. After all personnel were landed 
the vehicles carried seventy rounds of ammunition, fifty 
gallons of water and seven boxes of rations. The Army 
DUKiv officer Placed the capacity load at 5000 rounds. 
The LST beached on £> olus 3 at which time the unloading 
was greatly accelerated, and LVT 4' s were employed. 

Organizational gear was sent ashore- at this time from 
the PA 118. Unloading at the beach was much easier from 
LCa's rather than LCVt^s the reason seemed to be in the 
twin screw rig of the LQd's. LCVP ! s tended to swing 
around and broach more than LCM ! s. On such a steeo beach 
it is -recommended that more LCM's be used if available. 
The rigging and slings seemed adequate. 

In a slightly rough sea much time was lost because 
of the mounding PA's took from LSM ! s and LST's alongside. 

A. superior fender would have given us more time to 
^ concentrate on unloading, 

#4 y\ v ' - -25-. • 

3rd Bn, 14th Marines Operation report, cont r d. 


1, Weapons »- 

-A- This Battalion was eauipped "with twelve 105mm 
Howitzers M2A1. Ten Howitzers ware on carriage M2A1 the."' 
other two were on carriage M2A2. These Hox^i tzars had been 
issued with combat tires, but were modified with short* hul?8 
to fit inside the body of DUO 1 s . After Saltan it became*': 
necessary to reinforce the trail shades to prevent bending 
or buckling especially in stony or coral positions. All \ 
shades had been reinforced by Division Ordnance prior to 

Individual equipment included approximately 200 ; 
rifles, cal ,30 Ml, and 300 carbines. Although T a 3.A. 
lists 105mm Howitzer Battalion personnel to be armed ex- . 
clusively with carbines, 30$ preferred, and were armed 
with, Ml ? s. Pistols are in 'great- demand, but as auxiliary 
weapons only c ; 

Calibre „3Q machine guns were employed in maintaining'' 
a perimeter defense for the Battalion in each position. 
In addition to 16 cal,, 30 HB machine guns, 22 BaR- s and . 
8 Rocket launchers were included in the Battalion security 
plan, 8 cal c 50 machine guns with A. A. mount 14—6, were to 
be used in the A<A. defense, but were lost during unloading 

~B~ Howitzers listed in -A- above were employed 
21 days, from D plus 1 to D plus 22. 

~G-> One Howitzer was lost on D day when DUKW* s 
were launched on afternoon of D day. 

Drivers had considerable trouble keeping their mo to rs 
running. One DUKW carrying "H" Btry' s second section 
developed motor trouble and began shipping in wetsr faster 
that it could be pumped out by hand. An attempt was made ;.r 
to tow the DUK^ back to the LST but was unsucc sssful. 
• 8 cal .50 machine guns were lost in sunken DUKW 1 s.. 

~D- Hal functions were extremely limited. The 
Battalion replaced two breech block operating handle " i ; h 
plungers, two cross heads, one operating handle latch '•• 
catch screw, several lanyards. 

Before leaving the Island Division Ordnance 
replaced six tubes. Division Ordnance repaired one 
broken level bubble on telescope mount H21, also 
replaced one clouded panoramic telescope. All other 
optical ectuipment held up extremely well. 
^ Spare parts and accessories as listed in 

T.B.A. are very adequate when available. 


3rd Bn, 14th Marines Operation report, cont r d. 

~F- Recommendations. 

1. All cross heads be made, of bronze, cast 
steel does not work. 

2. Brush, Bore M-12 should be issued with 
replaceable wire brush units. These units 

'to be issued on same basis as cleaning 

2, Ammunition:- * - ; - : 

-A- 33,753 total rounds expanded on operation., 
31,489 rounds of H.S. 
2,264 rounds of W.P., (10 rd»s H,C.) 

~B- No comments- on methods of supply. 

-0- No problem of ammunition storage, never 
enough ammunition to present a problem, 

-D- Ammunition of different fuzes should have a 
distinctive color for all markings; M48, bo# 
marking in yellow; M54, box markings white, 
etc, to eliminate confusion, especially at 

—3- Unit of fire should be increased from 200 to 
300 rounds per howitzer, .... 

Firing tables should be issued so that shell 
H.S.A.T.- can be used for indirect fire when needed. 

Section V - Comments and Recommendations. ' '.. 

It is felt that the total time elapsed, between 
embarkation and debarkation at objective was too long 
for troops and DUKW* s on, the LST.. Some troops had 
opportunity for liberty at Pearl Harbor, others were 
employed in transferring the Battalion 1 s gear from the - 
LST 1031 to the 648 when the former was sent into drydock, 
and there was not sufficient .time to grant liberty to all 
personnel. Troops on the PA had ample recreation during 
the rehabiliation period. It is recommended that equal 
opportunity be granted to LST and PA troops, insofar as 
practicable, in future rehabilitation periods before any 
operation, • 

DUKW l s >were too closely stowed on the LST tank 
deck to provide -aocessability for adequate maintenance „ „ 

s Operation reoort, conttd. 


after the Maui rehearsal. It is agreed by experienced 
DUKW officers that the vehicle should be thoroughly 
serviced after being water-borne, if it is to be idle 
as long as one month afterward; therefore it is 
recommended that, in future operations, DUKW Personnel 'be 
given an opportunity to service thoroughly their vehicles 
after a water-borne rehearsal, and that they be re- 
embarked dry on the LST. 

' A lighter weight, more portable radio, such as the 
SCR 300 or 619 could be used by the Forward Observers 
Parties in lieu of the* SCR 610. 

Two cast steel cross heads in the breech blocks of 
the 105mm howitzers were broken in the operation. ,It is 
recommended that all cross heads be made:of bronze 
instead of cast steel and installed at the factory. 
The brush, bore h-12 should be issued with replaceable 
wire brush units and issued on the same basis as 
cleaning material. 

It was found that three complete teams (HCO, VCO, 
3 computers) in the FDC worked very satisfactorily and 
allowed the personnel to stand watches without undue 
fatigue and subsequent loss of accuracy. 

Battery Commanders were used for liaison with 
Infantry Battalion Commanders. This worked satisfactorily 
but left the batteries with too few officers. Battery 
Reconnaissance Officers should be the liaison officers 
with Infantry Battalions. 

It is recommended that a firing table for H.3.A.T. 
ammunition be put, on the reverse of the high angle 
G-FT slide. 



4th Battalion, 14th Marines, Operation Report. 





Plans and Training 1 

Loading 1- 

Rehearsal 2 


Rehabilitation 2 

Shipboard Training 2- 

Forward Area Rehearsal 3 


Tactical Plan For Landing 3- 

Control Plan 4 

Description of Landing 4- 


Missions and Dally Operations 7- 

Summary of Ammunition Expenditure 10 



Plans and Training 

The Fourth Battalion returned from the Marianas 
Campaign and accomplished about three (3) months train- 
ing before leaving for Iwo Jima. During tills period 
normal battalion problems, both firing and non-firing 
were carried out as well as intensive specialist train- 
ing such as the training of demolitions people, machine 
gunners, and others.- Near the end of this period two 
(2) days were spent in carrying out ship-to-shore move- 
ments, practicing the method to be used to control the 
movement and landing of the dukws. The battalion was 
tnen loaded aboard the LST 1032. From Maui, T.H., to 
the staging area (Saipan) tne personnel aboard the LST 
was as follows. 

Marine Personnel Officers: 6 

Enlisted: 174 

Army Dukw Personnel - Officers: 2 

Enlisted: _61 

TOTAL 233 


The equipment loaded consisted of twenty-two (22) 
dukws, twelve (12) of which were carrying 105 mm howit- 
zers. One (1) dukw carried a preloaded radio jeep. 
Each dukw that carried a gun had twenty-four (24) rounds 
of ammunition preloaded and each "A" frame was to carry 
twnety-four (24) rounds of smoke (W.P-. ) in it. The 
remainder of the dukws carried various items such as 
communications equipment, machine guns, etc. The LST 
was loaded with three (3) units of 105 mm ammunition on 
the tank deck with dunnage on it to permit the dukws to 
rest on top of it- Before the dukws were put aboard 
one thousand and eight hundred (1800) rounds of 75 mm 
pack nowitzer ammunition had to be loaded aboard which 
necessitated tearing up the ramp made of dunnage and 
placing all the 75 mm ammunition in front of the 105 mm 
ammunition. All the W.P., and yellow smoke was stored 
topside in two (2) bins aft of the LOT, as well as in 
tne LGT.. Because of the priority given to launching 
the LGT and the necessity for getting smoke in with the 
guns tnis made it necessary to shift the W.P», before 

14th Marines Operation report - Iwo Jima (Cont'd) 

that was impossible to carry out at Kaneohe. After 
spending two (2) days in this area the ships left for 
Saipan. Snroute to Saipan all personnel aboard the LST 
had their clothing impregnated and sprayed with DDT as 
instructed. At Saipan ten (10) officers and one-hundred 
and forty-nine (149) enlisted came aboard raising the 
total to eighteen (18) officers and three-hundred and 
eighty-three (383) enlisted. Since only one-hundred 
(100) cots were issued it was necessary to break out 
the extra stretchers that the LST was carrying. 

Forward Area Rehearsal 

During the stop at Saipan the final rehearsal was 
carried out. Only the reconnaissance party of the 
battalion participated. They boated in an LCVF at 0900 
on 13 February 1945, and made a run to the line of 
departure and back* Final radio calibration wps accom- 
plished and latest intelligence was assimilated and 
given to all hands. 


Tactical Plan For Landing 

It)? J 

It was planned that the battalion reconnaissance 
party of nine (9) officers and twenty-four (24) enlisted 
men (Battalion Commander, Battalion Plans and Training 
Officer, Battalion Supply Officer,; Battalion Survey 
Officer, Battalion Communication Officer, Battalion 
Chemical Warfare Officer, three (3) firing battery 
Commanding Officers, and Fire Direction Center, Survey, 
Communication, and Medical Personnel) should be embarked 
from .the APA 207 at H-hour. This party was to rendez- 
vous off Baker control boat until ordered in to the 
beach by the Regimental Commander. Upon such order It 
was to proceed to Yellow Control Boat, secure permission 
to land, reconnoiter the battalion area, select positions, 
prepare installations, and guide the remainder of the 
.battalion into position. 

The remainder of the key personnel of the battalion 
was aboard che LST 1032, under command. of the Battalion 
: t \ ••Ex^GHtive Officer, with the howitzers and other essen- 


4 th Bn, 14th Marines Operation report - Iwo Jima (Cont f d) 

tial gear preloaded in twenty- two (22) dukws. This 
group was to remain aboard until ordered by the Reg- 
imental Commander to leave the LST. Upon such order it 
was to check in with Baker Control Boat then to proceed 
to Yellow Control Boat, remain there until ordered to 
proceed to the beach by the Battalion Commander, From 
the beach it was to be guided into position by the 
reconnaissance party. 

Ofrher personnel including drivers for two (2) TD 
9' s were aboard the APA 158 and APA 2©7. One LCM was 
to report to APA 158 at H plus 60 to load a TD 9 and 
personnel; four (4) LCM's were to report to APA 2*7 at 
" H plus 90 to load a TD 9, an 808 Radio Jeep and person- 
nel. These boats were then to report to the LST 1032 
to load additional personnel and to accompany the dukws 
as far as .Yellow Control Boat, From there, if practic- 
able, they were to precede that party, reach the beach 
first, and assist the reconnaissance party until the 
LST group reached the beach. 

Control Plan 

Control during the landing phase was to be main- 
tained by radio. The reconnaissance party had one (1) 
"610 M radio set on the Regimental Command Net and one on 
the Battalion Fire Direction Net. The Battalion Exec- 
utive Officer had one . 11 610 11 radio set on the Battalion 
Fire Direction Net to maintain contact with the recon- 
naissance party. He also had a "610" radio set on 
the Regimental Command Net to receive Regimental orders. 
The Executive Officer and Assistant Executive Officer 
of each battery had a "610" radio set on the Battalion 
Fire Direction Net, and were thus able to keep contact 
with the Battalion Commander and the 'Battalion Executive 
Officer. Control over the remaining Dukws and over 
accompanying small boats was to be by voice and visual 
signals. The Battalion Executive Officer also had a 
"610" radio set on the Dukw Company Net enabling contact 
with the LST to be maintained. 

. .. Description of Landing 


4th Bn, 14th Marines Operation report - I wo Jima (Cont'd) 

The reconnaissance party aboard APA 207 boated at 
0900, and left for Baker Control Boat at 0910, arriving 
there at 0955. It rendezvoused there until 1407 when 
it left for the line of departure* Crossing that line at 
1419 it proceeded to the beach, arriving at 1438; Under 
intense mortar and artillery fire immediately the party 
attempted to carry out its mission, moving inland, seek- 
ing to reach the area assigned the battalion* The fire 
was so intense in the position area assigned the 
battalion, that the party could carry out only the 
barest reconnaissance before having to dig in for the 
night. One (l) officer was wounded and evacuated; one 
(1) officer and two (2) enlisted men were wounded but 
not evacuated. 

Trie LST group remained aboard all of 19 February, 
and suffered six casualties (including one fatality) 
from enemy fire hitting in' T;he transport area. At 
approximately 1230, 20 February 1945, this. group was 
ordered to leave the LST, but at tnat time the ship was 
headed out to sea to discharge its LCT (1031) . Having 
done that it returned to its area and the first dukw 
was discharged at 1511. 3y this time the wind and sea 
had picked up considerably so as to offer very adverse 
conditions. An "A" Frame Dukw sank immediately after 
becoming waterborn. The remainder left for Yellow Con- 
trol at 1558 leaving one (l) unservicable dukw on the 
LST. Six (6) dukws failed to reach Yellow Control Boat 
due to. engine failure." All of these reported back to the 
LST, but only one (l) was taken aboard before sinking. 
The dukws arrived at line of departure at 1615 and left 
at 1620. It proceeded to Yellow Control Boat which 
would not', permit any landing at this time (1711) because 
of crowded beach conditions.. At 1720 permission was 
granted to send dukws to the beach. In order, not to 
off ex. a profitable target to the enemy who were still 
firing. on the beaches and because of the crowded beach 
conditions, the H&S Battery "A" Frame Dukw was dispatched 
to lead number one of "M" Battery to the beach ahead of 
the other dukws, so that there might be a. partial regis- 
tration that night. The n A H Frame Da£w hit the beach 
at 1725, followed immediately by number one of H M" 
Sattery.. Darkness fell soon thereafter causing great 
^^f^pLrjulty n maintaining control of J > remainder 


^ 4M^ lU, : _ ________ 

4 th Bn, 14th Marines Operation' report Iwo jima (CtJrvt'd) 

of tne dukws- that had- no radio • communications with the 
control dukw. The. last -du&w r landed at 0005 on. 21 
February 1945. 

During this' phase, seven (?) howitzer bearing dukws 
sank and one (1)^ "A M frame dukw sank. One (1) f, A ,f frame 
dukw was taken back into the LST 1032. Four (4) howitzer 
bearing dukws had returned to the L ST, but only one (1) 
got aboard to avoid sinking. One (1) officer drowned 
during this period, • " - 

The. personnel from the APAs' 158 and- 207 proceeded 
according to plan on 19 February 1945, but when not 
permitted to land returned to their respective ships 
about 1600 on that date. On 20 February 1945, because 
the LST 1032 had left station, the small boats went 
directly to the Control Boats. One- (l) LCVP from the^ APA 
207 hit the beach at 1030. A second one reached the 
beach at 1230, a third at 1730. All others," having been 
ordered to return for the night to their AFA 1 s boated 
again on D plus 2 and landed around noon on D plus 2. 

Ammunition resupply was- to be from the LST to the 
beach by dukws. Due to the adverse conditions and late- 
ness of tne landing no ammunition was landed on D plus 1. 
On D plus 2 and D plus 2 ammunition was brought ashore 
in dukws. At 1500 on D plus 4 the LST was beached on 
Yellow 2, and the remaining five thousand and two-hundred 
(5200) rounds were taken off as well as all organizational 
equipment and personnel by 0330, D plus 5. Thereafter re- 
supply of ammunition was from the ammunition ships direct 
to tne battalion position. This was so slow that it 
often limited the firing the battalion could do. 

All classes of supplies, except ammunition* were 
plentiful throughout the operation. When the dukws were 
lost a large 'amount of medical gear and small arms were 
lost. Resupply was quickly accomplished by using the 
reserve supply the battalion took on the LST* 

4th Bn, 14th Marines Operation report - I wo Jima (Cont ! d) 




One ton truck 
Water trailer 
808 radio jeeps 
Cargo jeep 

One ton truck 
Water trailer 
808 Radio jeeps 
TCS radio jeep 
Cargo jeep 

808 radio jeep 
Ambulance jeep 

















D plus 5 

D plus 5 

D plus 4 

D plus 4 

D plus 2 

D plus 5 

D plus 5 

D plus 5 

D plus 3 

D plus 5 

D plus 5 

D plus 4 

D plus 1 

D plus 4 


Missions and Daily Operations 

The battalion suffered four (4) killed in action and 
twenty three (23) wounded in action a&d all reports were 
made by means of the casualty card system and that proved 
to be very excellent. The morale of the men throughout the 
operation was of the highest degree and was undoubtedly 
maintained at this standard by the rapid delivery of mall 
and the distribution of 10-1 rations as well as the new 
type "C" ration. The health of the battalion was ex- 
cellent throughout the operation with no disease encount- 
ered. Sanitary measures were scrupulously observed and 
a daily inspection was conducted by the Battalion Medical 
Officer. Lieutenant Colonel YOUNG-DALE was ordered by 
tne Regimental Commander to assume command of the Third 
Battalion, Fourteenth Marines on 24 February 1945. Major 
SPRIT ZEN assumed command of the Fourth Battalion on 24 
February 1945. Lieutenant Colonel YOUNG-DALE returned on 
11 Marcn 1945, to resume command of the Fourth Battalion. 

The reconnaissance party of the battalion landed on 
t-day, but was unable to make any reconnaissance of the 


4th Bn, 14th Marines Operation report - I wo Jima (Cont'd) 

designated position area until the morning of D plus 1 
due to heavy shell fire and small arms fire that was, 
constantly sweeping the area. During the morning of D 
plus 1, two (2) boat loads of battalion personnel landed 
and joined the reconnaissance party in the area that was 
to be occupied by the battalion. The dukws were launched 
in heavy weather at 1511 the afternoon of D plus 1, By 
midnight the battalion had five (5) guns ashore. On D 
plus 1 ah attempt was made to locate the Corps. I, P., as 
designated in the attack order, however, this was 
impossible since' the unimproved road 'w«s unrecognizable 
and the railroad spur non-existent. A position area 
survey was '$)ttt in then by a three point resection using' 
as reference points, the shoreline on the south east 
coast near Mt . ' Suribachi, the shoreline on the north east 
coast and a corner of Airfield #1. The largest error in 
this survey, as later proven, was forty (40) yards. All 
guns were laid by base angle and the positions were 
plotted on the 1/20,000 Air and Gunnery Target Map that 
was to be ihe firing chart for the operation. At 1530 
on D plus 2 registration was started by the air observer. 
Due to his need to fire other battalions at the same 
time, the registration was completed at 1728. On D plus 
3 one (1) replacement howitzer was received from Division 
and put in position by 1130 that morning. Three (3) more 
replacement guns were given to the battalion, one on .each 
of tne following days; D plus 5, D plus 6, and D plus 7. 
The battalion thus consisted of three (3) batteries with 
three (3) guns each. The bulldozers were used quite 
extensively during' the entire period to dig the guns in 
as well as the various dumps. < Both bulldozers were 
knocked out by enemy shellfire at times, however, due to. 
the proximity of an almost totally destroyed bulldozer 
parts were salvaged and they were kept in running con- 
dition. Late in the operation (D plus 20) a one :ton 4x4 
ran .over a land mane and was damaged, This vehicle was 
also repaired by salvaging parts from other wrecked 
vehicles. One mechanical. "failure •occurred on the guns 
when a gun in :, L s: Battery • failed' to return to battery. 
The reserve oil was refilled, a manometer test was con- 
ducted by Division Ordnance. " The test failed to disclose 
r - * anything wrong' and the gun was put' back/ in operation. It 
- functioned perfectly from then on. While firing one (l) 


— «.4> — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 

lilMres Operation report - Iwo Jima .(Cont'd) 

round per minute for ten minutes for our sound ranging, 
one (1) gun was suddenly put under fire and had two (2) 
shells nit in the gun pit (approximately 75 mm) . It is 
tnought that the enemy brought the gun under fire by 
means of flash ranging. No damage was suffered by the 
gun other than the burning of the camouflage net. 

Throughout the operation this battalion had a 
general support mission, paying particular attention to 
counter battery fire. On several days it reinforced 
direct support battalions on preparatory, harassing and 
defensive fires. The operation order for e^ch day was 
issued the previous night, generally between 2400 and 
0600. Preparatory fires were ' arranged and registered 
when necessary; these fires were generally extended 
after K-hour until an F«0«, lifted them. 

During the day the battalion fired on targets of 
opportunity designated by air observers or forward 
observers. Occasionally it fired unobserved missions 
in areas where enemy activity had been noted. Often 
times it was difficult for the observer to note just 
now completely the mission was accomplished. If a 
particular gun was neutralized temporarily, a "Mission 
Accomplished" Was given;' still the gun, mortar, or rocket 
often fired again and again even though the concentration 
was frequently refired. Nevertheless direct hits were 
scored on some guns so that they were silenced perman- 
ently. Very few enemy troops were observed, very little 
enemy materiel noted in the open, therefore our fire 
was largely limited to neutralizing areas rather than 
to destroying particular targets. 

Harassing fires for the night were assigned gen- 
erally between 1800 and 1900, fired between 1930 and 
0500. In addition the battalion fired many counter 
battery missions each night, being adjusted by the sound 
ranging team, by the flash ranging team, t and by observers 
The sound ranging team functioned very well, locating 
many targets. The flash team was seriously hampered by 
the poor O.P., for the base was too short to determine 
lUSflifcflfifiHEa t e ly , therefore the team was seldom able to 
%<Jlfe|Bian a directional azimuth. If we located any 
i£$rg0t6 -''(iteviously fired) along that azimuth, we took 

4th Bn, 14th Marines Operation report ~ Iwo 01 ma (Cont'd) 

them under fire and had average success. On two occasions 
this method yielded excellent: results, definitely silencing 
the enemy weapon. 

This battalion also fired propaganda shell e. No 
definite report on the effect of that fire wgs given. 
The battalion also fired several high angle fire missions, 
all with excellent results; ; battalion massing was report- 
ed' very> ! good on all such missions* It also fired several 
yellow smoke shells to- designate target areas for all* 
strikes. Apparently the dispersion in this firing was 
exceptionally great, it is highly probable that the 
individual cannisters were hurled some distance upon 
bursting of the shell thus creating the appearance of 
"extensive dispersion. Also, the duplication of color, 
that is, using yellow smoke grenades pnd panels to 
designate front lines, and then using yellow smoke to 
designate targets, caused some confusion to the air 
observers of fire support ships. 

Summary of Ammunition Expenditure 

(a) Rounds expended by mission. 

Ho. of Missions 

No. of Rounds 

Registration fires 
Counter battery fires 
Preparation fires 
Harassing fires 
Defensive fires 
Targets of opportunity- 






565 missions 

23,407 rounds 

(b) Rounds expended by 


., /Propaganda 10 
Yellow Smoke 15 

M-48 13,480 
M-54 8,819 
M-57 • 1,0*83 

TOTAL 23,407 


' * a# * ^e^use of the slowness of dukws it is considered 

Bn, 14th Marines Operation repo'rt - Iwo Jima (Cont'd) 

worth while to have some other type of craft, such as 
an LCVP to aid in controlling the formation. It would 
also be a great aid to have a "610" radio in each dukw. 

Closer coordination should exist between the plans 
of the Navy and the Division to avoid any conflict as 
occurred when the LCT, which had a high launching prior- 
ity, was due to be launched at the same time that the 
dukws were to be launched and resulted in delaying the 
departure of the dukws. 

Some type of fire proofing material for camouflage 
nets should be made available. In one instance the nets 
caught fire readily as a result of enemy fire* 

The use of the same colored smoke to mark targets 
and front lines is a hazardous practice and should not 
be done because of the possible confusion that may 

This battalion was furnished with twenty (20) 
1/10,000, thirty-five (35) 1/20,000 and ten (10) 1/5,000 
maps. Tnis supply was adequate. 

The number of different types of ammunition used 
during the operation pnd the quantity often caused some 
confusion during darkness because of the similar 
packaging. It is suggested that some distinctive color 
marking system be adopted to aid in night handling. 

It would also be a great aid if the resupply 
ammunition ships could be loaded with at least the same 
square ammunition if not the same lot. 

It is recommended that the battalion be furnished 
with several light radios, such as the SCR 300, to be used 
by the landing party. The "SIO" is a two man load and 
too heavy for that purpose. 



4?6th Amphibious Truck Compa.ny, Operation Report 





(a) Organization 1 

(b) Loading 1 




(a) Landing 2 

(b) Ashore 4 

(c) General 4 


Organization and Loading for Combat. 

(•a) Organization: Fifty Amphibian Trucks and 
personnel of this organization w&re attached to the 14th 
Marine Regiment of the 4th Marine Division for this operation. 

(1) bight DUKV's, the company commander 
and enlisted personnel allocated to Regimental Headquarters, 
14th Marine Regiment were combft loaded (dry) aboard LST 763 .. 
at ^aui on 7 January, 1945. 

(2) Twenty DUK >- ' s , two company of t icers 
and enlisted personnel allocated to the 3rd battalion, 14th 
Marine Regiment were combat loaded (dry) aboard LisT 1031 at 
&aui on 10 January, 1945. 

(3) Twenty- two DUKW's, two company officers 
and enlisted personnel allocated to the 4th Battalion, li-th 
marine Regiment were combat loaded (dry) aboard LbT 10.32 at 
i'iaui on 10 January, 1945. 

(bj Loading. - . 

(1) The tight Regimental neadquarters 
i^UK-v's aboard LST 763 vere loaded with communlct tion and 
survey gear, small arms and ammunition, rations, water, 
personnel and personal gear, etc., not in excess of 7',000 
pounds. ' ' 

(2) The twenty uuK.^s, 3rd battalion. ^UK .'s 
aboard LbT 648 were loaded with three batteries 'of 105mm 
howitzers, ammunition, communications equipment, ordnance 
cbests, cleaning and preserving materials, radio jeeps, water, 
s. r nd bags, wire, miscellaneous battery gear plus personnel 
and personal gear. ■ 

(3) Tht twenty-two DUKV 1 s, 4th Battalion 
DuK'U's, aboard LST 1032 Were loaded with three batteries of 
105mm Howitzers,* ammunition, communication equipment, ordnance 
chests, cleaning and preserving materials, radio jeeps, 
rations, water, sand bags, wire and miscellaneous battery 
gear plus personnel . and personal gear. 

. 2. Rehearsal. ' 

u<sj 'Jff'iji . ) during rehearsal maneuvers off ^aui, 13 January 
y ;i tlir^' 17 'J'a'Huary, 1945, eight DUK 1 . 1 s were launched and went 
* 'r >/? t til) 

2. Rehearsal CContinued). 

(a) (Continued) ashore from LST 763, sixteen 3rd 
Battalion DUKV's were launched and went ashore from LST 1032. 
Personnel bivouaced until the following morning 16 January, 
1945, when after a water run of approximately seven miles _ 
all DUIC ' s were reloaded (wet) aboard their respective LST' s. 

(l) During the above mentioned maneuvers 
LST 1031 was damaged to such an extent that all DUKl.'s, cargo 
and personnel were transferred to LST 648 at Pearl Harbor. 

3. Lnroute to target. 

(a) During the period 16 January, 1945 to 19 Feb- 
ruary, 1945 the DUKv/' s were enroute to the target. while 
enroute maintenance of the DUKvj 1 s was performed about every 
third day. Motors were started, tires reinflated, gas, oil 
and water levels maintained, carburetors, air cleaners and 
filters maintained and repaired as necessary, however , com- 
plete maintenance considered advisable after vet loading due 
to long water run at ^aui, was not possible due to crowded 
condition of Tank Decks and DuKW cargo compartments. Prior to 
D-day carburetors settlement bowls were cleaned a nd emptied 
of water sucked into the gas tanks during the kaui maneuvers. 

(l) Enroute to the target each platoon 
officer oriented his platoon for the attack and also oriented 
himself with the artillery officers and the overall plan of 
attack. This was disseminated to the enlisted men concerned. 

4. Ship to Shore. 

(a) Landing. 

(l) On D-day at K plus 6 hours, under fav- 
orable weather conditions but a moder te sea the twenty DUKU's 
aboard LST 648 '-ere successfully launched. Enroute to the line 
of departure the Command DuKV: had engine failure due to wa ter 
in the gasoline. Two other L T uK."'s experienced similar trouble. 
By the time these DUKV/'s were repaired, information was 
received by radio that the proposed Battalion positions were 
under heavy enemy fire and the DUKV's were ordered back aboard 
the LST. During the reloading one LU£ T <, unable to pull its 
load up the ramp, sank, All personnel were saved, however, the 
• « •# *-DUK}& and its cargo including 105mm Hoi,ritzer were lost. On 

D-riight, after operation maintenance, including draining water 
from gas ta.nks and carburetor settlement bowls was performed* 
DUKw's were refueled. 



On D plus 1 at 0900 in a high wind end a 
rough sea, the nineteen DUKV's aboard LST 648, lying about 4000 
yards of Beach Yellow 2, were again successfully launched.. 
DUKW's rendezvoused at the line of departure until 1500 when 
ordered into Beach Red 2. 'Because of soft steep beach, high 
surf and heavy -load about half, these DUKW's had to be pulled 
on shore by bulldozers. One DUKV. broached and was lost in 
this landing. All personnel and most of the cargo on this 
kUKw was saved. Remaining eleven guns and cargo of this Bat- 
talion were placed in position by the DUKW ! s and unloaded by 
DUiC'v. A Frames. 

(8) On D plus 1 at 1445 the twenty-two DUKW's 
aboard LST 1022, lying in the assigned launching area, were 
successfully launched. Within five minutes after launching, 
DUKW #4-6, sunk before sufficient water had entered the hull to 
activate the bilge pump. All personnel were saved. The motors 
of seven additional DUKWs, each one carrying a 105mm Howitzer 
failed within a few minutes after launching. The failure in 
each case was caused by water in the gasoline, a result of in- 
sufficient freeboard due to the extremely heavy loads. All 
seven of these were subsequently lost due to inability to get 
them back aboard the LST. In the attempt to haul one of them 
aboard, one Marine Officer was lost by drowning. 

One additional DUKl* loaded with battery 
gear and personnel experienced motor failure as did the seven 
above but this one was brought along side the LST, unloaded 
and then brought aboard. The rema ining thirteen &UKWfs- ; pro- ' 
'aeededtto-. the- line";of departure. Their first landing attempt 
was thwarted by. heavy enemy mortar fire on the beach. On 
their second attempt to land at 2230 two DUKV's containing 
battery gear broached and were lost. All personnel were 
saved. The remaining eleven got. ashore, however, one of these 
was disabled by enemy shell fire and was abandoned. 

(3) On D plus 2- days at 0850 three DUKV's 
aboard LST 763, containing Regimental Command Fost gear were 
launched, went ashore, discharged- cargo and returned to tfce LST. 

(4) On D plus 5 days at . 0830 all eight DUIC's 
aboarc. LST 763, containing Command Fost gear and personnel were 
launched, went ashore, discharged their cargo and returned to 
the L5T. The initial landings of these DUKV's were made under 
conditions identical to these encountered by the other LUK v, s 


(Continued) . 

(l) During D plus 2, -3, and 4 days the remaining 
DUKW's were used principally to unload ammunition and cargo 
from their respective LST's. This was a continuous 72 hour 
operation. During this period thirteen DUKW's were lost by 
sinking or broaching. Difficulties encountered during this 
phase of the operation and factors contributing to the loss of 
these thirteen DUKW's are as follows: 

U) Inability of LST's 648 and 1032 to main- 
tain station resulting in water trips .up to twelve and fourteen 
miles in high seas. 

(b) Beach Control refused to permit DUKW's to 
land after dark because of reported Japanese counter landings. 
This left many DUKW's loaded with ammunition, adrift in the - 
water throughout the night. 

(c) Failure of Bowser Boats to supply gas to 
DUKW's as . called for in the operation plan. 

(d) Inability to maintain a landing for DUKW's 
clear of debris and beached vessels. 

(e) -Lack of shoring on LST ramps to hold them 
in position "against a heavy sea. 

(f) Weather and sea conditions during this 
period were extremely adverse. 

(c) General. 

(1) During this period D plus 6 cays to D plus 15 
days inclusive, all DUKW's of this organization were operated 
twenty-four hours daily, hauling ammunition and other cargo and 
evacuating casualties. -During this period three additional 
DUKW's were lost. The performance of the DUKW in this phase 

of the operation was satisfactory despite lack of any main- 
tenance beyond 1st echelon. 

(2) Although materiel losses were heavy, personnel 
•losses were light. One man was lost by drowning when his DUKW 
collided' with a small boat. Ten other men were wounded or 


" comme nda t ion s . 

(a) That the manufacturers established load limit be made 
known to and strictly adhered to by all branches of the services 
using DUKV 1 s . 

(b) That some type of crrft larger than an LCVF be used, 
to fuel DUKV's during the assault phase of the operation, one 
sufficiently large for a DUKV to moor alongside. 

(c) That every effort be made in future operations to 
designate ana maintain 'a clear landing for DUE! if' s. Failure to 
do so on this operation has caused many shoreline accidents 
and the loss of some vehicles, 

(d) That all DUKV rehearsal maneuvers be completed before 
final maintenance and combat loading. Land loading is strongly 
recommended. With this loading procedure the DUKV would then 
be fit for a long sea voyage where only limited maintenance is 
possible. Ve do recommend, however, that where possible the 
DUKV's be finally conditioned and combat loaded nearer the 

(e) That LST's operate roving retriever boats to pick up 

disabled DUKV s. 

(f) That LST's maintain station, thereby reducing the ^ater 
run of DUKV's.. This would greatly expedite the unloading pro- 

(g) The Medical authorities of both services participating 
in this operation have been lavish in praising the DUKV for 

the part it has played in the evacuation of casualties. DUKV's 
were not always readily available to them. It is therefore 
recommended that a sufficient number of DUKV's and operating 
personnel be assigned, to each Field Hospital' Unit for their" 
sole use in future operations. 





4th Amphibious Truck Company, Operation Report. 

rrc J IMA 



SECTION I: Planning and Preparation 

SECTION II: Movement to Objective... 

SECTION III: Ship to Shore Movement.. 

SECTION IV: Narrative of Operation.. 

SECTION V: Comments and Recommendations 


This company was activated on 21 October, 

1944, and organized in accordance with ourrent Table of 

She majority of the personnel had joined by 
1 December, 1944, though two officers joined about mid-Dec- 
ember, and several enlisted men joined as late as 1 January, 

1945. None of .the personnel, either officers or enlisted; 
men, had had prior training on DUKU'e. 

Training was as intensive as time and 
facilities permitted, Euch valuable preliminary training- 
was secured prior to arrival of equipment by arrangement 
with the 476th amphibian Truck Company (USA), whose person- 
nel were very cooperative at all times. This training was 
effected by sending as many observers, ofiicers and men as 
possible on two separate maneuvers in which the Army company 
and 14th' marines were engaged. In addition, training films 
were used extensively. 

•nil amphibian trucks were received on 1-2 
December. All vehicles were first driven 300 miles on land 
to train drivers and break in equipment, a. thorough check 
was then made under supervision of the maintenance officer and 
final ajustments made. 

Arrangements were made for two LST's to be 
made available for training. Intensive training in embarking 
and launching at sea, coming alongside a ship, and entering 
and leaving water over beaches- was effected. A . two-day 
rehearsal with sup-ported unit completed the training. All 
DUKV 1 s were then thoroughly overhauled and serviced in prep- 
aration for the forthcoming operation. 

Planning of necessity, conformed to that of 
the supported unit. The first platoon supported the first 
battalion, the second olatoon the second battalion, and the 
third, less detachments, supported regimental headquarters. 
To fit the requirements of the supported unit the first and 
second platoons were reinforced by elements of the third, 
prior to embarkation. One of the company headquarters DLK.. 1 s 
was fitted with special equipment and tools for maintenance. 


All. units of the company were embarked dry 
aboard EST's at Kahulul on 7-10 January, 1945. DuK .. 1 s were 
•loaded with guns, ammunition, personnel, etc., to a-oprox- 
I^C^joounds, including crew. After a rehearsal at 


' ^^'^^^^ iokiinu e d ) . 

naui the LST's anchored at Kaneohe Bay-, Cahu. ' There was no 
opportunity there to flush out the DUKV's with fresh water 
or to inspect and service then, Many items of vital equip- 
ment were procured while there. Personnel was granted liberty 
in -accordance with instructions. 

Vhile enroute to, the objective personnel were 
thoroughly instructed in details of the operation, 'using all 
available maps and material. Final plans, based on available 
intelligence were made and issued. \ ' 

This unit did not participate in forward 

area rehearsal. 


Platoons were, launched on order, first and 
second platoons at aoout l-±30 on D~da,y. WKu platoons went 
in in column with approximately - 100 yards distance, and 10 
minute inveral between .uuX.< ' s of erch battery. One officer 
and a few enlisted men of each platoon vert; ordered to take 
their platoon in and establish a platoon OP on shore and 
function as a forward control station, the l/uK*w ' s to. return 
to txheir ship to reload. An officer or senior NCO of each 
platoon, with the remainder of tht control personnel/- were 
"to remain aboard the LST to function as a rear control 
station, DUKW 1 s \>rere to shuttle between the two stations. 
Company headquarters landed with the first platoon and 
established a CP ashore, tte suits obtained by this system; 
of control were excellent. Several iXJX'w's were rescued on • 
the beaches by assistance given by personnel ashore. 

Better results could have been obtained 
•if it had been possible to maintain radio communications 
between the different elements of the company. 

A first platoon DUKW", carrying a gun, sank 
off the ramp of the LST. Reports indicate this to have been 
caused by the ship's failure to change their control light 
from green to red when the ship got underway. All other guns 
were landed safely, Both the first and second platoons 
_ . co mpleted landing at about 17-30. The third platoon landed 

••PT&t. rbout 2115 on D plus 1. 

■* > 


This company's mission was to land and supply 

the first and second battalions of artillery. Landing was 
accomplished on D-day and the supply function was continued 
through 28 February. On 1 Inarch the company was placed under 
operational control of VAC to unload ammunition ships. 
About: 3 March the company began continuous around the clock 
operation. This continued for about ten days and imposed 
considerable strain on all personnel, particularly after one 
officer and twenty men were detach&d to a Provisional bat- 
talion. Continuous operation over a long period, of time 
would not be possible with full equipment, ihe company 
continued under Corps control until ordered to re embark on 
15 inarch, fifteen DUKW f s being released on 14 March to 
re embark the .artillery regiment. 

Throughout the operation DUK'w's were employed 
to evacuate casualties, an average of four DUKW's being 
employed almost constantly for tha t purpose. 


On the initial landing it was found in 
almost all cases that beaches were too steep and too soft 
for DuKvv's to land. This was the cause o£ much maintenance 
as well as the loss of nine DuKV- 1 s which were broached and 
wrecked in the surf. The DUKV^s could not get up the beach . 
and had to be unloaded just clear of the surf. When tractors 
were Immediately available the DUKW's could be towed out, 
but if there was as much as five minutes 'delay they settled 
in the sand and filled with water and nothing could pull them ou 
In one case *wq trac.tore,.and an LYT. were -.hooked- to a DUKW 
and only succeeded in pulling off. the towing shackles. 

When DuKw 1 s had to unload in the surf they 
were un "Die to turn around and were forced to reenter the water 
stern first. As the surf was thick with ,debris and wreckage 
their rudders and propellers were fouled. Shafts and struts 
were torn out, and when the shafts ripped out large holes 
were torn in the hull. This condition- contributed largely 
to the loss of .-many of the twelve D-UKW J s xvhich were lost at. 
sea. , - ... . . ' , 

Crippled DUKW s could not land on the beach, 
nor could they get back aboard the EST f They could only drift 
helplessly while maintenance men tried to effect repairs. 


SECTION V - TContinu . . 

Several were repaired and continued in' service, but some sank. 
Had' an LSD "been available as a maintenance ship these cripples 
could easily have been towed aboard and saved. 

The maintenance DUKW was lost on D plus Z 
as explained in the preceding paragraphs. Its, loss was a 
severe handicap to the company. It had been, ;and would have 
•continued to be, Invaluable in rescuing and assisting cripples, 
and had the equipment it carried reached the beach it would 
have greatly facilitated repair and salvage x^rork, 

LST's did not remain in the area, and in most 
cases closed their ramps at night and refused to permit DUKw's 
to embark. One DUKW was reported lost 30 miles at sea. The 
LST designated as maintenance ship, while cooperative in other 
respects, would not permit welding on the tank deck. welding 
approximates 50 per cent of DUK.^ maintenance. 

Bowser boats arid gasoline barges often carried 
only 100 octane gas, which can not be used by DUKvv's. 

During the early stages drivers had difficulty 
finding landing joints and sometimes landed at the wrong place. 
The beaches were littered with wrecked craft and vehicles of 
all tsnses and there was no distinctive marker at landing points 
which the driver could recognize. 

Salvage was vitally necessary in order to keep 
remaining DUK^'s in operation. Salvage crews took every oppor- 
tunity to .salvage parts from wrecked equipment, even working 
in heavy surf on broached DUKW's. .^s a result all 29 remain- 
ing DUK\' ! 8 were fully operative when turned over to Corps upon 
departure from I T .vO JIk~. 

In general I consider that the personnel of 
this company proved themselves to be well trained and fully 
competent, and that ah excellent performance - at least as 
creditable as that of any other similar unit present - was 
turned in by the company as a whole. 

The following recomendations are submitted 
for future operations: 


'<<". < ■ i ' ' i . - 
• ♦ » • < \ ' v -V 

1. A distinctive, easily recognized beach 
marker for DUKti landing points. This marker to be carried 
ashore and set up at suitable landing piiats by artillery 
reconnaissance 'parties or by platoon leaders on initial landing. 

2. Bulldozers "be made available for' toving 
or grading at initial DUiO/ landing, and as long thereafter as 
may be necessary. 

3. DUKV landing points to be restricted to 

DUK*.' s only. 

4. --m LSD be designated as a DIjKw maintenance 
shit) for crippled DUK'.-'s. 

5. LST's to remain in the area and to 
permit DUK'^'s to embark at night. 

6. Lach LbT to carry 50 drums of 80 octane 
gasoline for refueling 1>UK1» 1 s . 

7. oowser boats and fuel barges to maintain 
a supply of 80 octane gas to refuel DUKw's. 

8. One 608 r nd six 610 radios, in Service- 
able condition, to be furnished for intra-comoany communication. 

9. Fifty per cent replacement on propellers, 
propeller shafts, shaft struts, and shaft strut caps to be 

10. i*o personnel to be detached from DUKv» 
company during sontinu^us around the clock operation. 

■ - 
lOV. ALjJ'Orii). 


Fourteenth Marines Regimental War Diary, 



28 December f 1944 - 5- April. ,1 945. .. 

This diary includes the loading of. this regiment for the 
Iwo Jima operation, its movement- to the objective., its operation 
as a part of the Fourth Marine Division at the objective, and 
its return to the base camp.- 

28 December, 1944 - 1/14 ( APA Group) at 12:30 p.m. departed 

f rom Camp Maui, Maui, T. H. 9 embarked aboard ship at 
" Kanului, ^aui, T. H. 

29 December,. 1944 ^ 1/14 (APA Group) at 9:00 a.m., sailed from 

K&hului, enroute S a nd Island," Honolulu Harbor, Oahu, T. H, 9 
at 5:00 p.m., arrived and anchored at Sand Island. 

30 Deo ember., 1944 - 1/14 • ( APA Group) at anchor at Sand Island; 

granted 50* liberty to personnel. 

31 December, 1944 ~ 2/14 at 12:10 the main body left Camp Maui, 

and embarked aboard the USS Logan, (APA 196 J . 

Ordnance Officers of the regiment commenced 
loading of ammunition aboard LST's" 726,. 763, 764 and 1031 
at Pearl Harbor. 

1 January, 1945 - 1/14 (APA) at anchor Sand Island, granted 

personnel 50/6 liberty. 

• ; 2/l4 at 0815 ship got underway from Kahului, 
and "the battalion compXeted shakedown aboard ship. 

Loading of ammunition aboard LST's completed. 
•4/14 Units abpard USS Mifflin, and Newberry 
sailed from Kahului, for Pearl Harbor. 

2 January, 1945 — -,H&S Battery 1/14 (APA) at .anchor; personnel 

participated in "physical exercise , 

2/14 . at 0800 , the Battalion Liaison Party 
was boated and participated in .debarkation drill off M a ui, 
and at 1700- the .APA r got ; underway for Pearl Harbor. 

.■■H&S-.14 ■and / 3/l4 : .&,'QM : s commenced loading 
vehicles and equipment aboard APA 118 at Kahului. . 

3 January, 1945 . -..0800- Hegimental CP r closed Marine Camp Maui; 

0900 Hegimental CP opened aboard 1 APA 118. 
-:-. «l/l4 No change. 
• • . c - 2/14 A^ i2p6 .the. APA arrived at Pearl Harbor. 
' s • ... .I-3/l4 1 Lbad^ing' pf . vphjlcles' and equipment 

. aboard APA 118 completed. ' Bat'taTipn Headquarters embarked 
aboard _APA. 206; the .remainder of the Battalion Transport 
Tfcing, .this, ship mf.Pf.Xl^ . . " ' ' ' ' ' 

-1- ~ " " " ' • ■ 


— — _ ' — — — — — 


3 January, 1945 - Battalion Liaison party and Forward Observer 

parties embarked with their respective units of the 24th 
Marine Regiment* 

4 January, 1945 - R&S B a ttery-14th sailed from Kahului; 1600 

arrived at Pearl harbor, 

1/14 No change. 

2/14 Liberty to 50# of battalion and re- 
mainder of troops participated in organized recreation. 

3/14 (APA 206) sailed from JAaui. 
4/14 No change. 

B January, 1945 
7 January, 1945 

- An units sailed from Oahu. 

- Arrived Maalaea Bay. 

LST Group started embarkation. 

8 January, 1945 - APA Group participated in ship to shore 
exercises at Maalaea Bay. 

9 January, 1945 


10 January, 1945 

Pearl Harbor. 

12 January, 1945 

13 January, 1945 

- APA Group arrived Oahu, from ship to shore 

Liberty for percentage of APA Groups at 
Continued embarkation of LST Groups. 
Regiment sailed from Oahu. 
Arrived ^aui. 

14 January, 1945 - Lstablished Regimental Communications net 
and completed plans for participation in corps ship to 
shore rehearsal. 

15-16 January, 1945- Participated in corps ship to shore rehearsal, 

18 January, 1945 - Arrived Oahu from rehearsal. Liberty granted 
to 50/c of personnel. Remainder of personnel participated 
in organized athletics- 

21 January, 1945 - Regimental Staff briefed battalion officers 

on LST's on forthcoming operation. LST 1031 broke down 
during maneuvers; this necessitated transfer of personnel 
and equipment of 3/14 to LST 648 at Honolulu. 

22 January, 1945 - LST ! s sailed from Oahu for Lniwetok Atoll, 

Marshall Islands, Central Pacific. 

* *. : ' • ^JL 

23-25 ^anua^iBhlSf9!lSmabilitation period continued for (APA) 


,%&##,Mmm REGIMENT WAR DIARY (Cont'd). 

26 January, 1945 - Regimental Staff briefed Battalion Comman- 

ders and their staffs on forthcoming operation. 

27 January, 1945 - (APA) Groups sailed from Oahu for ^nivetok. 

28 January, 1945- No Change. 

2 February, 1945 - Underway enroute i-nlwetok Atoll, conducted 

briefing of personnel on forthcoming operation, and 
conducted drills and exercises. > 

3 February, 1945 - LST's arrived and anchored ^niwetok. 

5 February, 1945 - (APA) Groups arrived and anchored £niwetok. 

Regimental staff issued latest orders to all battalion 
staff sections. LST's sailed from kniwetok enroute to 
Saipan Island, Marianas Islands, Central Pacific. 

6 February, 1945 - LST ! s underway enroute Saipan. 

7 February, 1945 - (APA) Groups sailed from Eniwetok enroute 


8-9 February, _19£5- Underway enroute Saipan; conducted 
briefing; conducted drills and exercises. 

10 February, 1945 - LST T s arrived and anchored. Saipan. 

11 February, 1945 - (APA) Groups arrived and anchored at 

Saipan. An personnel except reconnaissance personnel 
and unloading details transferred to LST's. 

12-14 F'ebruary,1945~ Conducted briefings, drills, and physical 
exercise. Final check on Regimental radio nets. 

15 February, 1945 - LST's sailed, from Saipan enroute I wo Jima 

Island, Volcano Islands, Central Pacific. 

16 February, 1945 - (APA) Groups sailed from Saipan enroute 

I wo Jima. 

17-18 Febru&r#1945- Underway enroute Iwo Jima, final briefing 
of personnel. 

19 February, 1945 - D-Day.^ Weather clear and cool. Division 
commenced landing on beaches Yellow and blue at 0900. 

-1. Infantry - RCT23 - 2 battalions abreast- 
nd 2-23 on right - landed at How hour on 



19 February, 1945 - 1, Infantry (Cont'd) - RCT25 - 2 battalions 
abreast - 1~25 on left and 3-25 on right - landed at How 
hour on £>lue, 1. 

RCT24 - Division Reserve. Landed by 
battalions complete at 1945. 

2. Artillery - 1/14 - D/3 - RCT25. In 
position and firing at 1715 (ll guns). 

2/14 - D/S RCT23. In position and 

firing at 2200. 

3-14 Wot landed. 
■ 4-14 Not landed. 

3. Ship- to*» Shore - Reconnaissance parties 
boated at H-hour proceeded to Line of -Departure and 
landed as shown below'. 

1220 - Reconnaissance party 1/14 left Line 
of Departure and landed Blue 1 at 1247. 

1328 - Reconnaissance party 2/14 left- Line 
of Departure and landed Yellow 1 at 1342. 

1410 ~ Reconnaissance party 3/14 left Line 
of Departure and landed Yellow 1 at" 1430. 

1415 - Reconnaissance party 4/14 left line 
.of -Departure and landed Yellow 1 at 1438. 

Reconnaissance parties experienced very 
heavy fire falling on beaches and in previously selected 
position areas. 3/14 requested to land battalion on 
beaches outside Division Zone of Action. Permission not 

At 1405 the Commanding General, fourth 
Marine Division directed fourteenth Marines to land 1/14 
and 2/14 to support attack. 'DUKW's of 1/14, 2/14 and 
3/14 were launched at 1430. 1/14 and 2/14 were ordered - 
to land. The CP of 14th Marines closed aboard APa 118 
at 1500, headed for the beach. 

1/14 was in position and firing at 1715 
in support of RCT25. Able battery of 1/14 lost one 
howitzer as DUKvv's were launched from LST. 2/14 sent 
following message at 1840; u We are experiencing difficulty 
with DUKi/, 1 s on beach. So far have been able to get only 
two .(2) DUKW's in. A road has been cleared to left of 
our position area and' we are trying to get in there." by 
2200 2/14 was in position and firing in support of RCT23. 

The Commanding Officer, fourteenth Marines 
ordered 3/14, 4/14 and n&S-14 not to land. This order 
was. received and acted upon at 1630. 3/14 lost one DUKlw 
and howitzer during embarkation. CP 14th 'Marines opened 
aboard LST 763. 3/14 and 4/14 were ordered to make re- 
ee at daylight and be prepared to land battal- 
r|ent«- 1 Order. 



5» Shi p to Shore (Cont'd) - Condition 
Red was in effect from iate afternoon throughout the 
hours of darkness. 

20 February, . 1945 - D/i ^ay. leather fair - rain during 
afternoon. • 

It .Xnf m$ry - N o change. 

2. Artillery - 1/14 - D/S - RCT25. 

2/14 - D/S - RCT23. 

3/14 - Reinforced - 2/14 after 1728. . 
4/14 - Not landed, 
CP, 14th Marines opened •• ashore at 1715. 

The division continued the attack* at 0830. 1/14 and 2/14 
fired a ten (10) minute preparation from K-10 to hour. 

3. Ship to Shore - 3/14 and 4/14 received 
orders to land. 3/14 was in position and firing by 
1728. 4/14 was unable to land. CP group, 14th Marines 
landed at 1705. 

4. Type of fires fired from 4715 , 19 
February to 1500, 20 February. 


Counterbattery ' 11 195 

Targets of Opportunity ' 23 .3-15 

Preparation . . , ^ 4:00 

Harrassing & Defensive 25 ' 1959 

Registration 12 5£ 

' .- / ' 80 2949 

5. Casualties :- from 0900 D-day to 1500 
D/i: * r 



' 10 ; ' _ - II 67 . 1 3 

6. Air observer from USS Wake Island 
fired first artillery- air spot missions". Total of four 
missions fired; - ., 

21 February, 1945 v -"D/2-. - Weather- clear • and- cool. 

• 1. Infa-ntry - No change . . 





21 February, 1945 ~ 2. Artillery - 1/14 - D/S - RCT25. 

2/14 - D/S - RCT23.. 
3/14 _ Reinforced 1/14. 
4/14 - Five (5) guns ashore and 
firing by 0800. One not in firing condition. 

The division continued the attack at 0810/ 
14th Marines fired coordinated preparation from K-15 * 
to 'K-hour in sunport of attack. 

3. Ship to Shore - 4/14 completed landing 
and was In position at 0638. Four (4) howitzers operative 
One (l) howitzer out of action due to defective sight. 
Battalion in do sit ion and firing at 0800. 

4. Tyne of fires fired from 1500, 20 Febr 
fuary to 1500, 21 February. 


Count erbattery 
Targets of Opportunity 
Harrassing & Defensive 

5. Casualties'. - 





















1 21 


5. Miscellaneous r- Regimental CP displaced 
inland from the beach. 

6. Air observer from USS Wake Island fired 
a total of 7 missions. 

2 February, 1945 - D/3. Weather, rain and cloudy. 

1. Infantry - RCT21 passed to control of 
the 4th Marine Division and was ordered to x>ass through 
RCT23 -orior to 0730. * 

2. artillery - 1/14 - D/S _ RCT25. 

2/14 - D/S - RCT23 r>rior to 0700. 
after 0700 D/S RCT21. 

3/14 - Reinforced 1/14 prior to 1300. 
after 1300 reinforced 2/14. 

4/14 - G/S. Six (6) howitzers in 


4/13 - G/S - 0700 until 1200. 
The division continued the attack at 0835. 



#, (cont 1 d) 

tZg February, 1945 - 14th Marines fired preparation from K-35 

to K-hour in support of attack. 14th Marines and NGF die- 
\. v # persed counterattack in Division Zone of Action at 2340. 

; 3. Typg of fires -fired from 1500, 21 

February to 1500 22 February. 

Count erbattery 
Targets of opportunity 
Harrassing & Defensive 

4. Casualties - 









• 6202 



5. Air Observers from USS Wake Island 
fired a total of four (4) fire missions-. 

Sound Ranging - located one (l) target 

during the period. 

6. Combat Efficiency - 80$. 

23 February, 1945 — D/4. Weather - Cool and overcast. 

!• Infantry - RCT 23 passed through RCT 25 
on right flank prior to 0830. 2/25 remained on line. 

— ~ -2. Artillery - 1/14 -B/S 

2/14 ~ D/S RCT21 
. 3/14 - D/S RCT24 
"S 4/14 - G/S 

wmL 3/13 - G/S 

The division continued, the attack at 
0730. 14th Marines fired preparation from K-45 to K-hour 
in support of attack. 1 

at 3. Types of fire fired from 1500, 22 

sat: February -to 1500 23 February. 

Count erbattery 
Targets of opportunity 

.Harris £ing &, Defensive 








23 February, 1945 - 4. Casualties - 


ML ML. . QL F ML off enl 

2 3*" 20 

5. miscellaneous - 3/14 displaced two 
batteries from 148 E at 1150 to 165 ft. In position at 
1400. OP and flash base opened at 1430 on &t. Surbachi. 

: P 6. Air observer from U3S Wake Island fired 

four(4) fire missions. 

Sound Ranging - located and adjusted 14th 
Marines on six (6) enemy guns and mortar positions 
during the period. 

7. Combat efficiency - 80#. 

24 February, 1945 - D/5. weather, clear and cool. 

1. Infantry - No change. 

' 2. Artillery - 2/14 - D/S - RCT21. 
3/14 - D/3 - RCT24. 
1/14 - 0/3. Reinforced 2/14 on 
preparation and defensive fires and reinforced 13th 
Marines on preparation. Also fired in support of 5th 
Tank Battalion Attack. 

4/l4 - &/3. Reinforced 2/14 on pre- 
paration and defensive fires. 

4/13 - Reinforced 2/14 from 1800, 
23 February. to 1200, 24 February. 

The division continued the attack at 
0915, Preparation in Zone of Action 21st Marines fired 
, from 0845 to 0930 and from 1330 to 1400. 
(NOTE: 2/14 reinforced by 1/14, 4/14, 4/13 - as main 
effort of division attack on left flank). 

3. Type of f ires , fired from 1500, 23 
February to 1500 24 February: 

Targets of Opportunity 
Harrassing & Defensive 

*e**'£ 4. Casualties - 
















VwO U* 











24 February, 1945 - 5. Miscellaneous * 3/14 completed dis- 

placement at 0945.. 

6, Air observer from USS Wake Island 
fired a total of twelve (12) fire missions. 

Sound Ranging - located and adjusted 14th 
Marines upon seven (7) enemy gun and mortar positions 
during the period* 

7. Combat efficiency ~ 85$. 

25 February, 1945 - P/6. Weather, clear and cool. 

1. Infantry - R0T23 passed through RCT21 
prior to 0700. RCT21 to 3rd Marine Division. 

3, Artmery - 2/14 - D/S - RCT23. 
3/14 - D/3 - RCT24. 
1/14 - D/3 - RCT9. 
,4/13 - Reinforced 1/14 as of 0700. 
4/14 - G/S. 

Corps Artillery reinforced on call. 
The division continued the attack at 0930. 
Preparation from K-45 to K-hour. ^t K~hour barrage 
rolled forward until targets of opportunity were taken 
under fire. 

3, Typg ,0£ f.j-res fired from 1500, 84 
February to 25 February: 

Count erbattery 
Targets of Opportunity 
Harrassing & Defensive 







"4, Cas^aUres - 





ft. Miscellaneous - H&S Battery completely 

•1/14 - completely unloaded. 
2/14 - 95$ unloaded. 
3/14 - completely unloaded. 
4/14 - completely unloaded. 
Units -of ~ VMO-4. started coming ashore. 

*. i. * 



25 February, 1945 - 6. Air observer from USSW a ke island fired 

fourteen, (14) fire missions. 

7„ Comsat efficiency 85$. 

26 February, 1945 ~ i>/7. leather, cool - rain throughout day, 

visibility limited. 

1. "Infantry - RCT25 on right passed through 

HCT24 at 0600. 

2. Art i Uery - 2/14 - D/S - RCT23. 

1/14 « D/S - RCT25 as of 0700. 
3/14 - Heinforce'd fires of 1/14 as 

of 0700. 

4/14 - 0/S. 

Corps Artillery reinforcing on call. 
, The division continued the attack at 0800. 
14th Marines and NGF fired a coordinated preparation 
from K-hour. 

3. Type of fires fired from 1500, 25 
February to 1500, 26 February: 


Counterbattery 48 1780 > 

Targets of Opportunity * 38 2365 

Preparation 78 8125 

Harrassing & Defensive 301 1673 

Registration 2 100 

474 14,043 

. 4t. Cas.u^tles - 



* ' 12 1 

5 . -Hi s c e 1 1 ah e o u s' : < - Two (2) planes of VMO-4 
landed on Air Strip No. 1 at 1330. One (l) plane on 
station at 1430.* Four (4) pilots and five (5) observers 
are now available for land based operations. . 

: 6. Air observer fired thirteen (13) fire 
missions. " • 

Sound Ranging - four (4) targets located 
and fired- upon. " 

* F'i a sh hanging — one (l) target located and 

fired upon. 

» 7; --.Cp-moat efficiency 85#. 


27 February,. 1945 - 2/8. Weather, clear and cool. 

1. Infantry - No ' change . 

3, Artil le ry - 1/14 - D/S of RCT25. 
3/14 - Reinforced 1/14. - 
2/14 - D/S - RCT23. ■ 
4/14 - &/S. 

Corps Artillery reinforced on call. 
The division continued the attack at 0800. 
Preparation. fired from K-45 to -K-nour. 

• g." 'Types of f^re fired from 1500, 25 
February to 1500, 27 Februarys 

Co unter battery 
Targets of Opportunity 
Harrassing & Defensive 


4j t , Casualties. ~ 









158 . 

1105 • 










5. Air observers operating from USS wake 
Island and I wo.. Jima Airstrip No. 1, fired a total of 
twenty four (24) fire' missions . 

Sound Ranging - Four (4) targets located 

and fired upon. 

; '. . Flash Ranging - .One (l) target located 
and fired ur»on. . 

0, Cpmbat efficiency 80?. 

28 February t 1945- &/9. Weather, clear and cool. 

^ 1.; Infantry - No change. 

: ~ 2*. Artillery - 1/14 - D/S ~ RCT25. 
2/14 - D/S - RCT23. 

3/14 - Reinforced 1/14. 

• -4/14 - 0/3. 

' Corps' Artillery reinforced on call. 




28 February, 1945 - 2. (Cont'd) The division continued the 
attack at 0815. Preparation fired from K-45 to K-hour. 
Coordinated preparation with Corps Artillery, ft OF, and 
12th Marines. At 1300, five (5) minute preparation 
fired for RCT23. 

5. Type of fires fired from 1500, 27 

February to 1500, 28 February* 






'Targets of Opportunity 






Harrassing & Def ensile 











4. , Casualties - 


1 9 

5. Air observer from USS Wake Island and 
Two Jima Airstrip No.._l fired thirty five (35) missions. 

Sound Hanging - No targets reported 

during period. 

6. Combat efficiency 85^. 

1 March, 1945 - D/10. weather, fair - visibility good. 

1. Infantry - HCT23 in line, relief 
completed at 0630. 

2. Artillery - 1/14 - D/3 - RCT25. 

3/14 - D/S - RCT24. 

2/14 - Heinforced 3/14. 

4/14 ~ G/S. Reinforced 1/14 during 
preparation and on right. Harrassing and defensive f irei 

Corps Artillery - G/3 14th Marines. 
Corps Artillery was on call. Two (2) batteries attached 
in G/6. 

The division continued the attack at 0830. 
Preparation K-io to K/24 - fired at normal rate. J^/S 
battalion fired close in to lines as observation per- 
mitted. &/ s battalion fired medium range. Corps Artil- 
^ :e concentrations. 




1 March, 1945 - 3. Type of fires fired from 1500, 28 

February to 1500, 1 March. 







Targets of Opportunity 






Harrassing* & Defensive 








,4, T ; Casualties. - 



2 "e 

5. Air observer fired 33 fire missions 
operating from US3 wake Island and I wo Jima Airstrip No. 
1. Three (3) enemy large caliber guns spotted by air ' 
observer and knocked out by his adjustment of Corps 
Artillery Qpon them. 

Sound Ranging - Mo targets reported 
during the period. 

6V Combat efficiency 80/*. 

2 March, 1945 D/ll. --Weather, clear and cool. 

l f Infantry ~ No change. 

2. Artillery ~ 1/14 - D/S RCT25. 
: '3/14 - D/S - RCT24. • 
2/14 - Reinforced 3/14. 
4/14 - G-/S. 
■ " Corps Artillery reinforced on call. 
The division continued the attack at 0800. 
Coordinated preparation from K-30 to &-15 and K-10 to 
K—hour- by 'Corps' Artillery/ MxF, and 14th Marines. 

3/ Type of fires 'fired from 1500, 1 • 

March to 1500, 2 March; 


Counterbattery "'• 57 1515 

Targets of Opportunity • - 36 1746 

Preparation ' 16 1520 

Harrassing <3c. Defensive 193 952 

Registration - - - • - 4 - - - ■• v 47 • 

- • • - v- - : - • -•- • -306 • 5,880 


2 March, 1945 - 4. Casualties - 



5. Mr observer* fired a total of forty 
two (42) fire missions from US3 Wake Island and Ivc ^'ima 
Airstrip No. 1. Observers used 14th Marine battalions, 
and when target required heavy artillery, Corps artillery 
was fired. 

Sound hanging - Six (6> targets located 

and fired upon. 

6. Combat efficiency 80/*. 

3 March, 1945 - D/12. Weather, clear and cool. 

1. Infantry - RCT23 passed through RCT25 
on division right at 0600. 

2. Artillery - 2/14 - D/S - RCT23 after 
0630 - prior to 0630 reinforced 1/14. 

1/14 - D/S - RCT25 prior to 0630 - 
after 0630, reinforced 2/14. 

3/14 - D/S - RCT24. 
4/14 - G/3. 

Corps Artillery reinforced on call. 
3/12 - Reinforced 14th Marines from 

K-75 to K-25. 

Division continued the attack at 0745. 
Preparation - Corps Artillery, NGF, 3/12 and 14th Marines 
fired a coordinated preparation preparing to effect 
neutralization of known enemy mortar and artillery 
positions geginning at K-75 to K-30. 

3. Type of fires fired from 1500, 2 
March to 1500, 3 March: 


Counterbattery 26 745 

Targets of Opportunity 33 1060 

Preparation" 12 3340 

Harrassing & Defensive 150 1006 

Registration _J0 81 

231 6,232 

4. Casualties - 




3 March, 1945 - 5. Air observers from tISS.Wake Island and 

Iwo Jima Mr Strip No.- 1 fired a total of nineteen (19J 
fire missions. 

Sound and Flash hanging - No targets 
reported during period. 

6. Combat efficiency 80#. 

4 March, 1945 - D/i3. Weather, rain and cloudy. < 

1, IngWtry - No change. 

g . , AyXXXlevY - 2/14 - D/S - RCT23. 
1/14 - Reinforced 2/14. 
3/14 - D/b - RCT24. 
4/14 - G/S. ' 
Corps Artillery reinforced on call. 
The division continued the attack at 0730. 
Preparation - coordinated preparation by Corps Artillery, 
NGF, and 14th Marines from K-15 to K/15. 

3. Typ-e-of fires fired from 1500, 3 
March to 1500, 4 March: 

Count erbattery 
Targets of Opportunity 
Harrassing <& defensive 
Registration • ' 

















■ A4IS31NG- 



.. 3- ' .. .. 

'.. 5. Air observers hindered by low ceiling 
during afternoon - 21 fire missions conducted. 

Sound - and £ lash Ranging - One (l) target 
located by sound and fired upon. Flash Ranging cl6*sed 
due to poor visibility. - 

6 . Combat e f f i c ie nay. 8 0# . Efficiency 
impaired by lack*" df 'ammuni tion.. . 

5 March, 1945 - D/14-. leather, clear and cool. 

■ 1: Infantry -- RCT2.5 relieved RCT23 at 0600. 


5 March, 1945 

- g- Artillery - 1/14 - D/S - RCT25. 

2/14 - D/S - RCT23 Drior to 0600, 
after 0600 G/S. 

3/14 - D/S - RCT24. 
4/14 - G/3. 

Corps Artillery reinforced on call. 

14th Marines registered check points 
in Zone of Action of 5th Marine division. 

13th Marines registered check points 
in 2-one of action of 4th Marine Division. 

No attack in division ^one of Action. 

5. Types of fire fired from 1500, 4 
March to 1500, 5 March: 
Targets of Opportunity 
Harrassing & Defensive 


4. Casualties 




















5. A'ir observer from USS Wake Island and 
Iwo Jima Air Strip No. 1 fired seventeen (17) fire 

Sound Ranging - One (l) target located 

and fired uoon. 

6 March, 1945 
to 0600. 

6.. Combat efficiency QOfo. 
- D/15 - leather, clear and cool. 

1. Infantry - RCT23 relieved 3-24 prior 

2. Artillery - 1/14 - D/S - RCT25. 

2/14 - Reinforced 1/14 orior to 0600. 
After 0600 D/S RCT23. 

3/14 - D/S - ECT24. 
4/14 - G/3. 

Corps Artillery reinforced on call, 
'i'he division continued the attack at 0800. 
^Preparation - 2/14, 3/14, 4/14, fired oreparation for 
VACLF_f rom K-10 to K/21.- From K-10 to" K-21, 1/14 Cr/o 

~""e¥livision. From K/45 to K/Sl, 1/14, 2/14, 3/14 


1 11 yy TONitlg mfm y 

^ * v <jF^*2!&TH MARINE REGIMENT WAR DIARY (Cont'd). 


6 March. 1945 - 2. Artillery (Cont'd) - 4/14, and three 
(3) battalions from 3rd and 5th Marine Divisions and 
two (2) Corps Artillery battalions fired preparation 
in Zone of Action 4th Marine division. 

5. Type of fires fired from 1500, 5 
March to 1500, 6 March: 


Counterbattery 26 755 

Targets of Opportunity 39 1572 

Preparation .26 4280 

Harrassing & Defensive 377 1445 

Registration £ 57 

472 8,109 

, Casualties, - 



1 2 

5.' Mr observer fired twenty (2i fire 
Sound Ranging - No targets reported 

during period. 

5. Cqrobat, efficiency Q5%. 

7 March, 1945 - D/16 - Weather, cloudy with occasional 


1. Infantry - N change. 

g. Artill ery - 1/14 - d/s ~ HCI25. 
2/14 - D/S - RCT23. 
3/14 - D/S - RCT24. 
Corps Artillery reinforced on call. 
The division continued the attack at 
0730. 14th Marines neutralization fires from 0800 to 
0830 on all known- enemy mortar positions. Corps Artil- 
lery and 14th Marines fired coordinated, five (5) 
minute preparation for RCT23 at 1225 and RCT24 at 1240; 
each lasted five (5) minutes. 

3. Tvbe of fires fired from 1500, 6 
G'/ 7 March: 


Fourteenth marine regiment war diary (Cont'd) 


7 March, 1945 - 3. Type of Fires (Cont'd) 


Counterbattery 55 796 

Targets of Opportunity 17 547 

Preparation ' .40 2050 

Harrassing <& Defensive 40 856 

Registration Z 45 

159 4,294 

,4 T Casual. frAes, - 


mm f m l 


2 2 

5. Air observer fired sixteen (16) fire 
missions. Corps Artillery fired by air observor on 
concrete blockhouse. Three (3) direct hits with con- 
centrated penetrating fire. No apparent effect observed, 

Sound Ranging - Three (3) targets located; 
and fired upon by Corps Artillery. 

6. Combat efficiency 80%. 

8 March, 1945 - D/17. Weather, cool and clear. 

1. Infantry - No change. 

2. Artillery - 1/14 - D/3 - RCT25. 

2/14 - D/3 ~ RCT23. 
3/14 - D/3 - RCT'24. 
4/14 - G/3. 
The division continued the attack at 0830. 
Corps 4rtillery and 14th Marines fired coordinated 
preparation on known artillery and mortar positions 
from K-90 to K-60. 

- 3. Type of fires fired from 1500, 7 
March to 1500, 8 March: 


Counterbattery 45 716 

Target of Opportunity 23 710 

Preparation 14 - 4611 

Harrassing & Defensive 216 900 

Registration 5 , 57 

303 6,994 

4. Casualties - 




yiSfe*W"te^w ____ - - - - 

2i|&WTEENT| A M|K^ WaiWWT WAR DIARY (Cont'd) 

ftPAiW*** _ 

' ; ^ I Cont'd; ~' ~ ' ~ 

'*JB inarch, 1945 - 5. Miscellaneous -'Eighteen '(18) rounds 
of yellow smoke fired to identify tar-gets for support 
aircraft. ' ' 

6. Air observer fired a total of nine 

(9) missions. 

Sound Ranging - No targets reported 
during the period. 

9 March, 1945 

7. Combat efficiency 8C#. 
- D/18. leather, cool and clear. 
1. Infantry ~ No changes 

2. Artillery « 1/14 - D/3 ~ R0T25. 

2/14 - D/3 - r.CT25. 
3/14 - D/o - B.CT24. 
4/14 - G/ s . 

Corps Artillery reinforced on call. 
"The division continued the attack at 0700 
Coordinated Corps and 14th Marines preparation for 
£-hour to K/10." 

3. I'yDe of fires fired from 1500, 8 
March to 1500, 9 ^archi 

Targets of Opportunity 
Harrassing & Defensive 


4, Casual tie's - 

seventeen (17) fire missions. 

Sound Ranging 
and fired upon/ " 

"6^ Combat efficiency 85$. 


NO. iciobi 

!0'N3 NO. ROUND, 







* 230 





5,882 _ 





2 6 

1 fired a 

total of 

• 3ix (0) 

targets located 


10 March, 1945 - D/19.. Weather, clear and cool. 

1. Infantry RCT24 relieved by RCT25 and 
RCT23 prior to 0730. 

2. Artillery - 1/14 - D/3 - RCT25.* 

2/14 - D/S - RCT23. 
3/14 - -D/S - RCT24 prior to 0730, 
after 0730 reinforced 2/14. 

4/14 - 0/3. 

Corps Artillery reinforced on call. 
The Division continued the attack at 0800 
Fourteenth Marines reinforced by Corps Artillery and 
two (2) battalions of 12th Marines fired preparation 
from K-25 to K-15 and from K-10 to K-hour. Preparatory 
fires rolled forward in successive concentrations of 
100 yards at five (5) minute intervals from K-hour 
to K/15.. 

3. Type of fires fired from 1500, 9 
March to 1500, 10 March: 

Count erbattery 
Targets of Opportunity 
Harrassing & Defensive 
Registration ^ 






4. Casualties - 





11 March, 1945 

5. Air observers fired one (l) mission. 

6. Combat efficiency 85/£. 

- D/20. Weather, fair and cool. 

1. Infantry - RCT25 and RCT23 over ran 
enemy resistance in Zone of Action of the 4th Marine 
Division, except pocket in Zone of -Action RCT25. 

^ r . . . .. 2. Artillery - On corps order three 

/ jOSjmn battalions available to reinforce 13th marines. 

1/14 - D/S - 4th Marine Division 
■30. ^fter 1430 reinforced 13th Marines. 


RLGIwiiNT v*AR DIARY (Cont'd). 


11 March, 1945 




- 3. ; ArtUlery - (Cont'd) 

2/14 - Reinforced 13th Marines as of 

3/14 - Reinforced 13th Marines as of 

4/14 - Reinforced 13th Marines as of 

Preparation - 2/14, 3/14, 4/14 fired 
30 minute preparation from K-10 to K/20 in Zone of Action 
of 5th Marine' Division. 2504 rounds fired. N call 

5. Type of fires fired from 1500, 10 
March to 1500, 11 March: 

Count erbattery ' 
Targets of Opportunity 
Harrassing & Defensive 





4. Casualties - 





5. Air observer fired one (l) mission. 
Artillery air spot discontinued at 1145. 

Bound Ranging - No targets reported 

during period. 

12 March, 1945 

6. Combat efficiency 85#. 
- D/21. leather, fair and cool. 

1. Infantry - Continued mopping up. No 
artillery needed in Division Zone of action. 

2. Artillery - 14th Marines reinforced 
13th Marines on call., 3/14 fired harrassing fires in 
Zone of Action of 5th Marine Division from 1900 to 
•0630 and 0900 to 1000. 

14'th Marines fired preparation in Zone 
of ^c.t.ioajtf 5th Marine Division from 0903 to 0913. 



(G nt l d) 

12 March, 1945 - 3. Type of fires fired from 1500, II 

March to 1500, .12 March:. 


Preparation 4 . 1093 

Harrassing & Defensive ' BQ. 57 g , 

84 1,665 

4. Casualties - 



* ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 1 1 — — — 


5 P Combat efficiency 85%. 

13 March, 1945 - 3/22. Weather, clear and cool. 

1. No change, 

2. Artillery - Units of 14th Marines 
available to reinforce 13th Marines on call until 1130. 

1/14 - Closed station at 1130. 
2/14 - Closed station at 1100. 
3/14 - Closed station at 1000. 
4/14 - Closed station at 1130. 
No attack, no preparation. 

3. Type of fires fired from 1500, 12 
Mar to 1500 13 March: 


Harrassing & Defensive 118 652 

4. Casual t^e.s, - 



5. Miscellaneous - 3/14 and 2/14 fired 
harrassing fires in ^one of Action of 5th Marine Division, 

§, Comfrat efficiency 85> prior to 1000. 

•„ . . , :; '?.~ 'Billeting parties of H&S 14th Marines, 

3/14,, 4/14 and 4th Marine DUKW Company went aboard 
.APA 234, / ' ■ • 

„ 14-15' March, 1945' Continued loading of equipment and 

personnel; H&S Battery, 3/14, 4/14 and detachments from 
1/14 and 2/14, 4th Marine DUKTrf Company aboard APA 234 
(USS BOLLINGER). 1/14 aboard APA 172 ( US3 GRIMES). 
2/14 aboard APA 228 ( USS ROCKBRIDGE), 15 March, 1945. 
Ten (10) men from 4/14 aboard APA 133 (USS BEECH-aM ) , 



16 March, 1945 - All organized resistance on Iwo Jima 
• ceased. 

17-18 March, 1945 - anchored off Iwo Jima. 

20 March, 1945 - Bailed from Iwo Jima enroute Guam Island, 

Marianas Islands, Central Pacific. 

21 March, 1945 - Arrived Guam. 

23 March, 1945 - Sailed from Cxuam, enroute Eniwetok ^toll, 
Marshall Islands, Central Pacific. 

27 March, 1945 - arrived at Eniwetok. 

28 March, 1945 - Sailed from kniwetok, enroute Hawaiian 


4 April, 1945 - 2/14 arrived Maui. H&S, 1/14, 3/14, 4/14 

arrived Pearl Harbor. H&S, 1-14, 3/14, 4/14 sailed from 
Pearl Harbor enroute to Maui. 

5 April, 1945 - H&S, 1/14, 3/14, 4/14 arrived Maui. 

^Vttj4ti/0^ _^ 

L. Gr. DitL HA v&ii . 


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